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Introduction 
 
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union and with it of socialism and its model of a centrally 
planned economy around 1989, the model of neo-liberal free market economy was left without 
competition and went about completing its global victory. Global free trade, so the neo-liberal credo, 
would lead to development and eventually to increased standards of living for all. The corresponding 
economic and political norms deeply influenced international conventions and international 
economic institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank and came to 
shape their agenda and the means to its realization. This and the massive technological developments 
of the last decades paved the way for a globalization of trade on a formerly unthinkable scale. The 
whole world became potential markets and production areas. 
The main actors of this economic globalization were large multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
that made use of the new possibilities to increase their profits by shifting production  to  developing  
countries  with  lower  labor  costs,  t o  expand  their markets, and t o  take over more and more  
smaller firms. After a few decades of operating with their new global supply chains and markets, 
the biggest MNEs’ turnover nowadays is higher than the BPI of entire states (Young / Welford 2002).  
As predicted by economic theory, many profited from these developments, among them 
the MNEs and the consumers in the industrialized states who were able to further increase their living 
standard, but also many inhabitants of developing countries where the average living standard and 
life expectancy increased over time.1 However, despite the promises of economic theory, a vast part 
of the world’s population continues to live in desperate poverty. Critical voices soon grew louder 
claiming that the WTO’s and the World Bank’s policy of forcing developing countries to open their 
markets – allegedly for their own good – were actually detrimental for them, harming the world’s 
poorest even further instead of bettering their lot. The industrialized states were accused of using 
just the kind of protectionist measures which they prohibited to developing countries to protect 
their own interests. Besides, the outsourcing of production to low-wage countries often went along 
with bad working conditions and high risk at the bottom of the supply chains, as well as with 
ecological and social degradation (Nicholls/Opal 2005, 56). MNEs were blamed for exploiting  workers  
in  their  global  supply  chains  since  working  conditions  in developing countries are  often 
appallingly bad, human right abuses are widespread, wages often insufficient for subsistence, and 
the safety and health of workers are often put in jeopardy. While industrialized countries had found 
legal and social policy means to regulate their domestic markets and soften the effects for the losers of 
the free market economy, economic globalization is not accompanied by effective global governance 
thereof, and there are no institutions that soften the effects for the losers of the globalized free 
market.  
But the outsourcing of production to low-wage countries affected workers in industrialized 
                                                             
1 Cf. https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm#chart1b. 
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countries as well since, as a consequence, many of them lost their jobs, which in turn led to 
widespread criticism, among others from worker unions.  
 On the background of the above issues, global trade is attacked from various sides and in 
many different ways as being unfair. Public concern with these and related issues regarding the 
perceived unfairness of global trade sparked a number of debates and developments. On the level 
of the world trading system, especially after the WTO-summit and the respective civil unrest in 
Seattle of 1999, the institutional workings of the WTO were criticized as unfair on the grounds of 
favoring the interests of industrialized countries over those of developing countries, and demands 
were voiced regarding institutional reform (e.g. Oxfam 2000). On the level of trade policies of states, 
debates about the justification of government subsidies raised fairness issues. On the level of MNEs 
and their global supply chains, criticism of exploitation and unfair trade led activists to starting the 
Alternative Trade movement, which set about establishing a parallel trade system focused on better 
conditions and returns for workers and producers in developing countries. Out of this developed the 
Fair Trade movement, a growing activist and consumer movement whose main actors are local and 
international organizations that import goods produced according to the criteria of the Fair Trade 
movement, and organizations which monitor the fulfillment of these criteria and certify the according 
products with a Fair Trade label.2 At the same time, the growing pressure on MNEs to assume more 
responsibility for their global supply chains sparked corresponding debates within the fields of 
business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR) and led MNEs to adopt CSR policies.3 Lately, 
debates and demands regarding “living wages” have become more and more important in NGO and 
public discourse, and corresponding initiatives have been gaining momentum.4 Last but not least, 
questions regarding the moral duties of the consumers themselves, who have tremendous collective 
power seeing as the end point of global supply chains, have given rise to the field of consumer 
ethics with its questions regarding the responsibility and duties of the individual consumer (c.f. e.g. 
Harrison et al. 2005; Schwartz 2010).  
  In all these areas questions related to fair trade are being discussed. With regard to what 
exactly is unfair with respect to current global trade, we find many different answers, among them the 
                                                             
2 We will engage with the Fair Trade movement’s understanding of fair trade in Part II. A short introduction into 
the movement’s structure and history can be found in Appendix I. 
3 This concern an additional important topic that lies outside of the scope of this thesis: the problem that, 
notoriously, contrary to working national jurisdictions, in the international realm of global trade there is no 
accountability and security of a functioning rule of law. Crimes committed in the context of global trade go 
mostly unpunished. The well-known reason for this is that while trade is globalized, jurisdiction is still mainly 
national. The resulting gap in the law’s ability to deal with international wrongdoing by corporations is known 
under the heading of “governance gaps” (e.g. Ruggie 2008). “These governance gaps provide the permissive 
environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation.” (ibid.) For 
more on the topic see Baughen (2014) who offers an extensive analysis of the current legal situation and explores 
possible solutions in depth 
4 E.g. the Living Wage Foundation, the Asia Floor Wage Campaign, the Fair Wear Foundation etc. 
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following5: the background conditions of global trade are very unequal; the current global trade 
system is not sustainable; there are unfair power inequalities between industrialized and developing 
states in the WTO; the real global market is far from the ideal market of economic theory; government 
subventions and taxes lead to an un-level playing field; outsourcing production is unfair to domestic 
workers; product prices don’t include ecological and social costs; workers and MNEs have highly 
unequal bargaining power; people from developing countries often have no free choice as to 
accepting work contracts; profits of trade are distributed unequally; MNEs exploit workers; the rich 
profit from the bad situation of the poor; there is no accountability and responsibility in the global 
economy; the free market system neglects human values; etc. As a matter of fact, it seems we cannot 
go through these lists and discard some issues out of hand as definitely off topic – they all somehow 
seem to have a point. This variety of answers impressively illustrates how multifaceted the concepts 
of unfair and fair global trade are. How exactly the points are related to the concepts of fair and 
unfair global trade is a fascinating question.  
When we look at the existing literature from different fields that use the term “fair trade”, we 
get a similar picture of highly diverse and contradicting views. Often the respective understanding of 
“fair trade” is merely implicit, that is, it is not elaborated what exactly the concept is supposed to 
mean and what normative grounds it is thought to rest on. If there is an explicit explanation of the 
understanding of “fair trade” it is usually the description by FINE which is cited. 6 This “definition”, 
which is widely recognized in the organized social Fair Trade movement, reads: 
 
„Fair trade is a trade partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, 
which seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable 
development by offering better trade conditions to, and securing the rights of, 
marginalized producers and workers - especially in the South. Fair trade 
organizations (backed by consumers) are engaged actively in supporting producers, 
awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of 
conventional international trade.“ 7 
 
The passage offers an informative description of the values and normative goals of the movement – it 
does not, however, supply a proper definition of the term „fair trade“, and without further 
elaboration it accordingly doesn’t contribute much to understanding the concept and its normative 
grounds. 
The lack of conceptual clarity complicates the debates on the topic and often leads them to 
missing the actual point of disagreement. The tendency for misunderstandings is further enhanced by 
                                                             
5 The following is a collection of answers from students in my workshops on “fair trade”.  
6 FINE is an informal association of the four major organizations of the Fair Trade movement (FLO, IFAT, NEWS! and 
EFTA, its name being composed of the first letters of the four organizations). For more on these organizations see 
Appendix I. 
7 www.befair.be/site/download.cfm?SAVE=1314&LG=1. 
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the fact that professionals from a wide variety of fields and with very different perspectives and 
theoretical backgrounds engage in it: practitioners and activists, politicians, economists, political and 
moral philosophers etc. 
Seeing the conceptual confusion, it is surprising that there is but a hand full of short publications 
which offer an overview over different positions on fair trade and examine their conceptual and 
normative bases. 8 While they offer valuable inputs in this respect, they leave much to be explored, if 
only for reasons of scope.  
 
Research objectives and structure of the argument 
 
The first intention of my thesis is therefore to fill that gap by providing an overview over the debates 
on fair trade and bring some much needed clarity into their complex normative foundations. The 
second aim is to elaborate the basics of an original argument with regard to what fair trade amounts 
to. The respective line of argument is interwoven with the discussion of the relevant concepts and 
theories in Part I and the discussion in chapter 7. The focus of this normative project is the question 
what exactly (if anything) is unfair about MNEs’ trading practices within their supply chains, and what 
fair trade conversely would demand. In particular, I want to examine if and how it is justifiable that 
living wages are ethically required in the supply chains of MNEs.  
Let us look a bit more closely on the topic of this thesis. 
The term “fair trade” consists of two components, namely “fair” and “trade”. Whereas “trade” 
is a rather straightforward descriptive term, “fair” is a deeply normative term. “Fair” and its 
counterpart “unfair” are so-called thick ethical concepts, that is, the normative judgement is inherent 
in the terms themselves: if something is fair this implies that it is morally desirable, whereas if 
something is unfair this implies that it is morally undesirable.  
So, while it is quickly explained what is meant by “trade”, the crux regarding “fair trade” lies in 
explaining what is meant by “fairness” – particularly in the context of trade. In other words, we want 
to figure out what conditions must be met for trade to qualify as fair.  
Existing positions on fair trade in the literature and in public discourse make certain claims 
regarding this question. These claims rely on a certain understanding of the concept of fairness – 
what I call their conceptual grounds – and on certain related (explicit or implicit) normative 
arguments, premises and background theories – what I call their normative foundations. To enhance 
the conceptual clarity and precision of debates on “fair trade” and deepen our understanding of their 
normative foundations, we first need to gain an in-depth understanding of the normative concepts 
involved. In the first part of the thesis we will therefore examine the central normative concepts 
                                                             
8 Most notably Miller 2010; James 2009; Risse 2007; Risse/Kurjanska 2008; Anderson/Riedel 2006; Boda 2001; 
Suranovic 2000. 
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underlying the debates on fair trade and situate them within the relevant theoretical context. Our 
analysis will start out with a broad understanding of “(un)fairness” and “(un)fair trade”, because 
people are referring to a wide variety of morally problematic issues in the realm of global trade 
when employing the notion of “unfair trade”. The term “unfair” in this context is often used in a 
very broad, unspecific way. Similarly, both in public and academic discourse the terms “fair 
trade”/”unfair trade”, “just trade”/”unjust trade”, and “ethical trade”/”unethical trade” are often 
used more or less interchangeably, without clear delineation between them (see e.g. Maseland/De 
Vaal 2002; Suranovic 2000). 9 Seeing that there is a close relation between them, it is not 
surprising that the concepts of justice and general morality play an important role in debates under 
the heading of “fair” trade, the most widely used term of the three. Accordingly, if we want to capture 
the crucial moral issues in the debates on fair trade it is important not to restrict our understanding 
of the term “fair trade” to one specific concept at the outset, but rather to start out with a 
sufficiently broad understanding of the notion that leaves room for several interpretations – including 
some that, in the process of our analysis, may turn out to be more aptly understood as issues of just 
trade or ethical trade.  For these reasons I will not only look at the concept of fairness and its 
relevance for global trade, but also at the concept of justice and some concepts and issues from 
general ethics (like claims, duties, and responsibility) that are important for questions of fair trade. 
At this point, another preliminary remark is called for. While our research interest concerns the 
question what fair trade amounts to, we are in practice much more often confronted with claims about 
trade being unfair in a certain way than with claims about trade being fair for certain reasons.10 In a 
similar vein, surveys show that most people have strong moral intuitions when it comes to assessing 
specific situations as unfair, and they often agree in their assessment (cf. Finkel 2001). However, 
the precise content of the positive concept of fairness is much more difficult to grasp – both for the 
people in the surveys and for philosophers (cf. Finkel 2001, Carr 2000). 
In light of this, we need to clarify how the relation between unfair and fair will be understood in 
the following. I will take it that something is fair (enough) if and only if it is not unfair; in other words, 
I will understand fairness as the absence of unfairness. This, or so I think, is also how the relation is 
usually implicitly conceived. On this background, I assume that fair trade can plausibly be understood 
as not-unfair trade, and I will make use of this assumption in approaching the concept of fair trade. 
Let us now return to the research objectives and structure of the thesis. After having 
                                                             
9 In the context of the social Fairtrade movement there exists a technical distinction between “fair trade” and 
“ethical trade” which defines “fair trade” as “focused on terms of trade with small scale producers”, while “ethical 
trade” is understood as being concerned with “working conditions in mainstream production” (Barrientos/ Smith 
2005, 190). However, these definitions are useful only from a practical-descriptive perspective and will not 
concern us further. 
10 This is per se not a reason for thinking that (current global) trade is probably indeed unfair (unjust/unethical), but 
is rather due to a specific trait of moral concepts in general and the fairness concept in particular: People usually cry 
out indignantly “this is unfair!” whereas we hardly ever hear anybody shout “this is fair!” Presumably then, we take 
it to be the default case that things go right, and as long as everything goes morally “smoothly” there is no need to 
shout (or talk) about it. 
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explored the central normative concepts and their theoretical framework in Part I, in Part II we turn to 
the analysis of the normative foundations of the most common positions on fair trade as found in the 
literature and in public discourse. The positions I will discuss are the following:  
 
a) Fair trade is trade the rules of which are determined in a fair way (in criticisms of the WTO 
negotiations, e.g. Steinberg 2002; Goff 2011) 
b) Fair trade is free trade (economic theory, e.g. Krugman/Obstfeld 2003, and classical moral defenses of 
the free market, e.g. Smith 1776, Hayek 1944, Buchanan 1975, Nozick 1974, Friedman 1980) 
c) Fair trade is trade that serves the worst off (e.g. Fair Trade Movement, Stiglitz/Charlton 2005) 
d) Fair trade is trade the terms of which ensure reciprocity and impartiality (e.g. GATT/WTO 
principles) 
e) Fair trade is trade on a level playing field and requires a harmonization of standards (e.g. Zervas 
2008, Bhagwati and Hudec 1996)  
 
f) Fair trade is trade the burdens and benefits of which are distributed fairly (e.g. James 2012) 
 
g) Fair trade is trade that balances the stringent claims of citizens and foreigners proportionally (e.g. 
Risse 2007, Risse / Kurjanska 2008) 
 
h) Fair trade is trade that duly considers or equalizes the interests of workers in the supply chains 
(e.g. Stakeholder approach, Fair Trade movement, Bhagwati 1996, Koslowski 1996) 
 
i) Fair trade is trade that distributes the burdens and benefits proportionally throughout the supply 
chains (e.g. Klein 2010, Starmanns 2010) 
 
j) Fair trade is trade that is not involved in exploitation (e.g. Fair Trade movement) 11 
 
For analytical purposes, these positions will be classified according to four dimensions. The first 
dimension concerns the levels of analysis to which positions on fair trade can roughly be assigned: 
positions that concern the fairness of the world trading system (level 1), positions that concern the 
fairness of the trade policy of states (level 2), and positions that concern the fairness of trading 
within the supply chains of MNEs (level 3).12 Corresponding to this distinction, Part II is divided in 
three chapters, each of which is concerned with one of the three levels of analysis. For reasons 
specified below, the main focus of this thesis is on level 3, both in terms of scope and depth of 
analysis.  
With regard to each of the positions, I will secondly clarify how “trade” is understood and 
what “object” the fairness claim is accordingly referring to: the (global) trading system, trade 
                                                             
11 This list of positions on “fair trade” is not thought to be complete or exhaustive. I believe, however, that these 
are the most prevalent positions on “fair trade” found in the debates. 
12 The level of consumer ethics, which could be conceptualized on a fourth level as asking what fairness 
demands of consumers, will not be included in the current analysis for reasons of scope.  
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policy, or economic exchanges. 
Third, I will classify positions with regard to the focus of their normative assessment: either on 
the background dimension, the procedural dimension, or on the outcome dimension of trade. Finally, I 
will classify positions with regard to their normative grounds as either positions on ethical trade, just 
trade, or fair trade. These distinctions will be established in detail in Part I. 13 
On top of these classifications, the discussion of each position will be based on the following 
main questions:  a) How can the position be reconstructed in terms of the necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions it specifies for trade to qualify as fair? b) Who is the subject of the claim’s presumed moral 
duties to ensure fair trade, and what do those duties presumably ask of him? c) What conceptual and 
normative foundations is the claim based on? And d) How plausible is the claim?  
Let me now turn to the second, more specific research objective of the thesis. It consists in 
determining what exactly (if anything) is unfair about MNEs’ trading practices within their supply 
chains, and what fair trade conversely would demand of them – particularly, I want to examine if and 
how living wages are a demand of fair trade. The according in-depth discussion in chapter 6 
constitutes the normative heart piece of the thesis.  
There are several reasons for this focus: First, the level of the supply chains of MNEs is where 
the Fair Trade movement as the most prominent social context for claims of fair trade is situated 
(as a counter-system to the one of mainstream trade through MNEs). Presumably due to this, it is 
the context most present in public debates on fair trade. Second, it is the level which has received the 
least attention in the literature so far. There is of course literature on business ethics in general and 
on the responsibility of companies with regard to human rights in particular14, but  there is, to my 
knowledge, no philosophical examination of the explicit question what demands fair trade makes 
of MNEs, and on the question if living wages can be justified as a demand of fair trade.  
The focus on the supply chains of MNEs might surprise political philosophers, who would 
generally locate the relevant fairness questions exclusively on the institutional (political) level. So, 
why do I consider the level of the supply chains of MNEs to be relevant in its own right for questions 
of fair trade? 
There are two reasons for this: First, there might be genuine questions of fairness on the level 
of trade practices of companies that are not reducible to questions on the political level. As we will 
see shortly, the concept of fairness is relevant for a vast array of contexts that have nothing to do 
with political or legal institutions, and it is not clear prima facie why this should not also apply to the 
context of trade within the supply chains of MNEs. Therefore, it cannot simply be assumed that 
there are no fairness questions on that level. If someone wanted to argue for that claim, he would 
have to analyze potential fairness issues on the level of  MNEs  supply  chains  in  their  own  right  
and  then  consider  if  they  can  actually  be “dissolved” into fairness considerations on an 
                                                             
13 For a summary on how I conceive the respective concepts see the conclusions at the end of Part I. 
14 Especially Ruggie 2011 and 2013. 
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institutional level. 
Second, whatever the relevance of fairness issues on the level of MNEs’ trade practices in an 
ideally just world would be, the question of the fairness of trade practices of transnational companies 
is highly relevant under current non-ideal conditions. Theories of justice usually aim at providing the 
principles for the institutions of an ideally just society and a just world. This is important because it 
tells us what institutions we should be aiming at establishing. However, we nevertheless need 
principles for the current, non-ideal situation too. In the words of Rawls, these problems “are the 
pressing and urgent matters (…) that we are faced with in everyday life” (Rawls 1971, 8).  In the 
current situation then, where global institutions guaranteeing global justice or global fair trade are 
largely absent (as might be claimed), the question of duties of fair trade of MNEs is relevant in its own 
right.  
Let me now outline the course of my own normative argument with regard to the question 
what fair trade amounts to. Regarding trade among trading actors, in Part I show why approaching fair 
trade through the concept of just exchange outcomes does not get us as far as we might think (3.8). I 
also show why the claim that fair trade requires the outcome related fair distribution of burdens and 
benefits throughout the supply chain (7.3) depends on them qualifying as contexts of genuine 
cooperation (4.7), which, as I will argue, is bound to fail.  
Instead of focusing on the outcomes, I argue that we must focus on the procedural fairness of 
trade. After investigating different propositions for explications of “fairness” (4) I suggest 
understanding fairness as requiring no disadvantaging others and no taking advantage of existing 
disadvantages, thereby allowing for relevant aspects of the background dimension into the procedural 
demands of fairness.  
Further, I argue that fairness duties should be understood as a particular kind of duties of 
special relations with their requirements depending on the context or social practice at hand (4.9). 
With regard to fairness in direct interactions I argue that the procedural voluntariness 
requirement is of central relevance, which has consequences for our assessment of trade in the supply 
chains of MNEs, where it is linked to the concept of exploitation (7.4). With regard to the latter, I 
argue that, based on the proposed understanding of fairness, the voluntariness requirement has to be 
understood in a more demanding way, which, as we will see in chapter 7.4, surprisingly brings us back 
full circle to the outcome dimension of transactions in the sense of particular normative requirements 
they need to fulfill. As to the question if and in what sense MNEs are responsible for exploitation and 
other wrongs in their supply chains, I set the stage in Part I by examining the relevant aspects of 
responsibility in general and David Miller’s connection theory of responsibility (2007) in particular(3.4), 
which I consider very helpful for our context. In Part II I will apply this theory to the question at hand 
and argue that it gives us weighty reasons to ascribe responsibility to MNEs for wrongs in their supply 
chains under certain circumstances.  
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As to fair trade with regard to the global trading system and the trade policy of states, it is 
mainly fairness or justice regarding the background conditions of trade that is required. In Part I I 
prepare the ground by showing how assessments of the normative demands on those background 
conditions depend on the question if we understand the world as a whole as a context of justice or not 
(3.7). During the examination of existing positions of fair trade on these levels in Part II, I relate them 
to my understanding of fairness and assess them accordingly. Finally I sum up the conclusions of my 
analysis. 
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Part I: Conceptual and Normative Foundations: Trade, Justice, Fairness, and General Ethics  
 
1. Trade 
 
Let us start with a definition of “trade” and related descriptive concepts: trade, or commerce, consists in 
the exchange of goods or services for money, goods or services between two or more entities, involving 
the transfer of ownership of the traded goods or services. In the primary sense of the term, trade thus 
refers to economic exchanges, the trading entities being individuals or companies. A network that allows 
trade is called a “market”.  
Trade takes place in the context of the institutional and legal background conditions that 
structure and regulate the market. A “free market”, as opposed to a “regulated market”, is a market in 
which prices are determined by supply and demand without government intervention.15 “Free trade” is 
trade that takes place within a free market. An economy that is based on a free market is called a “free 
market economy”. With regard to domestic markets, it is the state that sets the institutional and legal 
background conditions of trade.  
In a secondary sense, “trade” refers to trade between states. Here, trade takes place between 
trading entities from different countries, its background conditions being set by trade policies of and 
trade agreements between the respective states. These background conditions of trade are often 
referred to as “the trading system”. Note that this is sometimes also shortened to “trade” (cf. positions 
discussed in Part II). “Bilateral trade” designates trade between two entities (usually states) whereas 
“multilateral trade” designates trade between more than two trading entities. “Global trade” designates 
trade across countries and continents within complex networks of globally dispersed supply chains. With 
regard to global multilateral trade, it is above all the World Trade Organization (WTO) that sets the 
respective background conditions for trade.  
Trade enables and is fostered by the specialization and division of labor. The latter operates by 
dividing work into narrow tasks that people can specialize in, whereas trade enables them to exchange 
the products of their specialized labor for money and thus everything else they need. Division of labor has  
been  the  source  of  material progress  for  many  centuries, and  especially  since  the industrial 
revolution. The respective specialization has two main benefits: First, it leads to professionals being very 
good at what they do – much better than anybody who does that task alongside hundreds of others. 
Second, it results in cheaper products, resulting from more efficient production through so called 
“economies of scale”. Economies of scale are the savings that result from having a particular task done 
by fewer groups in fewer places. In this way, transportation, machinery, and labor costs are drastically 
reduced.  For  example, rather than transporting the raw materials for knives to 10’000 households, 
and having knives being produced in 10’000 home forges by 10’000 amateur smiths, it is much more 
                                                             
15 This is of course a very sketchy definition. For a more detailed account of the free market, see chapter 5.2.1.3. 
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efficient to transport the raw materials to one village forge or, nowadays, one factory (thereby saving 
transportation  costs),  and  having  it  produced  by  a  few  industrial  machines (thereby saving the 
costs of building 10’000 home forges) by a few specialized professionals (thereby saving the huge 
amounts of time and effort of 10’000 people making knives). 
The benefits of the division of labor become bigger the larger the group of people that trade 
their goods and services becomes – i.e. the larger the market gets. This is because the larger the market 
gets, the greater the degree of specialization that is possible, and the more specialization there is, the 
more benefits from it are generated. Accordingly products become cheaper and better as market size 
increases (all else being equal), and with cheaper products being available to more people, the 
economic standard of living rises. This effect holds in principle true across country boundaries too if 
trade is not restricted.  
 The efficiency-benefit just presented is one of many arguments that are brought forth in favor 
of free trade within a free market. We will investigate these arguments in detail in Part II, section 5.2 
as we analyze the normative foundations of the claim “free trade is fair trade”.  For now, all we need is 
the definition of trade supplied above to be able to make sense of the “trade”-element in the term 
“fair trade”. In the following we will turn to the second element of the term “fair trade”, namely the 
properly normative “fair”.  
 
2. Differing General Concepts of Fairness 
 
When  making  a  judgement  about  the  fairness  or  unfairness  of  trade, we do so according to a 
certain underlying understanding of “fairness”. This understanding of “fairness” is in many cases 
intuitive, and in some cases based on explicit reasoning. However, in order to understand the various 
positions concerning fair trade, it is crucial to look closely into the multi-faceted concept of fairness. 
The terms “fairness” and “fair” are used with a confusing range of different meanings in 
English. I suggest we don’t easily dismiss some uses of fairness as non-genuine, either in general or 
in the context of global trade. Rather we should proceed carefully in examining the concepts of 
fairness that are used in ordinary language, and in doing so assess their conceptual and normative 
adequacy. 
In a first generic sense “unfair” is used to express that the speaker is unhappy with something 
that affects him negatively (Carr 2000, 7f). Someone could for example exclaim “that’s unfair!” if it 
is raining on his wedding day, or when his train leaves just when he reaches the platform. Used in 
this sense, “fair” doesn’t have a specific moral meaning but simply expresses the speaker’s subjective 
displeasure. 
In a second moral sense “unfair” is used in more objective ways, denoting the presence of 
moral flaws concerning the matter in question (ibid., 9). More specifically, two concepts of moral 
unfairness are of relevance for our topic: 
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In a first, unspecific moral sense, „unfair“ is used with regard to actions or situations that 
display general moral flaws. Someone could for example admonish a child who just hit another child 
“stop it, that’s not fair”! In this sense, “not fair” or “unfair” means simply “morally wrong” and “fair” 
means “morally right”. We will call this the general moral concept of fairness.  General  moral  
questions  with  regard  to  global  trade  are  certainly  of  high importance and make a relevant 
appearance in the existing discussions on the topic of fair trade. We will therefore encounter the 
general moral fairness concept in this thesis as well. 
In a second, more specific moral sense, “unfair” is used with regard to actions or situations 
that display specific kinds of moral flaws. For example, a child might claim that it is unfair that he got 
a smaller piece than everybody else in the distribution of a birthday cake, or someone might claim 
that a soccer game was unfair because the referee was partial, or it might be claimed that it is unfair 
if people from low income groups have less chances for getting higher education, etc.  “Unfair” in 
this sense means something close to „unjust“ or „inadequate”. We will call this the specific moral 
concept of fairness.  
When speaking of fairness and fair (with or without italics) in this thesis, it is this specific 
moral fairness concept I refer to. When I use “fairness” and “fair” in quotation marks, it is the term I 
refer to.  
Although we intuitively seem to grasp the concept, when trying to pin down the specific 
kind of moral flaw that constitute specific moral unfairness it becomes clear that this is not easy. As 
an illustration, consider that in the above examples unfairness could be explicated in very different 
ways: in the first case as unequal distribution, in the second as partiality, in the third as inequality of 
opportunity. Even at second glance, none of these uses and explications seems implausible. This 
suggests that the concept of specific moral fairness is multifaceted: we seem to be using different 
“fairness principles” with regard to different kinds of situations, or with regard to different 
perspectives on situations. It is also possible that one and the same fairness explication plays out 
differently in different contexts. In chapter 4 we will examine different explication of specific moral 
fairness and consider the question just mentioned. 
Now, even if we restricted the topic of this thesis to “fair trade” in the specific moral sense  of  
fairness, the  concept  of  justice  would  still  play  a  very important  role  for  our analysis. This is 
so for the following reasons: 1) the concept of specific moral fairness is closely related to the 
concept of justice, 2) the concept of justice is of high relevance in debates on fair trade, and 3) the 
concept of justice has been explored in much more detail by philosophers than the concept of 
fairness. In short, for understanding positions on what fair trade amounts to we need to gain an 
understanding of the concepts and theories of justice and their relation to our topic as well. 
Let us start with the relation between the concept of justice and the concept of fairness.  
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2.1 The Relation between Specific Moral Fairness and Justice 
 
In philosophical as well as in public debates there are several ways to understand the relation 
between specific moral fairness and justice. A first position holds that there is no clear distinction 
between them at all. Fairness accordingly is understood as meaning more or less the same as justice. 
Indeed, both in everyday language and in philosophical texts, “justice” and “fairness” are often used 
interchangeably – and so they are with regard to the topic of fair trade. This presumed overlapping of 
the concept of fairness with the related concept of justice might explain the striking lack of theories of 
fairness mentioned in the introduction. Indeed there are almost no thorough analyses of the concept 
of fairness in the classical philosophical literature, whereas the concept of justice (and, besides, the 
concept of equality) has frequently been at the center of such analysis, often building the core of 
encompassing ethical or political theories. 
When justice is understood in the traditional sense of “giving each person what they 
deserve” (see 3.1), we could say then that unfairness consists in the flaw of people not receiving their 
just deserts. 
However, there are also positions that distinguish conceptually between fairness and justice. 
While there are a number of possibilities, I will present the two which seem most plausible to me. 
A first position understands justice as being concerned with outcomes, mainly in terms of 
distributions, whereas fairness is concerned with processes. 16  A position along these lines seems 
for example to be taken by Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971), where he proposes to identify a 
just basic structure of society by means of a fair process for determining its traits (see 3.7.1). 
To illustrate the difference between fairness understood as process-focused and justice 
understood as outcome-focused and its intuitive plausibility we can look at the following example 
from Carr (2000): Suppose S receives a sentence for a crime she has not committed. Carr suggests 
that we would then consider her being punished unjustly, since she doesn’t deserve the 
punishment. But if S’s conviction followed a trial which qualifies as fair (because proper procedures 
were followed), and if “she is sentenced to a punishment commensurate with the nature of the 
crime she is mistakenly said to have committed” we assumedly wouldn’t consider her punishment 
unfair (Carr 2000, 44). Rather we would say that justice has not been done “even though the trial 
was fair” (ibid.). Imagine on the other hand a case where S is sentenced to a punishment which is far 
too severe for the crime she allegedly committed, perhaps because the judge happened to dislike 
her. Now we would complain that the sentencing is unfair because the process was flawed. Carr 
concludes from this that „Fairness (…) looks to the integrity of process and not to desert” (Carr 2000, 
45). 
In  theory,  this  differentiation  would  seem  analytically  helpful  to  me.  But it is 
complicated by the fact that “fairness” is also widely used with regard to outcomes and background 
                                                             
16 For the distinction between the background, procedural and outcome dimension see 3.5. 
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structures, both in general and in debates on fair trade. It is for example claimed that it is unfair that 
developing countries don’t profit enough from global trade (outcome), or that it is unfair that they 
don’t have the chance to participate in global trade on equal terms with developed countries 
(background conditions).  
There is a second way to distinguish between justice and fairness that may be able to account 
for this fact. In this perspective, justice is understood as a trait of institutions that govern whole 
societies (or cooperative contexts) and distribute rights and resources among their members. 17 This 
institutional understanding of justice is nowadays the mainstream view among political philosophers 
(Murphy 1998; cf. Barry 1995; 214, Bleisch 2010, 63). In this sense, the predominant realm of 
application of justice is understood as being the state. 18 
When justice is understood in this way, general ethics is understood as being concerned with 
individual actions (Bleisch 2010, 64; Pogge 1989, 17). Fairness on the other hand can be understood 
as being concerned with particular social practices and interactions, such as playing games, queuing, 
bargaining, etc., and their background conditions, processes and distributive outcomes. In this sense, 
we would say about institutions that they are just or unjust, whereas we would say about particular 
practices and interactions among individuals within those practices that they are fair or unfair. 
Understood in this sense, fairness gains more importance where institutions are weak or absent. 
Global trade might be a case in point, which might explain the prevalence of the notion of fairness 
in this area. 
In the conclusions of Part I, I will explain how I will be using the terms “just”, “fair”, and 
“ethical” trade with regard to the classification of positions on fair trade in Part II. For now though we 
will simply keep those different possibilities in mind while I keep using the terms in an unspecific 
way. Since in the next chapters we are moving in the realm of general and sometimes very old ethical 
principles, a specific use for now would not make sense. 
Now, let us turn to those principles that justice and fairness clearly have in common, and 
some of which they also share with general ethics. In order to understand the moral grounds of 
questions and positions about fair trade, we need to gain an understanding of these basic principles. 
To this aim, in a next step we will examine the traditional concept of justice, its different aspects and 
their relevance for the topic of fair trade. In the course of this we also need to clarify the relation 
and relevance of issues of general morality for the broad topic of fair trade. 
  
                                                             
17 In this sense, Rawls (1971) called justice the first virtue of social institutions. 
18 This position and versions of it that consider the world as a whole as a context of justice are presented in 
chapter 3.6. 
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3. Justice, General Ethics, and Fairness 
 
3.1 Justice, Reciprocity, and Proportionality 
 
Traditionally, justice in a broad, moral sense is understood to be about moral equilibrium. The moral 
equilibrium is intact if people get what they deserve and is broken when they don’t. In this sense, 
justice is traditionally understood as being concerned with “giving to each what they deserve”, 
“what they are owed”, or “to each his own” (suum cuique tribuere). In this understanding, justice 
applies to individuals and institutions alike. Sometimes this basic understanding of justice is thought to 
apply to “fairness” as well, as expressed by Koslowski in the following statement: “According to the 
natural right tradition from the Roman Corpus Iuris  up  to  Thomas  Aquinas,  fairness  is  the  
permanent attitude, supported  by  will  and directed by prudence, to give each his own, especially 
his rights” (Koslowski 1996, 72; cf. Boda 2001, 22). 
An aspect of this basic understanding of justice is the concept of reciprocity. Reciprocity is 
about a moral equilibrium of give and take: if A gives something to B (help, money, etc.), A seems 
to deserve to get something back from B in return (positive reciprocity). If A takes something away 
from B, B seems to deserve getting it (or something of similar value) back, whereas A seems to 
deserve to have something similar taken away from him (negative reciprocity). 
Reciprocity is often cited as one relevant “fairness” standard with regard to trade (Suranovic 
2000; Miller 2010). We will examine in detail how this plays out in Part II. 
As to how much we should give (or take), it should be in proportion to that which we got 
ourselves. Proportionality is then another aspect of the basic concept of justice. As such a just 
punishment must be in proportion to the graveness of the crime, a reward proportional to the 
deserving deed, etc. As Aristotle put it, justice demands that what people get is proportional to 
their deserts (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1131a30). 
As we just saw, justice as proportional reciprocity comes in both a positive and a negative 
form. Negative reciprocity implies that an equilibrium should exist between the damage  done  to  
the  victim  of  a  crime  and  the  damage  the  perpetrator  suffers  in consequence (or its 
translation into monetary compensation). While this idea has been very influential historically, 
negative reciprocity has been rather discredited from a theoretical moral perspective. The standard 
is, however, presumably of relevance with regard to concerns about retributive justice for crimes 
committed in the context of global trade.19 
Much more important nowadays is positive reciprocity. Positive reciprocity demands that we 
repay positive deeds with equally positive deeds. It is, as such, implicit in the common notion to 
                                                             
19 Suranovic (2000) takes negative reciprocity to be a specific fairness standard in debates on global trade. I will 
not discuss this position since negative reciprocity is a purely formal “fairness” standard that is at odds with the 
understanding of fairness and justice understood as thick ethical terms (that is, fairness in this sense would require 
us to do morally bad things for reasons of retribution. cf. also chapter 4.3). 
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owe something to someone because he did something for us. 20  Although, to my knowledge, it 
hasn’t often been explicitly in the center of philosophical attention, it is an extremely important 
and basic moral principle. To consider the intuitive appeal of the principle, let’s look at some 
examples: I always help you out when you are out of money. When the reverse situation arises, 
what is morally demanded of you? Rather uncontroversially, I think, you should to do the same for 
me (if you are in a position to do so). Why? Because positive reciprocity demands that you benefit 
me the way I benefitted you. In any case, if you don’t help me although you could, I (and also 
uninvolved third persons) would consider this morally blameworthy of you. Take another example: 
two people cook a meal together,  one  of  them  cutting  the  ingredients  and  the  other  mixing, 
seasoning and cooking them. How would we judge one of the two if he insisted in eating the meal all 
by himself? Again, we would consider this unjust (other things being equal), since it violates the norm 
of positive reciprocity claiming that he who benefits another in an interaction should be benefitted 
sufficiently by him as well. 
The norm of reciprocity seems to be deeply engrained in our evolutionary make-up. This view 
is taken by Tomasello and Herrmann (2010), who conduct empirical studies on the behavior of small 
children and apes, and conclude that reciprocity seems to lie on the very basis of human sociability. 
In fact, reciprocity as the tendency to reciprocate positive or negative behavior is so basic that 
even many animals show it (ibid.). Others, like Axelrod (1984), claim that some kind of "tit-for-tat" 
reciprocity is a basis for morality and a form of justice. 
John Rawls shares the assumption that the fact that people act according to the norm of 
reciprocity makes societies possible in the first place (Rawls 1971, 433), and he gives weight to this in 
his theory of justice. There and in other theories of justice, the norm of reciprocity is seen in the 
context of beneficial interactions within whole societies, which are usually called contexts of 
cooperation. 
Cooperation is often understood as generating duties of fairness and distributional justice 
on the basis of the norm of positive reciprocity (see 4.7). John Rawls for example sees social 
cooperation – understood essentially in the sense of a system of wealth production based on labor 
division – as implying norms of reciprocity and thereby as the basis for the claim to distributive 
political and economic justice (Rawls 1971).  
He is right, I think, to claim that reciprocity is of basic importance for society. But as we just 
saw, the norm of positive reciprocity is much more basic than that. It is a fundamental moral intuition 
we seem to apply to (basically) every beneficial human interaction. 
 
  
                                                             
20 I owe this remark to Lars Dänzer. 
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3.2 Claims, Rights , and Claim Bases  
 
In  a  more  contemporary  terminology,  the  general  concept  of  justice  can  be understood as the 
requirement that legitimate or stringent claims or rights must be satisfied or honored.21  The 
counterpart of a claim or right is the duty on someone’s part to the fulfillment of it.22 Justice in this 
broad sense is concerned with fulfilling people’s stringent claims, and with the fulfillment of the respective 
duties, as opposed to merely meritorious or supererogatory deeds. For example, people are usually 
thought to have a right not to be killed, tortured, coerced, deceived, and lied to, and they have 
stringent claims to get what they have been contractually guaranteed or promised, and to get back 
what someone borrowed from them. 
The question on what grounds people can have stringent claims to something, in general and 
in the context of trade in particular, can be formulated as the question what the relevant claim bases 
are in the relevant context. Some stringent claims are so basic that they are usually thought to 
require nothing more than being human as their claim base. They are called natural rights and go 
back to John Locke’s theory on natural rights (cf. Locke 1690; Hart 1955. Cf. chapter 3.6.2). The 
theory holds that every person has equal basic moral rights, so-called natural rights, which 
constrain other people’s actions. They are called natural rights because they are thought to apply 
independently of institutional arrangements or beliefs. Their range is traditionally understood along 
the following lines: “Each person has the right to do whatever she chooses with whatever she 
legitimately owns so long as she does not violate the rights of others not to be harmed in certain ways 
– by force, fraud, coercion, theft, or infliction of damage on person or property. Each person has the 
right not to be harmed by others in the mentioned ways, unless she voluntarily waives any of her 
rights or voluntarily transfers them to another or forfeits them by misconduct. Also, each adult 
person is the full rightful owner of herself and each child person has the right to be nurtured to 
adult status by those responsible for her creation. It is generally supposed in the Lockean tradition 
that starting from the premise of self-ownership, under  actual  conditions  on  earth  one  can  
validly  derive strong rights of private appropriation and ownership of land and moveable parts of the 
earth.” (Arneson 2013, cf. Nozick 1974). 
The right to equal freedom of every human being is often thought to be the most basic one 
(e.g. Hart 1955), entailing many of the other rights like the right not to be killed, tortured, deceived, 
etc. In the terminology of rights, these claims are called negative rights, meaning that they are claims to be 
free of something. Historically, natural rights are an important predecessor of what we nowadays call 
Human Rights.23 
Claims are based on people’s voluntary dealings or “transactions” with each other, such as the 
                                                             
21 I will not distinguish sharply between rights and claims since this is a complex issue and it is not important for 
our topic. For the relation between the two see e.g. Feinberg 1964. 
22 For the connection between rights and duties cf. Feinberg 1964; Shue 1996, 153f; Raz 1986, 420f. 
23 UDHR 1948. For an excellent philosophical overview on the topic of Human rights see Griffin 2008.  
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claims to get what was agreed upon in contracts and to that which was promised. Others still arise out 
of special relationships that people have with each other, such as the one between parents and their 
children. Both of them are part of what Hart calls special rights (Hart 1955, 183). What all special rights 
have in common is “(…) that they arise out of special relationships between human beings and not out 
of the character of the action to be done or its effects.” (ibid., 186). For example, when something is 
promised to somebody, “we voluntarily incur obligations and confer or create rights on those to whom 
we promise” (ibid.). What is also special about special rights is that they are limited to specific others: 
“When rights arise out of special transactions between individuals or out of some special relationship 
in which they stand to each other, both the persons who have the right and those who have the 
corresponding obligation are limited to the parties to the special transaction or relationship.” (Hart 
1955, 183).  
Note that at the most basic level, the question as to what counts as a base for stringent claims 
is a question that normative moral theories try to answer, and different moral theories do so 
differently. Until now I spoke as if there were different kinds of claim bases, and I actually believe this 
is the case. However, let me mention the perspective of Utilitarianism24 as a normative moral theory 
that works on the assumption of a single claim base. 
In utilitarian theories there is only one basis of stringent claims, namely well-being (or 
something similar). In any situation, claims arise from the well-being of people (or beings with 
genuine interests), and everyone’s well-being counts equally in the pursuit of  the overall goal, which 
is maximization of overall well-being. When relying on utilitarian theories, comparing claims in the 
sense justice demands is quite straightforward: the different claims are compared by utilitarian 
aggregation (i.e. by comparing the utility different individuals would get from an action), and 
competing claims are satisfied in proportion by including each in the aggregation in accordance 
with its strength. In a utilitarian perspective, justice then amounts to choosing the action that 
maximizes aggregate utility, and in this the demands of justice coincide with the demands of morality 
in general.  
An important concept in utilitarian theory is the law of decreasing marginal utility. Marginal 
utility is the change in the utility from increase or decrease in the consumption of a good or service. 
The law of decreasing marginal utility holds that with the amount of units consumed, the increase in 
the utility of one unit decreases. For example, if someone is hungry, the first apple he eats has a very 
high utility, the second he eats in a row has a slightly lower utility, the third an even lower one, and by, 
say, the 20th apple the increase in utility will be close to zero (by then he probably even feels sick of 
apples).  
With regard to the question of just trade, a utilitarian perspective might be in the 
background of some people’s intuition that certain things in the context of global trade are unjust – for 
                                                             
24 For a classic exposition and defense of Utilitarianism see Mill 1998 [1863]. 
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example, workers in developing countries in the supply chains of MNEs earning below-subsistence 
wages. The reasoning could be this: because of the law of decreasing marginal utility, the workers have 
more weighty claims to the extra money that would raise their salaries to cover their subsistence 
needs than the MNE, since the positive effect of that money on their well-being would be substantially 
higher than if it went to the profits of the supplier or the MNE. Therefore, living wages in this context 
are a demand of ethical trade. 
However, if we look at it more closely, the utilitarian perspective on claim bases rests on very 
counterintuitive assumptions, which has consequences for the plausibility of arguments such as the 
above. For example, we usually think (and our legal systems are based on the idea) that people can 
get a stringent claim to certain things by their individual actions – a thought that has no space as such 
in utilitarian theories. We generally think, for example, that people have a stringent prima facie claim 
to their legitimately earned property which cannot simply be overrun without further justification by 
the fact that this property would be more conducive to overall well-being if taken away from them, as 
utilitarian reasoning (at least on the face of it) would have it.  
If we e.g. think about what considerations (i.e. claim bases) should flow into the 
determination of just wages, we would certainly not think that the only relevant claim base is the 
well-being of the workers – rather we would presumably think that a wage should take into 
consideration the productive contribution of the workers, their qualifications, their responsibilities, 
their effort, possibly also their needs, etc.25 The utilitarian perspective also leaves no room for 
taking into account the issue of voluntary consent to work contracts. In short, it treats distributions in 
the context of trade and business as if they were happening in a morally unstructured vacuum, which 
seems clearly inadequate. 
I take it that the idea that there is not just one base for stringent claims but that there 
are multiple ones is better in accordance with our intuitions. Contrary to utilitarian theory, in 
deontological theories there is a range of possible bases for stringent claims above the ones based 
on special relations. Some of the most widely accepted ones are desert or merit, need, and 
entitlement. Effort is another but more controversial candidate. Let me give some examples without 
going into any details here: a scientist seems to have a claim based on merit to a prize because of 
his individual achievements, a criminal might have a claim based on entitlement to a trial in 
accordance with the legal rules, and the drowning child from the example above seems to have a 
claim based on need to being saved by a passer-by.  
When there are different claim bases it is not straightforward how claims should be 
compared. A deontological theory must elaborate for example how needs- and entitlement- based 
claims are to be compared, possibly assigning priority to one. Also, it has to explain how claims made 
on different bases should be satisfied proportionally. In a deontological perspective then, morality 
                                                             
25 On wage justice see e.g. Köllmann 2010. 
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operates in a more complex way than it does in utilitarian ones, and might demand things that are in 
opposition to consequentialist considerations. 
As we said, moral claims always generate corresponding duties to their fulfillment. But how 
exactly are these duties to be conceived? 
 
3.3. Duties of Justice, Duties of Benevolence, and Duties of Special Relations 
 
The counterparts to the above mentioned universal basic human claims (not to be killed, tortured, 
coerced, and deceived) are duties of justice, or in Kant’s terms perfect duties. They are owed to 
everybody, always. Traditionally, perfect duties were thought to be situated predominantly in the 
realm of negative morality, meaning that they require us to abstain from actively doing 
something to others – namely from infringing their moral rights or, roughly speaking, from wronging 
or harming them. Examples are the duty of justice not to kill, to torture, to steal, coerce, or deceive 
others. These are duties that prima facie apply to everybody, always. Observing these duties requires 
us not to act (in certain ways), whereas the violation of these duties is active, that is, the performance 
of the forbidden action. On the other hand, in this (simplified) picture omitting an action cannot be a 
violation of a perfect duty. 
On the other hand, duties of benevolence or imperfect moral duties are duties that are 
meritorious, but not strictly morally required. Examples include paying for the education of the 
children of someone else, helping others attain their plans and goals, or giving to charity. Such 
imperfect duties were traditionally thought to be situated in the realm of positive morality, meaning 
that they require us to actively do or give something to others.  
Applying the broad concept of justice as fulfillment of people’ stringent claims (by people 
performing their perfect duties) to the topic of global trade, just global trade could be understood 
as global trade in which people get what they deserve, or global trade in which the legitimate or 
stringent claims of people are honored in proportion. Clearly, this is a relevant topic when thinking 
about the moral issues involved in global trade. However, when justice is understood in this broad 
sense, its demands mostly coincide with those of general deontological morality (i.e. the fulfillment of 
perfect moral duties). Terminologically, I therefore take it that it makes more sense to call the issue 
of fulfilling the perfect moral duties related to trade (and thereby fulfilling the stringent moral claims 
of the people involved or affected by it) ethical trade, and to reserve the term “just trade” to 
designate a more narrow understanding of justice in trade. In this sense, the question of ethical trade 
then can be formulated like this: What exactly are the stringent moral claims and the perfect moral 
duties in the context of trade? 
Perfect negative duties apply in the context of trade as well as in any other area of life. The 
default picture of what morality demands in economic transactions has long been somewhat like this: 
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If someone keeps his contracts, doesn’t coerce and deceive their trade partner 26 they fulfill  all  that  
morality strictly  demands  –  and  thereby  can  be  said  to  comply  with the demands of ethical 
trade. In this perspective, if someone offers their trade partner a better deal than is necessary for 
them to agree to the transaction this is certainly generous and morally meritorious, but it is not 
strictly demanded by morality – and therefore not required for “ethical trade”. If someone omits 
offering assistance to a trade partner in bad circumstances (above what is agreed contractually), in 
this perspective he presumably doesn’t violate any duty of justice. 
Now, the above picture is of course too simplistic. First, there are certain specific grey areas 
with regard to negative duties in trade. Let me just mention some: One concerns the concept of 
exploitation and its moral implications. Although most people would agree that we have a perfect 
moral duty to abstain from exploiting others, when looking at it more closely it becomes apparent 
that it is highly controversial what exploitation entails, and what the respective duties involve. We 
will engage with the concept of exploitation and its relation to fair trade in detail in chapter 7.4.1. 
A second grey area concerns the moral assessment of contributions to right violations or 
harms in complex situations – such as human rights violations in global supply chains. While it is 
clear that the stringent claims or rights of people have been violated in these situations, it is 
controversial who carries what part of the moral responsibility for this. The main issue is whether or to 
what extent actors are responsible if they do not directly harm others in the context of trade but are 
nevertheless connected to the harming in some way – for example by contributing to the wrong, or by 
enabling it somehow. Examples are cases where wrongs are committed at some point in global 
supply chains, like in an independent local plant or plantation in a developing country. Are 
institutions and MNEs responsible for the wrongs too?  What duties do they have in these kinds of 
situations? We will engage with the concept of responsibility in chapter 3.4, and with its application to 
said questions in detail in chapter 7.4. 
The second reason why the default picture sketched above is too simplistic is that the strict 
association of perfect duties with negative morality and imperfect duties with positive morality 
doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. As an illustration, take the famous example by Singer (1972): a passer-by 
walks past a pond in which he sees a child drowning. Since he has not personally harmed the child, 
the strict association of duties of justice with negative duties would suggest that the passer-by does 
not have a duty of justice to safe the child. Of course this is highly counter-intuitive. Rather, it seems 
intuitively clear that the passer-by has a strict (perfect) moral duty to actively try to save the child – 
provided he can do so without great danger to himself. This is an action though and belongs to the 
realm of positive morality. The example accordingly shows that the strict association of perfect moral 
duties with negative morality (requiring us to abstain from actions) is intuitively not convincing. 
Rather, or so is often assumed, strict duties do include certain positive duties, such as the duty to 
                                                             
26 And of course doesn’t torture or kill etc. him either. 
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assist strangers in desperate need of help when this is possible at a low cost to oneself. Conversely it 
might be an imperfect duty to help others with less crucial aims and plans, and to help strangers 
in need at high danger and/or cost to one self. 
Transferred to the context of trade, an intuition  along the above lines might be at work 
regarding many people’s opinion that trade partners or employers do in fact have a perfect duty to 
help their trade partners or employees in desperately bad conditions improve their situation – if this is 
possible at low cost to themselves. Understood in this way, this assistance would be a perfect positive 
duty, analogous to the example with the drowning child above. On these grounds it could be tried to 
argue that companies have a perfect duty in the context of trade (i.e. a duty of ethical trade) to 
make sure their employees’ basic daily needs are met, pay for their life-saving medical treatment etc. 
Such a duty of assistance in desperate circumstances could be a moral base for perfect positive duties 
of companies towards their workers. 
However, the problem with this claim is that it is prima facie unclear why it should be the 
companies that have the duty to offer the said assistance – and not another actor like the state where 
the respective people in desperate circumstances live.  
While I will engage with this question in detail in chapter 7, let me anticipate that I see two 
general lines of argument one could pursue when trying to ground the claim that actors (like MNEs or 
states) have certain perfect positive duties towards their trading partners.  The first one approaches the 
issue through the concept of responsibility and uses a theory of responsibility to argue that the 
respective actor has certain positive duties regarding his trading partners. The second one approaches 
the issue though the concept of duties of special relations, and argues that the relationship between 
trading partners is of a kind that inherently generates certain positive duties on the part of the trading 
partners.  
Duties of special relations are based on what Hart calls Special rights (Hart 1955, 183f; see 
chapter 3.2). As such they are based on the idea that certain kinds of relations between people are 
sufficient to ground particular claims and duties between them – most notably, but not exclusively, 
certain perfect positive duties. For example special relations are often considered to be a claim base for 
duties of solidarity. In other words, contrary to other positive duties, such positive duties of special 
relations are inherently assigned to specific actors because of their relationship with the person 
who has the according claims. Classic examples of duties of special relations – or role obligations as 
they are sometimes called – are special duties of parents towards their children, of spouses or 
partners towards each other, and of co-nationals towards each other (like in Millers theory of 
responsibility, see section 3.5). Besides, there are duties of special relations as part of certain 
professions, such as doctors, lawyers, etc., the respective content of which varies according to 
professional relation.  
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What is special about them from a normative point of view is that they legitimate and even call 
for a general partiality of the duty bearer’s towards the claim holder, which might seem peculiar from 
an abstract normative perspective. However, I agree with Scheffler that rather than being strange or 
questionable, the partiality they result in is a very important part of morality (e.g. Scheffler 2001): 
“(…)  the  demands  of  morality,  as  ordinarily  interpreted,  have  less  to  do  with abstractions like 
the overall good than with the specific web of roles and relationships that serve to situate a person in 
social space” (ibid. 36f).  
Some authors argue for a direct justification of duties of special relations (e.g. Williams 1981), 
others for a two-levelled justification (e.g. Barry 1995). For reasons of scope I will discuss these 
different approaches here. What matters for our purpose is that I assume special obligations to be 
justifiable in principle. 
So far, in this framework we have not encountered duties of specific moral fairness. How then 
should they be conceived? Are they perfect or imperfect duties, or do they belong to the category of 
duties of special relations? While I will discuss this question in detail in chapter 4, let me anticipate 
that I will propose to understand duties of fairness as a particular kind of duties of special relations. 
This will then be used in chapter 7 to ground the argument that trade inherently generates certain 
positive duties as a demand of fairness on the part of the trading parties.  
For now, let’s now turn to then concept of responsibility which is crucial for assigning duties to 
particular actors.  
 
3.4. Responsibility 
 
While the concept of duties specifies what the fulfillment of claims or rights demands, the concept of 
responsibility translates this into concrete demands on particular actors, that is, it specifies who has 
which duties. As we saw before, with negative duties it is straightforward who has the duty to fulfill the 
corresponding claims: since they ask us to omit certain acts, namely those that harm others (or violate 
the negative rights of others), the according responsibility to fulfill negative duties falls to each actor 
himself, that is, everybody has the duty to omit such acts.27 With regard to positive duties of assistance, 
this is more complicated, and here the concept of responsibility becomes highly important.  
Let me note that here that I am not interested in legal responsibility, but in moral responsibility. 
Nevertheless, moral responsibility and legal responsibility are structurally closely related concepts, and 
since the latter has long been closely studied by law-scholars, we will turn to legal specifications of the 
concept of responsibility when they are useful our discussion. 
Ascriptions of responsibility imply three general aspects: (1) Who is responsible, (2) what he is 
                                                             
27 The question of who has the duty to ensure that others don’t violate their negative duties concerns in turn a 
positive duty of assistance, since it demands that certain actions be actively taken. 
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responsible for, and (3) towards whom he is responsible.28 Let me say something about the first 
aspect: for an actor to be the subject of justified assignments of responsibility at all (1), a crucial 
condition has to be met: He has to be a moral agent. This is why we cannot assign moral responsibility 
to a computer system, to a natural catastrophe, or to “the market”.  For an actor to qualify as a moral 
agent, three necessary and together sufficient conditions have to be met (cf. e.g. Neuhäuser 2011, 
57): He has to 1) be able to act (by doing or omitting something), that is, he has to be able to actively 
interfere in the world. This criterion is about causality. He has to 2) be able to act freely, that is, he has 
to be able to choose between alternative courses of action. This criterion is about freedom of action 
and will. And he has to 3) be able to make decisions for or against a course of action according to 
moral criteria. This criterion is about the ability to take the moral point of view. 
What is important in the context of this thesis is the question if these criteria are only fulfilled 
by individual human actors, or if collective entities, especially states and companies, can be moral 
agents as well and thereby the subjects of ascriptions of moral responsibility. To discuss this question 
in detail is outside the scope of this thesis. In the following I will assume the position, following 
authors such as Neuhäuser (2011), Werhane (1985), French (1979, 1984), that companies and 
institutional actors like states can indeed be considered moral actors, and therefore are potential 
subjects for the ascription of responsibility.29 
 
3.4.1 Prospective and Retrospective Responsibility 
 
Legal   and   moral   responsibility   has   two   temporal   directions:   a   prospective   and   a 
retrospective one. 30 Prospective responsibility consists in an agent having certain legal or moral 
duties concerning someone or something, where those duties are created by his role, task, or a 
certain activity (Cane 2002, 31). This obviously relates back to claims and duties of special relations 
(see 3.2. and 3.3). Examples are the responsibility of parents for their children, the responsibility that 
comes with one’s profession (like the responsibility of a doctor for treating his patients according to 
the Hippocratic Oath, or the responsibility of a watchmen to keep watch), the responsibility that 
comes with the activity of driving a car (the duty to drive safely), etc. The law imposes many such 
responsibilities, for instance on employers in favor of employees, on doctors in favor of patients 
etc. (ibid., 31). In law, these prospective responsibilities are mostly based on contracts or 
agreements, but they are not confined to them as the case of family relations shows.  
The counterpart of prospective responsibility is historic or retrospective responsibility, which is 
directed at past violations of duties.  If someone has actively and directly harmed someone else, this 
                                                             
28 For an overview over the many questions related to responsibility see e.g. French (ed.) 1991. 
29 I agree with Neuhäuser that they should not be conceptualized as persons, which has the important moral 
implication that they have moral duties whereas not having moral rights (since they lack the according traits) (cf. 
Neuhäuser 2011, 98f). 
30 See e.g. Cane 2002 and Craig 2000. 
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is what lawyers call misfeasance; if one has omitted to prevent someone from being harmed this is 
called nonfeasance. Retrospectively, someone is usually taken to be (legally) responsible for his 
misfeasance, but not generally for his nonfeasance. But to the extent that one’s prospective 
responsibilities require one “to take positive steps to achieve good outcomes or to prevent bad ones, 
prospective responsibility (…) can lay the foundation for historic responsibility for omissions and what 
lawyers call ‘nonfeasance’” (ibid., 32). In other words, if one has the prospective duty to prevent 
someone from being harmed and fails to do so, they become retrospectively responsible for their 
nonfeasance. 
It is plausible to claim that this line of reasoning applies to moral responsibility as well. To 
illustrate this, look at the following example: a robber robs a bank, while the bank’s watchman is 
watching television instead of keeping watch. Here the robber is obviously morally responsible for his 
misfeasance. But it seems equally clear to ascribe moral responsibility to the watchmen because he 
violated his prospective responsibility in the form of the duty to keep watch. 
What has been said on responsibility so far illustrates three things of high importance with 
regard to the responsibilities in the context of fair trade. First, the example illustrates that 
responsibility is dividable. It is in fact very common for more than one actor to be co-responsible for a 
wrong, either by misfeasance or nonfeasance. This means that, for example, although states might in 
principle have the responsibility to ensure their citizens’ survival by means of working social systems, or 
legally independent suppliers in developing countries are responsible for poor working conditions in 
their facilities, this is not enough to show that MNEs don’t carry a corresponding co-responsibility for 
them. 
Second, if a moral actor actively and relevantly contributes to the violation of people’s 
stringent claims in the context of trade (for example, an MNE contributing to health-damaging 
working conditions in an independent supplier), we have reason to ascribe retrospective responsibility 
to them with regard to those conditions. However, as we will see in chapter 7., it is very difficult to 
define what counts as an active and relevant contribution to a wrong in complex causal contexts.  
Third, we saw that when we have established that someone has a special prospective 
responsibility for someone or something this is a basis for ascribing to him retrospective responsibility 
in the case where he has not prevented something bad from happening. Importantly, the distinction 
between acts and omissions is not relevant in this respect: if, in the above example, we describe the 
watchman’s action as an omission, this doesn’t make him any less responsible. So if we can argue 
convincingly that MNEs have a prospective responsibility for ensuring good working conditions for 
the people in their supply chains this justifies ascribing to them retrospective responsibility in case 
they don’t prevent bad working conditions in their suppliers even if they themselves do nothing that 
actively wrongs someone and only omit intervening. 
In the following I will introduce a highly interesting approach for ascribing responsibility in 
complex contexts: David Miller’s connection theory of remedial responsibility (Miller 2007). Although 
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it was formulated for another context, it constitutes a helpful theoretical framework for answering 
questions of responsibility in the context of global trade. 
 
3.4.2 Miller’s Connection Theory of Remedial Responsibility 
 
 
Miller’s theory of responsibility distinguishes between two main concepts of responsibility, namely 
outcome responsibility and remedial responsibility.31 Outcome responsibility (following Honoré 1999) 
is the responsibility agents bear for the outcomes of their past actions, whereas remedial 
responsibility is the duty of agents to put certain bad states of affairs right (Miller 2007, 83-4). In 
terms of the distinction between prospective and retrospective responsibility introduced above, 
outcome responsibility is located within the realm of retrospective responsibility.  With  remedial  
responsibility  things  are  more  complicated:  it  is  forward looking like prospective responsibility, 
but unlike the latter it is concerned with rectifying an already bad situation. 
The first concept we are interested in with regard to our topic is remedial responsibility: 
Remedial responsibility, as we said, is relevant when there is a state of affairs in need of remedy – in 
our case, bad conditions in the supply chains of MNEs. The reflections regarding remedial 
responsibility start with the state of affairs in need of remedy, and then analyze who we have reason 
to identify as being responsible for remedying it.  With regard to our topic, we are of course 
interested if MNEs can be identified as remedially responsible for bad working conditions in their 
independent suppliers. How then are we to make judgments of remedial responsibility? 
Miller proposes what he calls a “connection theory” of remedial responsibility: “The basic idea 
is that A should be considered remedially responsible for P's condition when he is linked  to  P”  (Miller 
2007,    99)  in  one  or  more  of  the  following  ways: 1.  A  is  morally responsible for the wrong to P, 
2. A is outcome responsible for the wrong to P, 3. A is causally responsible for the wrong to P, 4. A has 
benefitted from the process that led to P’s deprivation, 5.  A  has  the  capacity to  remedy the  
wrong, 6.  A  is  member of  the  same community as P. 32 In other words, the mentioned connections 
are criteria or reasons for the ascription of remedial responsibility to particular agents. They will be 
explicated in some detail and related to our question below. However, I will not argue for them here 
but rather assume for the sake of the argument that they are plausible on the grounds that they fit very 
well with common intuitions on the topic. 
Let me start by looking at the relation between the different criteria. The three former 
criteria – moral, outcome, and causal responsibility – are connected in the sense that moral 
                                                             
31 A similar approach is taken by Young 2007, who distinguishes between a liability model of responsibility and a 
social connection model of responsibility. 
32 Since MNEs are predominantly from another country (and community) than the workers at the beginning of 
the supply chains, the community-connection is usually not directly relevant for this question. Note however 
that it can be used to argue for a remedial responsibility of local countries or communities for bad working 
conditions on their territory or concerning their people. 
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responsibility (which in Miller’s sense implies blameworthiness) is the most comprehensive one, 
usually implying outcome responsibility, which in turn implies causal responsibility. This suggests that 
moral responsibility is the strongest criterion, outcome responsibility the second strongest and pure 
causal responsibility the third. In contrast, the latter three conditions are independent from the first 
three and from each other. 
In case most of the above criteria are fulfilled by the same agent, this gives us weighty reasons 
to identify this agent as remedially responsible and accordingly assign remedial responsibility to him. 
In case the criteria point to several agents, we might assign shared remedial responsibility to some or 
all of them. But what is normatively called for if the different criteria point to different agents 
and thereby conflict? In such cases, according to Miller, “there is no algorithm that could resolve 
such disputes. We have to rely on our intuitions about the relative importance of different sources 
of connection” (ibid., 107). 
We will use this theoretical framework in chapter7.4.2 to examine the concrete duties of MNEs 
with regard to the people in their supply chains.  
 
3.5. Structural, Procedural, and Outcome Justice or Fairness 
 
Let us now have a closer look at the aforementioned distinction between the background, 
procedural, and outcome dimension of justice and fairness. When having a closer look at  different  
situations  where  we  apply  the  concepts  of  justice  and  fairness, it becomes clear that we use it 
with regard to different dimensions of situations. This can be shown well by considering the case of 
negotiations. For the overall assessment of a negotiation as just or fair, three dimensions seem to be 
potentially relevant: first, the preconditions of the negotiation, second, the process of the negotiation 
itself, and third, the outcome of the negotiation. These three dimensions can be called structural or 
background justice, procedural justice, and outcome justice. Their relevance is not restricted to 
negotiations but potentially applies in all situations that seem to generate concerns of justice or 
fairness. 
The first dimension of justice, structural justice, is concerned with the preconditions of the 
proceeding in question (negotiation, competition, distribution, etc.), or in other words, the 
background conditions that structure them. In the case of negotiations for example, structural 
justice concerns the context and forum of the negotiation, the criteria for the determination of 
participants to the negotiation, and for agenda setting. Structural justice honors the claims of 
people to chances for participation and success. When questions of background justice are about a 
whole social system (as opposed to particular practices like a negotiation, a competition etc.) they 
are what I will call genuine questions of social justice.  
The second dimension of justice is concerned with the process. It looks at the procedures used 
and the behavior of the participants in the process (of the negotiation, competition, distribution, etc.). 
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Procedural justice honors the claims of people to a just or fair process of the practice in question. 
For example, in a trial procedural justice demands that the laws are followed properly, the judges 
don’t accept bribes and make their decision impartially etc.; in a sports competition it demands that 
the athletes follow the rules of the game and play fair, and that the referee is impartial. 
This procedural dimension of justice is often, though not uncontroversially, equated to the 
concept of fairness (see 1.1). Understood in this sense, procedurally just trade would be fair trade.  
From the trading individuals’ perspective, procedurally just trade is usually thought to amount to no 
lying, coercing, contract breaking, law breaking etc. That is, procedurally just trade in this 
understanding must mainly fulfill the classic perfect negative duties that are relevant in trade. 
However, even if one accepts the equation  of  procedural  justice  with  fairness,  it  is  still  
unclear what  the  correct explication of procedural justice or fairness i s  – is it generally compliance 
with negative duties? In this case fairness would coincide with general morality. Is it compliance with 
the rules? Is it Impartiality? Not disadvantaging others? This question will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. 
It should be noted that there is an important relation between background justice and 
procedural justice or fairness. This relation is such that the former sets the stage for the latter, i.e. 
just background conditions set the stage for a procedurally just or fair proceeding (negotiation, 
competition etc.). As an illustration consider Barry’s example of a boxing match: „(…) procedural 
fairness rules out one boxer having a piece of lead inside his gloves; but background fairness would 
also rule out any undue disparity in the weight of the boxers; similarly background fairness would 
rule out sailing boats or cars of different sizes being raced against one another unless suitably 
handicapped” (Barry 1965, 98-99). As another illustration consider a famous cartoon: a horse, an 
elephant, a bird and a monkey, all of them participants in a competition, are sitting in front of the 
judge who explains the task of the competition: “Every competitor has to fulfill the same task: 
Climb this  tree!”.  It  is  obvious  that,  although  the  process  of  the  competition  is  just  in  that 
everybody gets the exact same task, there is something genuinely unfair about the competition – 
namely that the different set up of the animals makes for unfair or unjust background conditions 
in the sense of unequal chances in the competition: a monkey and an elephant have highly unequal 
chances when it comes to climbing a tree. This relation between  background  justice  and  
procedural  justice  or  fairness  is  highly  relevant  for questions of fair or just global trade. It will 
therefore come up prominently later on in the discussion. 
Let’s turn to the third dimension of justice now, which is concerned with the outcome of the 
proceeding (negotiation, distribution, etc.). It is also referred to as the substantive dimension of 
justice (as opposed to the procedural and structural dimensions). Outcome justice  looks  at  the  
principles  underlying  the  distribution  which  is  the  result  of  the proceeding, or more precisely, 
the distribution of burdens and benefits in the outcome of the proceeding. Just outcomes honor the 
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claims of people to a just or fair share of the burdens and benefits in the distribution in question. 
What exactly just or fair shares amount to is of course highly context dependent, and even regarding 
specific contexts everything but trivial. 
In the context of questions of fair trade, outcome justice is relevant in that it is often 
claimed that the distribution of burdens and benefits form global trade is unjust or unfair. This 
criticism can be directed both to the trading system as a whole (see e.g. Aaron James’ position, 
chapter 5.2.5), or at trade in the supply chains of MNEs (see chapter 7.3). Regarding the latter, the 
criticism concerns the fact that by far the largest part of the profits goes to MNEs in developed 
countries who only carry a small part of the burden, whereas very little profit goes to the people at the 
beginning of the supply chain, who carry the biggest part of the burden through their hard manual 
labor. Note that the proportional distribution of burdens and benefits constitutes a popular fairness 
standard, which will be discussed in chapter 4.7. However, note also that the conditions for the applicability 
of the standard are quite strict in that it is restricted to contexts of cooperation (see chapter 3.5.1, 3.6. and 
4.7). 
There is an important relation between outcome justice and procedural justice in some kinds 
of proceedings. In these cases, which Rawls calls cases of “pure procedural justice”, just outcomes are 
completely tied up with procedural justice. The connection is the following: “there is a correct or fair 
procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the 
procedure has been properly followed” (Rawls 1999, 75). In these cases “there is no independent 
criterion by reference to which a definite outcome can be known to be just” (ibid, emphasis added). 
As an illustration of pure procedural justice Rawls refers to gambling. If the gambling procedure “is 
fair and freely entered into under conditions that are fair”, the distribution of cash after the bet is fair 
whatever it is. The same is true of sports competitions. Look at the example of a basketball game: if 
the game is procedurally just or fair, i.e. there has been no cheating or favoritism by the referee, the 
outcome can be considered just as well. There simply is no just  outcome  independent  of  the  
process  of  playing  the  game  because the  just  result  is determined through the process. 
It should be stressed though that in both cases, procedural justice is not enough forthe overall 
assessment of the outcome as just. Rather, as was mentioned before, the structural dimension of 
justice is relevant too.  Analogous to the boxing match and the animal competition example, consider 
a hypothetical basketball game where a team of badly equipped small amateurs competes against 
a team of tall, perfectly equipped NBA professionals. Even if the game is procedurally just, it assumedly 
wouldn’t be considered a „fair competition“, and this judgment concerns its background dimension: 
The two teams have widely divergent chances of success for structural reasons, and accordingly the 
competition will assumedly end with an extremely disparate result, e.g. 200 to 10. In this sense, a very 
uneven outcome might not be unjust per se (because it is a case of pure procedural justice), but it might 
suggest that there might have been flaws in the justice of the structural and / or the procedural 
dimensions. And if that is the case, the overall judgment of the game must probably be that it 
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was unfair – not because of its outcome, but because of the structural and / or procedural flaws that 
led to the outcome. 
Coming back to the mentioned relation of pure procedural justice, just outcomes and 
background justice, we should note that is highly relevant with regard to questions of social justice. 
To illustrate this, consider how Rawls understands the relation between the three dimensions of 
justice in his Theory of Justice: “In order … to apply the notion of pure procedural justice to 
distributive shares [i.e. let procedural justice determine the just outcome of distributions] it is 
necessary to set up and to administer impartially a just system of institutions. Only against the 
background of a just basic structure … can one say that the requisite just procedure exists” (1971, 
76). Rawls elaborates that just background conditions are those that ensure equal opportunity (see 
chapter 3.6.1).  
In Rawls’ view, just background conditions make it possible to let people focus on procedural 
justice in their daily lives: “The role of the principle of fair opportunity [as Rawls’ criterion of 
background justice] is to insure that the system of cooperation is one of pure procedural justice. 
Unless it is satisfied, distributive justice [i.e. outcome justice] could not be left to take care of itself, 
even within a restricted range” (ibid.). In matters of social justice then, Rawls argues that just 
background conditions that guarantee equal opportunity are necessary to let procedural justice take 
care of just results. 
This relation between the three dimensions of justice is highly relevant for questions of the 
justice and fairness of global trade. There is of course no equal opportunity for economic success 
among the global population. Does it follow from this that we cannot rely on procedural justice to 
reach just outcomes in global trade? Do we accordingly need additional criteria for just outcomes? 
Does it follow that striving for just global trade must primarily mean bettering the opportunities of 
the currently disadvantaged? Or is it that the relation between the three dimensions of justice 
doesn’t hold on a global scale? Does background justice mean something completely different 
globally than within a single society? We will deal with some of these and related questions in some 
detail in the section 3.7.2. Let me just note here that it is highly controversial if and how Rawls’ 
relation between the three dimensions of justice applies on a global scale, and what implications 
follow from it. 
In opposition to pure procedural justice where just outcomes are determined by just 
procedures and background conditions, there are other cases where just outcomes are definable 
independently of process and background conditions. I will call them cases of outcome justice. In 
these cases there is an independent criterion for defining a just outcome, “a criterion defined 
separately from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed” (Rawls 1971, 75). Generally 
speaking, outcome justice is fulfilled when the people’s substantive claims, i.e. their claims to a 
certain outcome or, in the case of distributions, to a certain share of the benefits that are 
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distributed, are fulfilled or honored in the outcome of the proceeding in question. 
 
3.5.1 Types of Outcome Justice: Cooperative Justice and Allocative Justice 
 
In which situations, then, is outcome justice relevant? There are two classic cases. The first, which I 
will call cooperative justice, applies in the case of people standing in a cooperative relation to each 
other, with the cooperation producing certain benefits in the form of either common or public 
goods. In these situations, simply put, people get claims to benefits by contributing to the burdens of 
producing the good in question. An example for the former is a team of students preparing a 
presentation for which they will be graded together. A classic example for the latter is public 
transport, the burdens being mainly the costs to operate public transport, while the public good 
produced consists in the availability of public transport for everyone. In both cases, outcome justice 
demands that there must be a certain proportion between burdens people carry and the benefits they 
enjoy. This proportionality relation demands both that those who cooperatively contribute should 
enjoy a proportional part of the benefits, and that those who enjoy the cooperatively produced 
benefits should, at least prima facie, contribute proportionally to carrying the burdens.33 In our 
examples, this means that all the students should equally contribute to the presentation, because 
they will be graded together, and that those who use public transport should contribute to its costs. 
The latter version of the principle states that those who contribute to carrying the burdens necessary 
to produce the benefits generated by the cooperation have  a  prima  facie  claim  to  the  equal  
contributions  of  the others who enjoy the benefits. This is known as the principle of fairness, which 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.7. 
It is important to note that in Rawls’ view, the interactions within a society are to be 
considered a form of cooperation, and accordingly cooperative outcome justice applies in principle: 
people should get shares in accordance with their contribution to society’s good. In a context as 
complex as the interactions of a whole society though, it would be impossible to decide what this 
entails (and bring with it a plethora of other problems). For this practical reason, Rawls advocates that 
the system be set up such that it can work as one of pure procedural justice. The market as an 
objective, decentralized system of value distribution is to take over a substantive role in determining 
burdens/contributions and benefits, whereas people’s chances for success in the market are to be 
equalized in their formative phase, and those that cannot participate successfully in the market are 
taken care of by the community. 
Regarding questions of justice in global trade, an important question is accordingly if global 
trade constitutes a case of cooperation of the kind that triggers cooperative outcome justice. 
This relates to the questions in the last section as follows: if global trade is to be considered a form of 
                                                             
33 With the exemption of those who are not able to contribute, like children, disabled people etc. who are usually 
thought to have a claim to benefits without contributing to the burdens. 
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cooperation in the relevant sense, the relation between the three dimensions of justice applies to 
global trade as well. In this case, for pure procedural justice to be relied upon for bringing about 
just outcomes, background justice would be necessary. Without background justice in place we 
would need to judge the outcomes of global trade according to the criterion of a proportional 
distribution of the burdens and benefits of global trade, and set up some kind of system to see to 
their implementation (for an suggestion in this vein see chapter 5.2.5). 
And what follows if global trade doesn’t qualify as cooperation in the relevant sense? Does 
that mean that only the demands of procedural justice apply with regard to global trade, or do 
we nevertheless somehow have to take background conditions into account as a demand of fairness or 
justice? The explanations on the relation between procedural fairness and background fairness 
suggest that the latter is indeed the case. As we saw, they apply as a demand of fairness even in 
contexts such as sporting competitions that have absolutely nothing to do with social justice. We 
will come back to this important finding later on. 
For now, let’s come back to the second case of outcome justice. A llocative justice applies 
when a given collection of burdens and benefits “is to be divided among definite individuals with 
known desires and needs, and when the collection to be distributed is not the product of these 
individuals, nor do they stand in any existing cooperative relations” (Rawls 1999, 76). Since in this 
case there is no “pre-history” of the distribution which generated prior desert claims on the benefits 
to be distributed, the just distribution will take other claim bases into account. A simple example of a 
case where allocative justice applies is the distribution of a birthday cake among children at a 
party. A just distribution will take several claim bases into account: Probably the child whose birthday 
it is has a prior claim based on entitlement to the biggest piece of the cake, but all the others might 
have an equal claim to a share of the cake. Thus the just distribution would allocate the biggest piece 
of cake to the birthday child and a smaller and equally sized piece to all the other children. 
But what if some children don’t like cake, whereas other children love it? And what if two of the 
guests are teenagers with a huge appetite? In other words, will a just allocative outcome take people’s 
preferences and needs into account? Rawls seems to think so. He writes that in the case of allocative 
justice, it would be “natural” to distribute the benefits “according to desires and needs, or even to 
maximize the net balance of satisfaction. Justice becomes a kind of efficiency, unless equality is 
preferred. Suitably generalized, the allocative conception leads to the classical utilitarian view. For as 
we have seen, this doctrine assimilates justice to the benevolence of the impartial spectator and the 
latter in turn to the most efficient design.” (Rawls 1999, 76, emphasis added).  
I agree that distributing according to the desires of people is often natural and sensible, but it 
seems mistaken to me to think that justice would require this. After all, this would be the case only if 
we accept desires or preferences of all kinds as bases for stringent claims, and this is only plausible in 
certain preference utilitarian theories. While a distribution according to preferences in the case of 
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allocations in a claim-vacuum makes perfect sense, it is implausible from a deontological 
perspective to consider this a demand of morality. Clearly, some Humeans and authors like Joseph Raz 
consider interests of high importance as claim bases. However, not just any interests or preferences 
are relevant in this perspective, but only basic, highly important ones from an objective point of view. 
After all, if we ask what a just distribution would be we are not asking what shares the parties 
would want subjectively, but what shares they should get objectively. 
It is important to note that the distributions resulting from trade are not a case of allocative 
justice, because the allocation doesn’t take place in a pre-distribution claim-vacuum: the benefits that 
are distributed in the outcome of trade are the results of previous actions which generated claims  
based  on  entitlement.  So people, companies and possibly countries go into trade with unequal 
claims to shares of the benefits, and just distributions of trade outcomes cannot disregard this. This 
suggests that a utilitarian line of argument in the sense of the intuition mentioned in chapter 3.2., 
namely that the workers in developing countries have claims to a bigger part of the profits of trade 
because the positive effect of that money on their well-being would be substantially higher than if it 
went to the profits of the supplier or the MNE, has to be seen as implausible. In the words of 
Rescher, accepting that “all men come into this world with exactly the  same  status  regarding  
claims,  merit,  and  deserts,  there  is  no  gainsaying  that  this situation is radically altered once men 
begin to act. Human actions - or at any rate, the great bulk of them - are inherently claim-modifying” 
(Rescher 2002, 21).  So with regard to distributions from global trade we are dealing with claims on 
different bases, at least an important part of which is based on the previous actions of the parties. 
This means that the fact that distributions from trade are unequal, even highly unequal, is not enough 
per se to make them unjust. 
At this point we will look more closely into the notions of equality and equality of opportunity 
that underlie some of the above issues and which we have encountered several times already. We 
will do this in the form of a short (and necessarily superficial) detour into these  concepts and the 
respective theories.   
 
3.6 Equality as an Element of Justice and Fairness 
 
The underlying, basic idea behind both Rawls’ and Rescher statements above is that all human 
beings are equal. 34  In the most basic sense this means that they should be seen as having equal 
worth or moral status, and accordingly be treated as equals. This idea is the basis of 
Egalitarianism, a strand of political philosophy and moral thought underlying most modern western 
thinking. Equality plays a pivotal role in all relevant modern theories of justice and concepts of 
fairness, but it does so in different ways.  
                                                             
34 This section is mostly based on Arneson 2013. 
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Some theories focus on people being treated equally. The ideal of formal equality of treatment 
implies that people generally have a claim to be treated in the same way, requiring morally relevant 
reasons for differential treatment. In the terms used before, this is a requirement of procedural 
justice, and it is often linked to fairness. For example, in sports competitions referees are supposed to 
treat all the participants in the same way without favoritism, the law is supposed to apply to 
everybody in the same way etc.  
Besides the formal outlook on equality which focuses on treating people equally, the question 
of the equality of people can also be understood in a substantive way, by focusing on something 
people should equally have or get. They concern what is usually called distributive justice – the 
question of the rightful distribution of certain things among people. 
There is considerable controversy among different theories of justice on what it is that is to 
be distributed equally among people. We will shortly look into some relevant positions so we can 
understand their implications for questions of justice in global trade. The first position I present 
focuses on people having equal chances for success or, in other words, equality of opportunity. The 
second position focuses on equality of negative freedom, and the third and fourth one on equality of 
positive freedom. 
 
3.6.1 Equality of Opportunity 
 
A  specific  form  of  the  ideal  of  equal  chances  for  success  is  the  ideal  of  equality  of 
opportunity, which is an important form of social equality in modern western thinking. In its basic, 
formal form it requires that all people have the same chances for social positions that confer special 
advantages, meaning that 1. these should be open to all applicants, and that 2. the selection should 
be governed by the criterion of merit only. This implies that nobody must be disadvantaged on 
grounds that are irrelevant to the task in question – such as skin color, gender, place of origin etc. 
The according ideal of a society is a meritocracy – a society where people’s positions are 
determined by their merit only. In the words of Roemer, equality of opportunity demands that in 
„the competition for positions in society, all individuals who possess the attributes relevant for the 
performance of the duties of the position in question be included in the pool of eligible candidates, 
and that an individual’s possible occupancy of the position be judged only with respect to the relevant 
attributes” (Roemer 1998, 1). 
Formal equality of opportunity has close intuitive connections to fairness in that it demands 
that people cannot be discriminated against on morally irrelevant grounds. As such, it is central to 
distinguish the relevant claim bases from the irrelevant one with regard to the context at hand. We 
will come back to this in chapter 4. 
In a much more demanding form John Rawls (1971 and 2001) formulated the ideal of equality 
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of opportunity as a principle of equality of fair opportunity. It requires that society should do what it 
can to level the playing field among individuals during their formative periods, so that all those with 
relevant potential will eventually be admissible to pools of candidates competing for positions. This 
includes substantive support to the disadvantaged to strengthen their chances vis-à-vis those born 
into more fortunate circumstances. In a weak form many social states try to move closer to this 
ideal, by means of free public schools, scholarships for further education etc. In a strong sense 
though the ideal is hardly implementable, since it will never be possible to give all children exactly 
equally favorable environments to grow up in and develop their talents without violating other basic 
values. 
We should note that the ideal of social equality of opportunity is not just important from a 
justice perspective, but also from an efficiency perspective. In the words of Banarjee/Duflo “(…) the 
socially efficient outcome [is]: making sure that every child gets a chance” (2011, 81), because only in 
this way the slumbering talents of people can fully come to flourish to the benefit of society. 
With regard to debates on global fair trade, it is controversial if and how the ideal of fair 
equality of opportunity in a broad social perspective is a requirement of justice between societies. 
This question is discussed in the philosophical “Global Justice”-debate which is the topic of the 
chapter 4.7.2. However, from the perspective of fairness the much more restricted formal equality of 
opportunity with regard to participation and chances for success in particular social practices is 
relevant in a more general sense. As I said, we will come back to this in our discussion of different 
fairness standards in chapter 4. 
 
3.6.2 Equality of Negative Freedom: The Libertarian Position 
 
Let me turn to a position which holds that justice requires equal negative freedom for people – 
freedom for outside infringement. This is the view of the libertarian position (e.g. Nozick 1974), 
which is a version of John Locke’s theory on natural rights (Locke 1690. See chapter 3.2.). It holds that 
the morally required equality among people consists in every person having equal basic moral 
rights which give people certain absolute claims against others and thereby constrain people’s 
actions. In other words, for the libertarian position the basic equality among people consists in them 
having equal negative rights that require others to abstain from actions that would infringe these 
rights. We recall that they put very high value on people’s freedom, asserting people’s right to do 
whatever they choose with whatever they legitimately own so long as they do not violate the 
rights of others not to be harmed in certain ways – by force, fraud, coercion, theft, or infliction of 
damage on person or property. The libertarian position puts high emphasis on the legitimacy of 
private property, freedom of contract and the free market as a necessary condition for this freedom. 
Conversely, it is generally in opposition to redistribution of wealth and government regulations that 
curtail the free market. We will examine what the libertarian position means for the question of 
44 
 
distributive justice in chapter 3.7. 
With regard to trade, a libertarian approach generally holds that just trade or fair trade is 
given when the negative rights of people are not infringed, meaning that the state doesn’t interfere 
with the voluntary interactions between trading actors, and there is no fraud, coercion, theft, or 
infliction of damage on person or property. This position on the meaning of “fair trade” will be 
discussed in chapter 5.2.1.1 on the liberty-based line of argument for the position that “fair trade is 
free trade”. 
 
3.6.3 Equality of Positive Freedom: Income-Wealth Egalitarianism and Capability Approach 
 
 
According to an opposing views, the relevant equality among people lies in them all having equal 
claims of justice not only to negative freedom, but to effective positive freedom – the freedom and 
ability to do certain things. This entails having a variety of options to choose from regarding one’s life. 
One version of this position holds that what should be equalized among people is their 
income and wealth. This is because in a functioning market society, having money gives one a wide 
variety of options: to purchase commodities and do with them whatever one likes, engage in a 
variety of activities etc. Accordingly, to give people equal freedom in this sense, equality of income 
and wealth is seen to be necessary.  
However, this position has encountered serious objections. A first one is that to bring about 
and sustain a condition in which all people have the same amount of money would require 
continuous and extensive violations of people's Lockean rights, since these include the right to 
gain more property than others by gift, trade, or hard work (Nozick 1974, chapter 7). This relates back 
to what we said in chapter 3.5.1: even if everybody comes into this world with exactly the same 
rights, this situation is radically altered once men begin to act, because human actions are inherently 
claim-modifying. 
A second, related objection is that liberty necessarily leads to an unequal distribution of 
money over time even if it is distributed equally at some point, since people will choose to act in 
very different ways (Walzer 1983.) . A third objection is that monetary equality would inhibit people's 
engagement in wealth-creating and -saving activities for lack of motivation, and would thereby 
reduce society's wealth making everybody worse off. Some of these problems we will examine in 
more detail in chapter 5.2.1 with regard to the moral arguments for free markets. They do render 
the wealth egalitarian position unattractive, which is important to note with regard to ideals some 
people might entertain with regard to a globally equal distribution of wealth. 
A second, more plausible version of the position that focuses on positive freedom argues that 
what is morally required for society is not to create equality of income or wealth, but equality of basic 
capabilities (Sen 1980, 1992; Nussbaum 1992). Let me explain shortly what is meant by that. People 
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may do or be many different things – in Sen’s words, they have many different possible 
functionings. Many of these are of little importance, but others are essential for human flourishing. By 
capabilities Sen means all of the functionings that an individual is really free to choose at a time. 
The proposal of Sens approach is that what society should aim at is to get each person at or above 
the threshold level for every one of the capabilities that are specified to be necessary for a minimally 
decent or good enough life. Achievement of these basic capabilities is what should be equalized 
among people. Put differently, this approach advocates equal sufficiency for all but is open for 
differences above that level. 
With regard to trade, an approach that understands equality or sufficiency of positive freedom 
as a requirement of global justice could argue that just trade or fair trade is given when the actions 
and decisions of trade actors and institutions are guided by these goals. For example, along these 
lines one could argue that justice in global trade requires international trade regimes to serve the 
goal of alleviating severe poverty. The latter position is held e.g. by Stiglitz/Charlton (2005) and will 
appear again in chapter 5.2.2 regarding the position that fair trade is trade that serves the worst off. 
The question whether ideals of positive equality apply within societies is a question of 
distributive justice, which is the topic of the next chapter (3.7.1). The question how this looks like 
with regard to the global context will be discussed right after in chapter 3.7.2.  
 
3.7 Distributive Justice  
 
3.7.1 National Distributive Justice 
 
When the term “justice” is used in political philosophy and political theory it is usually the realm of 
distributive justice which is referred to. Distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of 
benefits and/or burdens among a certain group of people. It can be understood as being about giving 
to each member of that group what she deserves in the context of the distribution, or, in other 
words, fulfill the claims of individuals in the distribution. This requires comparing claims of different 
individuals, and finally satisfying them as much as possible in the face of competing claims of other 
individuals. The latter involves, again, the idea of proportionality: if stringent claims cannot be fully 
fulfilled in the face of competing claims, justice demands they be fulfilled as far as possible in 
proportion to their strength. As Aristotle put it, it is about the proportion of the shares people get in 
accordance with their deserts (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1131a30). This requires that the 
bases for stringent claims of individuals have been determined beforehand, which, as we have seen 
before, is done differently in different moral theories. 
The most usual realm of application of distributive justice is institutional systems that 
distribute benefits and burdens and establish an enforceable system of claims. As such, nation 
states have traditionally been in the focus of questions of distributive justice. As we will see later in 
46 
 
more detail, it is a contested question if requirements of distributive justice apply on a global scale 
nowadays. This is especially salient since the most prominent and controversial question of 
distributive justice is if and to what extent redistribution from the rich to the poor members of that 
group is justified or called for.  
A first central question with regard to distributive justice concerns the role of claims based on 
desert for just distributions. Let me sketch, very roughly, three classical, contradictory positions on 
the role of desert claims to elucidate what is at issue here. They are the positions of Robert Nozick, 
John Rawls, and Michael Walzer. 
On one side of the spectrum we find the libertarian position of Robert Nozick, as presented in 
his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) – mentioned before as the position which understands 
justice in terms of negative freedom only. It is based on the Lockean account of natural rights I 
discussed in chapter 3.2., and closely related to the argument for the free market based on liberty that 
we will encounter in chapter 5.2.1.1. Nozick’s argumentation is set in the framework of a set of 
procedural rules regulating the interactions of people, and an original distribution of goods that has 
come about in compliance with this set of procedural rules. Within this framework, Nozick argues that 
each individual should be entitled to freely do what she wants, and is entitled to reap the results of 
her freely chosen actions as her just deserts. In this view (and in front of according background 
conditions), everybody has a stringent claim based on entitlement on what they get as the results 
of their actions. The natural talents and abilities people use in coming to deserve things are 
something they just have, as consequence of a natural distribution, and people are therefore entitled 
to the benefits that are generated by them (Nozick 1974, 225). The natural distribution of talents and 
abilities may be arbitrary and undeserved, but it is not illegitimate, so why should not those who 
fortuitously have them benefit from them? According to the libertarian position, distributive justice 
accordingly demands that the property rights of people are protected, whereas it cannot demand of 
those who fared better to subsidize those who fared worse – after all, it was their decisions (in 
combination with their natural talents) that led to the according results. Redistribution (through taxes 
etc.) is accordingly seen as unjust.  
On the other end of the spectrum we find the liberal position of John Rawls, as presented in 
his book A Theory of Justice (abbreviated ToJ) (1971). We have already examined important ideas of 
Rawls regarding the relation of background, procedural and outcome justice in chapter 3.5. Now we 
will focus on the other aspects of his theory that are relevant for our topic. 
In the ToJ, the primary subject of justice is understood as being the basic structure of a 
society. In the terminology introduced earlier, the basic structure is concerned with the relevant 
conditions of background justice. The basic structure “is a public system of rules defining a scheme of 
activities that leads men to act together so as to produce a greater sum of benefits and assigns to 
each certain recognized claims to a share in the proceeds [outcome justice]. What a person does 
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depends upon what the public rules say he will be entitled to, and what a person is entitled to 
depends on what he does. The distribution which results is arrived at by honoring the claims 
determined by what persons undertake to do in the light of these legitimate expectations” (Rawls 
1999, 73). The effect of the basic structure is a certain distribution of basic goods (which include basic 
rights and resources).  
Rawls argues that the natural talents and abilities are not something people are 
responsible for and have done anything to deserve, and accordingly they don’t have a claim on the 
benefits generated by them either. To allow the distribution of primary social goods to be 
determined by natural talents and abilities, he argues, means to let people's life prospects be 
determined by factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view, i.e. that have no moral 
justification. Instead, Rawls argues, people should agree “to regard the distribution of natural talents 
as a common asset and to share in this distribution whatever it turns out to be” (Rawls 1971, 101). 
Distributive justice accordingly demands redistribution through taxes etc. 
Let’s have a closer look at the method Rawls uses for deriving what he calls a just basic 
structure in the case of a (national) society, and at what he identifies as the traits of a just basic 
structure. 
The method Rawls uses for deriving principles of justice is a famous thought experiment 
regarding rational equals who agree on the basic principles of justice that their society should be 
based on through an impartial process. Imagine a hypothetical contract situation, the so called 
„original position“, where rational individuals representing different groups of society decide about 
the basic structure of their society. They do so behind a „veil of ignorance“, meaning that they 
don’t know to which group they belong, and therefore cannot try to influence the design of the 
basic structure in a way that favors their particular interests.  
Rather, they have to find a basic structure that favors all as much as possible, since they 
hypothetically could end up as member of any group of society. 
The „veil of ignorance“, which constitutes the basic methodological idea of Rawls’ ToJ, is a 
device for guaranteeing fair results of the hypothetical negotiation in the original position. Because of 
this methodological role of fairness, Rawls calls his theory “justice as fairness”. Note that the 
concept of fairness in play conceives of fairness as impartiality (see chapter 4.2.). 
Rawls argues that the principles of justice the representatives would choose behind the veil of 
ignorance are the following: the first principle, which has lexical priority over the second, holds that 
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar 
liberty for others” (Rawls 1971, 60). These basic liberties of citizens include the political liberty to vote 
and run for office, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience, freedom of personal 
property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. 
The  second  principle  has  two  parts  (Rawls,  1971,  303),  holding  that  social  and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged in a way so that: (a) they are of the greatest benefit to the least-
48 
 
advantaged members of society (the difference principle), and (b)  offices  and  positions  are  open  
to  everyone  under  conditions  of  fair  equality  of opportunity. This is the liberal principle of fair 
equality of opportunity that we have encountered before.  Both of these principles are often 
mentioned in debates on just or fair global trade, and we will come back to how they apply there in 
chapter 3.7.2. 
The third approach concerning the role of desert for distributive justice is the one Michael 
Walzer elaborated in his 1983 book “Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality”. 
Walzer argues that there is not one principle of just distribution (related to what we called “claim 
base” before), but rather that there are several, depending on which social “sphere” is at issue. The 
principles of distribution Walzer mentions are free exchange, desert, and need. The social spheres and 
the according principles of distribution are the following: free exchange is the just distributive 
principle for the sphere of money and commodities, desert is the just distributive principle for the 
sphere of recognition (including offices, punishment etc.), and need is the just distributive principle for 
the sphere of welfare and security. For the realm of trade, this means that according to Walzer, free 
exchange is, in principle, the just principle of distribution, whereas desert and need play no role there. 
This implies that there are no independent claim bases in transaction that could serve as criteria 
for outcome justice, and accordingly justice in exchanges is conceived in purely procedural way. 
It is relevant to note that Walzer conceived his theory for national societies, and that he 
assumed that the other spheres are properly addressed by the according institutions. In the realm of 
global trade this is notoriously not the case. Nevertheless, this division into spheres is one way 
how to argue that free exchange is the just distributive principle with regard  to  global  trade, and  
that  need  and  desert, while  they  should  be  addressed  by different institutions, play no 
significant role there. It stays to be determined what this means in non-ideal theory, i.e. where 
such institutions are absent.  
For now though let us turn to the question how the depicted theories of domestic egalitarian 
justice can be transferred to the global level and what implications this has for understandings just and 
fair global trade. We will start with Rawls’ theory of justice, because it heavily influences debates on 
“fair trade”, both explicitly and implicitly. 
 
3.7.2 The Perspective of Distributive Justice on Global Trade 
 
With regard to the application of Rawls’ theory of justice to the global realm, an important question 
concerns relation between the three dimensions of justice as depicted in chapter 3. Assuming that it 
is correct, and in a very general sense transferable from the national to the global level, just global 
trade could be understood in the sense of procedurally just trade in front of just global background 
conditions. The important question in this perspective then is: what does global background justice 
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amount to? 
Framed this way, the debate on just global trade has to be understood in the broader context 
of the so called Global Justice (GJ) debate in political philosophy. In the following I will briefly sketch  
the  basic  controversy  and  important  positions  of  the  debate. 35 
The basic question of the Global Justice debate is if distributive justice is required or possible  
only  within national  societies,  or  if  the  world  as  a  whole constitutes a context of justice too. 
Simply put, the former is the „nationalist“ position, the latter the „cosmopolitan” position (from 
cosmo-polis = the world polity). 
Adherents of a nationalist perspective claim that for various reasons, distributive justice can 
only be sensibly conceived within a nation state, whereas it is not an issue globally. In this view, 
a state is seen as the precondition for the application of egalitarian justice, since it puts the co-
nationals or citizens in a relationship to one another that generates associative duties of justice, 
particularly duties of socio-economic egalitarian justice (Nagel 2005). Rawls himself argued that, when 
the thought experiment of the original position is repeated on the international level, not individuals, 
but nation-states have to be seen as the parties agreeing on the terms of their future co-operation, 
and that the principles of international justice derived with the help of the veil of ignorance (non-
intervention, self-determination, pacta sunt servanda, etc.) are analogues only of the first of his 
justice principles (Rawls 2002, 378-380). On the other hand, the second principle (of which part (a) is 
the difference principle) only applies to particular societies and has no application in the international 
context (in the simplified vocabulary used here, Rawls is therefore to be seen as a „nationalist“). In this 
view, people only have duties of egalitarian justice towards their co-nationals, but not towards 
outsiders. Accordingly, socio-economic inequalities, which might be in need of justification within 
countries, are not in need of justification on a global scale (e.g. Rawls 1971; cf. Miller 1995 and 
Nagel 2005). 
Put in a simplified way, in the nationalist perspective, disparities in the “background 
conditions” of global trade are not in principle seen as problematic from the perspective of justice, 
and neither is outcome justice of global trade seen as something to worry about. In other words, the 
only justice dimension of relevance to nationalists with regard to global trade is procedural justice, 
while background and outcome justice on a global level are considered irrelevant. On the level of 
trade practices of MNE’s, to many nationalists just or fair international trade accordingly usually 
means solely procedurally just trade in the sense discussed before. 
On the level of trade policies of states, the nationalist perspective asks for procedural justice 
among nation states (e.g. when negotiating bilateral treaties), and implies that it is legitimate that a 
just trade policy of a country is to serve first and foremost its own citizens. In this view of course, not 
only the industrialized countries but every country has the right and duty to devise its trade policy 
                                                             
35 For an helpful overview on the debate see Blake 2005. 
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in this way. On the level of the world trading system, again, the nationalist’s focus would be on fair 
processes when nation states negotiate the rules for international trade within the WTO. Nationalists 
would consider it completely just that what takes place are tough negotiations among governments 
with the interests of their own citizens in mind, but moral nationalists would object in the name of 
justice to attempts to cheat or coerce other delegates. With the focus of justice being on the 
procedural dimension, the main remaining question is what the demands are for negotiations to 
qualify as procedurally fair. We will have a closer look at this in chapter 5.1. 
Above that, many argue that there is a duty to “further just arrangements not yet 
established” in the international realm (Rawls 1999, 99). This can be based on Rawls methodology, 
but it can also be based on the general duty to recognize others as equals and the need to 
institutionally secure such relationships of mutual recognition as equals (e.g. Lister 2011; Wallimann-
Helmer 2011). 
For now though let us quickly look at how the nationalist perspective on global justice can be 
justified. There are three main lines of argument that are used to defend a nationalist perspective: a 
communitarian one (e.g. McIntyre 1981, Taylor 1985, Sandel 1996), a liberal nationalist one (e.g. 
Miller 1995, Tamir 1993), and an institutional one (e.g. Nagel 2005). 
The communitarian line of argument maintains that socio-cultural connections are the 
source and the natural context of morality. Human beings are understood as “embedded selves” 
(Sandel 1996, 50ff.) whose moral world view, vision of the “good life” and identity is essentially 
determined by the community they grow up in. On this background, shared communal life is also 
understood as the basis of moral duties, which the members of a community owe to each other. 
Outsiders on the other hand are not owed comparable things, and accordingly the world as a 
whole is not seen as a context of justice. However, since globalization is leading to ever closer global 
ties between people in the economic, cultural, social and medial realm, the picture of closed-off 
cultural communities has become rather implausible, and so has the negation of any global duties on 
the communitarians own account. Accordingly, most communitarians today accept that at least certain 
minimal moral duties exist on a global scale. However, they stop far short of global distributive justice 
(see Bleisch 2010, 46). 
The focus of liberal nationalists is less on the communities themselves and more on their 
functional role for the individuals living within them. Thriving cultural communities are seen as highly 
valuable und important for individuals since they offer a context in which sensible and good lives can 
be lived. The special connections co-nationals have with each other naturally make them partial 
towards members of their own community, which is seen as valuable because it leads them to do 
demanding things for each other. These special ties between co-nationals are a prerequisite for 
solidarity among them, which in turn is the basis of distributive justice (Miller 1995, 1999; Tamir 
1993). This solidarity does not exist on a global level, so distributive justice has no place there. 
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For  both  communitarians  and   liberal  nationalists,  attempts  to  get  to  global 
distributive justice would be considered to be both unnatural and harmful to national communities 
since they erode their cohesion and ability to fulfill their vital role for their members (ibid). Besides, 
national communities are seen as primarily responsible for their own faring and not that of others 
(although they might have certain duties towards them too). 
What I want to call the institutional line of argument for a nationalist position on the question  
of  global  justice  centers  on  the  role  of  institutions.  It maintains that the prerequisite for 
justice to apply is the submission of a group of people under a shared coercive system of rules 
and laws with institutions able to enforce them (Nagel 2005). The reason is that people owe 
justification to those that are coerced by their institutions, and this justification is only possible if the 
system is just. The coercive institutional setting which generates the demand for justice is, according 
to Nagel, currently (and into the foreseeable future) only given in existing nation states and not on a 
global level, so the concept of justice does apply to nation states, but not globally. 
A similar stance is taken by Risse (2007) and Kurjanska/Risse (2008) in their papers on fairness 
in trade, which are basically about fair trade policy of countries (see chapter 6). Risse argues that 
“fairness applies differently within and across states” (2007, 359) because within countries there is 
a shared legal corpus, with regard to trade especially property law and market regulations, which 
“must be justifiable to all it coerces” (ibid). Accordingli, Risse and Kurjaska are to be counted as 
nationalists on institutional grounds in the Global Justice debate. Since Kurjanska/Risse understand 
fairness to be about what people owe to others, and since this might differ with regard to citizens and 
non-citizens, their view on fair international trade is directly linked to the Global Justice debate, 
since what people owe to co-nationals versus what they owe to strangers is linked to the position one 
takes in that debate.  
The counter position to the nationalist one on the topic of global justice is the cosmopolitan 
perspective. It holds that the world as a whole does constitute a context of justice. There are two 
main bases for this position: One, which is sometimes called Globalism (e.g. Forst 2002), maintains 
that the principles of justice are to be applied on a global level insofar as there are (empirically) 
global institutions. The other, Cosmopolitanism in the narrow sense, maintains that principles of 
justice apply globally since their focus is individual human beings everywhere in the world, be there 
according global institutions or not (cf. Bleisch 2010, 218, FN 6). 
Cosmopolitans usually argue in one of two ways: either in a comparative perspective that 
global inequalities are unjust, or in an absolute perspective that severe poverty as a human rights 
violation as such constitutes an injustice. 
The former position is based on the view that global equality is something desirable and that 
global inequalities are in need of justification. Usually it is argued that global inequalities are unjust in 
virtue of leading to unequal life opportunities for people for morally irrelevant reasons, the country of 
birth being a question of luck and not of desert, analogous to social class with respect to national 
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societies. That this unjust situation must be changed is usually justified by transferring Rawls’ original 
position to a global level, with representatives of all countries (or individuals) agreeing on principles 
for their cooperation under the specified impartial conditions. 
Accordingly, cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists are divided by their answers to the 
question if this thought experiment of the original position for determining just institutions can (or 
must) be transferred to the global level, and if yes, which actors are to be involved in the original 
position at the global level (individuals or states). The cosmopolitan claim has it that the original 
position should be transferred to a global level, with representatives of all countries (or even 
individuals) impartially agreeing on principles for their cooperation. They argue that these 
representatives of global humanity would agree on something like a global difference principle (Pogge 
1989, Beitz 1979, Scanlon 1973). One could of course also agree on the methodological procedure 
and the setting, but argue that individuals behind the veil of ignorance would arrive at more 
minimalistic principles on the global level. It could be argued for example, very plausibly in my 
view, that they would minimally arrive at a principle that requires sufficiency for all of the world’s 
population. 
One can also arrive at the position that sufficiency is a requirement of global justice in another, 
more direct way, by arguing that severe poverty as a human rights violation is to be seen as the main 
ethical problem that needs to be redressed as a requirement of global justice. 
However we arrive at this conclusion: the view that severe poverty is an extremely weighty 
moral problem is undisputed. Without arguing for it here, I take the claim that sufficiency is a 
minimal requirement of global justice to be a highly plausible position. But even agreeing that 
global sufficiency is a requirement of justice (or morality) leaves at least two basic questions open: 
first the question of how to bring the desired outcome about, and second the question of who is 
responsible for bringing it about. Let me mention a few points only in a non-systematic order 
regarding these vast questions and their relation to global trade. 
First, one can advocate global sufficiency but argue that it is not the role of global trade, 
but rather of political institutions (national, regional or global) to bring it about, e.g. by providing 
for everybody’s basic needs in the vein of social aid if necessary. In this view, trade should do what it is 
best at, namely enhancing the size of the economic pie, whereas distributing parts of it according to a 
sufficiency based ideal of global justice should fall to other actors, most plausibly the states. If so, we 
need to advance an argument for the claim that it is the states’ duty to form some kinds of global 
institutions that are concerned with the distribution of wealth according to the sufficiency ideal.  
In the absence of such global institutions, could a sufficiency position on global justice be 
reason enough for arguing that MNEs have the duty to pay living wages which ensure sufficiency? We 
could for example try to argue that powerful economic actors like MNEs have the duty to fulfil the 
sufficiency ideal in their realm of influence by paying their employees living wages as a requirement of 
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global justice. However, this line of argument is confronted with the same problem, namely that it 
remains to show why it should fall on companies to fulfill these positive duties. We would therefore 
need an argument showing that it is their responsibility to do so. We will come back to this in chapter 
7.  
Second, whether one takes a sufficiency position in the global justice debate or a 
completely different one, one sensible understanding of just global trade is procedurally just trade in 
front of just global background conditions. If someone assumes that current global background 
conditions are just, he might accordingly argue in this vein that just global trade in the current 
situation amounts to procedurally just global trade. If one relies on this connection and assumes that 
current global background conditions are unjust, procedurally just trade is not enough to assure the 
justice of global trade. This can lead to two conclusions: First it can be argued that there simply can 
be no just trade in front of unjust background conditions, and that what justice in trade actually 
requires is only working politically towards more just global background conditions. Everything else, so 
the argument, misses the actual issue of justice in trade. This position is sometimes taken by 
cosmopolitan political philosophers (e.g. Bleisch 2010).  
Second, it could be argued that for just trade in the current non-ideal situation, some additional 
criteria regarding the justice or fairness of trade are necessary, probably concerning its outcomes. In 
this sense, one could argue in an egalitarian vein that for just trade, trade outcomes must be such as 
to minimize or at least not widen the global inequalities among people, or one could argue in a 
sufficientarian vein that they must improve or at least not worsen the state of the world from a 
sufficiency point of view. Accordingly it could be argued  that  certain  or  all  the  actors  involved  
in  global  trade,  from  governments  to companies to consumers, have a duty to contribute to these 
just outcomes in the context of their trade actions. 
Assuming for the sake of the argument that this is true, there are still widely different opinions 
on how global trade best contributes to global equality or sufficiency. Some argue that global free 
trade is the most powerful means to this end (chapter 5.2.1). Others argue that free trade must be 
mediated globally to contribute to this goal (chapter 5.2.2). Others again argue that trade along the  
lines  of  the  Fair Trade  System  is  what  contributes  best  to  this  goal.  What all these positions 
have in common is that they understand just global trade as trade that contributes to a just world. 
With this we will leave the topic of global distributive justice and turn to a subject that is at the 
very heart of fairness in trade between economic actors, namely commutative justice. 
 
3.8 Commutative Justice  
 
Commutative justice is the traditional concept concerned with just exchanges between trading 
actors. It can be understood as being about giving to each person what she deserves in the context of 
an exchange. Commutative justice is accordingly about the outcome dimension of trade. According 
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to Aristotle, justice in exchange requires us to abstract from the specific characteristics of the persons 
who are exchanging and focus solely on what is exchanged. The principle which applies is that of 
strict reciprocity, or in Aristotelian terms arithmetic equality (i.e. equal shares for the exchanging 
parties) (Aristotle, NE, book V). In this  sense, the  underlying  idea  of  commutative justice  is  very 
simple  and  at  first  sight intuitively appealing: transactions are judged to be just when the items 
exchanged are of equal value. 
The relevant ethical principle behind the idea of commutative justice then is the principle of 
equivalence. It states that in an exchange one is entitled to getting the equivalent value of the good or 
service one provides. More generally put, the principle of equivalence claims that in exchanges a 
proportionality relation must be observed: the gains and costs of one party must be proportional to 
the gains and costs of the other party. A transaction accordingly is seen as being substantively unfair 
when significantly unequal values are exchanged  and  thereby  the  principle  of  equivalence  with  its  
idea  of  proportionality  is violated. 
An important traditional theory concerned with commutative justice is the doctrine of the 
“just price”. Having its roots in ancient Greek philosophy, it was prominently advanced by Thomas 
Aquinas on the background of medieval Christian ethics. In its most developed form, the doctrine 
was based on the Golden Rule "do unto others as you would have them do unto you", which 
Aquinas interpreted as implying that one should trade value for equal value. He argued that it was 
immoral to gain financially without actually trading something that one had created, and that 
charging interest on loans was „usury“ and constituted a type of theft since it did just that. 
Above that, Aquinas argued that it is immoral to raise prices in response to high demand, 
and particularly when faced with a buyer who had an urgent need for what was being sold and 
would therefore accept to pay a higher price: 
Si vero aliquis multum iuvetur ex re alterius quam accepit, ille vero qui vendidit non 
 
damnificatur carendo re illa, non debet eam supervendere. Quia utilitas quae alteri 
accrescit non est ex vendente, sed ex conditione ementis, nullus autem debet vendere alteri 
quod non est suum. . . 
If someone would be greatly helped by something belonging to someone else, and the 
seller not similarly harmed by losing it, the seller must not sell for a higher price: because the 
usefulness that goes to the buyer comes not from the seller, but from the buyer's needy 
condition: no one ought to sell something that doesn't belong to him. 
— Summa Theologiae, 2-2, q. 77, art. 1 
 
In this sense, Aquinas condemned for example practices such as raising the price of building supplies 
in the wake of a natural disaster. He argued that to take advantage of potential buyers' increased 
willingness to pay for building materials (based on the increased demand caused by the destruction of 
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buildings) constituted a kind of theft since the cost of the seller stayed the same whatever the 
demand. 
The School of Salamanca, which studied the question of the just price extensively during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century, argued that the just price is determined by the fundamental 
standard of commutative justice, namely equivalence of value, and that the best indicator of the 
value of a good is the price it fetches in an open market (Elegido 2009, 29). This is already basically the 
view of subjective value theory.  
 
3.8.1 The Principle of Equivalence and Subjective Value Theory 
 
In economics it is nowadays accepted that the theory which best explains descriptively the coming  
about  of  the  exchange  value  of  goods  or  services  is  subjective  value  theory. According to it, the 
value of things is a function of the sum of the subjective preferences of people which lead to demand 
for the good in question, and the available supply respectively scarcity of that good. This ratio is 
expressed by the market price of the good or service in question. The relevant value of a good in this 
perspective then is its exchange value which is equivalent to its market price and which is determined 
uniquely by the average of what others are ready to pay for it on a free market. This double function 
of money in a market economy  is  expressed  by  Walzer  when  he  writes:  „Money  is  both  the  
measure  of equivalence and the means of exchange; these are the proper functions of money“ 
(Walzer 1983, 104). Note that, of course, the average of the subjective value people put on 
something can differ widely from the individual subjective value a particular person in a particular 
situation places on that same thing. 
On  the  background  of  a  theory  of  value  based  on  subjective  preferences,  the principle 
of equivalence and accordingly the outcome justice of a transaction are fulfilled when the market 
price is asked and paid for a good. As Koslowski writes, the „equivalence of service and service in 
return expresses itself in the equivalence of the market value of the service and its price“ (Koslowski 
1988, 228). 
This has relevant ethical implications: someone selling something for a price substantively 
above the market price, taking advantage of a person’s high subjective valuing of that item at a 
specific time – for example in a situation of need, with the seller having a temporary quasi-monopoly 
on selling the item – could therefore be said to violate the outcome justice of transactions. This would 
apply for example to the case of a shopkeeper raising the price for a fire-extinguisher to the double 
of the usual market price when the neighboring housing district is burning. The same could be said 
of someone profiting from need by buying something relevantly cheaper than the market price, as in 
the case of someone who buys, say, a piece of jewelry of someone in urgent need of money for his 
relative’s medical treatment for much less than the market price (cf. Wertheimer 2008). As these 
examples suggest Wertheimer’s hypothetical market criterion works well in the case of monopolies. 
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Now although this market economy interpretation of the principle of equivalence enables us 
to identify the substantive injustice of certain transactions, it does not capture all our moral intuitions 
concerning possible substantive injustices of transactions. 36 To take an example relevant in our 
context: a transaction where party A (e.g. a farmer in a developing country) supplies a product 
produced by hard work to party B (e.g. an MNE)  who  makes  high  profits  with  his  product,  but  
doesn’t  get  paid  enough  for subsistence in return since the market price of that commodity is 
currently on a very low level, seems at least questionable with respect to the substantive justice of 
the transaction. Or, to take another example, if a profitable company in a region of high 
unemployment employs workers to an extremely low salary and lets them work very long hours, it 
seems doubtful as well if this qualifies as just simply because the market value of unskilled work in 
the region is extremely low. In cases like these, the fact that the market price is paid doesn’t dissolve 
the moral discomfort we feel concerning the justice of the transactions. The reason for this might be 
that when there is a disproportion in the outcome of transactions this violates the idea of 
proportionality behind the principle of equivalence, and thereby commutative justice. But how can 
this be accounted for? 
One way would be to argue that some morally important factors are lacking in the way the 
market value of goods and services is determined. Accordingly, it could be argued that the market 
value of goods and services should include different or at least additional elements besides the 
average subjective value people place on it. To explore this possibility we will turn to another kind of 
value theory. 
 
3.8.2 Objective Value Theory 
 
As we said, when understood as based on economic subjective value theory, the principle of 
equivalence only takes into account the exchange value of a good in the form of its market price. It is 
intuitively alluring to think that to capture the disproportion mentioned above, the additional 
element that should go into the market price of a good has something to do with its production. In 
other words, it could be tried to argue that instead of or besides it’s exchange value, the market price 
of a good or service should also take into account its production value, thereby accounting for the 
input that went into the production of the good consisting of labor, resources and energy. 
The idea of the just price is usually thought to do just that: it ties the price of a good to the 
costs of its production. In this vein, Suranovic writes: “A price for a good is fair if it is approximately 
equal to the cost of producing it, where the cost includes a reasonable return for the seller’s services. 
An unfair price occurs if the seller sells the product for a price which significantly exceeds the cost, 
                                                             
36 For a detailed critique of the hypothetical market approach see e.g. Sample 2003, chapter 1. 
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or if the price is significantly below the cost” (Suranovic 2000, 298). 37 
To express the dimension of the production value in a way that is not expressed in market 
terms itself (as consisting of the market prices of the inputs including material, labor etc.) it would 
have to be based on an objective measure of those inputs, based on an intrinsic value theory. 38 Such 
an outlook attributes an objective value to a product and thus delivers an objective criterion of  its  
value  independent  of  subjective  preferences.  As such an objective criterion to define the 
production value of a good or service, the average labor time that goes into the production of the 
good (Marx [1865],1996) has been suggested, multiplied by a quality factor for the labor (Lasalle 
1863), or combined with a factor of “suffering” in the process of work (cf. Smith 1976). 
The explanative version of objective value theory has been discredited, since it is faced 
with grave problems. To mention just a few, it cannot plausibly explain the value of found natural 
objects, of rare goods, or of aged objects (such as antiques), since no substantive labor has been 
spent on them that could explain its value. Moreover the labor theory of value tends to become 
circular when confronted with more than one input factor. This led Nozick to claiming that this 
incoherence can only be avoided by resorting to a market price theory of value (Nozick 1974, 
chapter 8). 
So it is not the explanative versions of objective value theory but the prescriptive or 
normative versions of objective value theory that are interesting for questions of just commutative 
trade, which focus on how much someone should receive in return for their labor or goods. One 
such prescriptive labor theory of value was defended by Josiah Warren in the 19th century (Warren 
1852). Starting from Adam Smith’s principle that labor is the true measure of price, he claimed that 
the just compensation for labor or its product could only be an equivalent amount of labor (or a 
product which embodies such an equivalent amount of labor). In the tradition of Adam Smith he 
considered the “cost” of labor to be the subjective cost to the worker, i.e. the amount of “suffering” 
involved in work (cf. Smith 1776). In an attempt to include additional relevant factors, Arghiri 
Emmanuel (1972) argued that labor has different levels of skill and intensity, which have to be taken 
into account when the value of a product is estimated. So if the labor performed by a worker in a 
developed country were, say, three times as skilled and intense as the labor performed by a farmer 
in a developing  country,  the  principle  of  equivalence  requires  that  their  products  should 
exchange at a ratio of three to one (Emmanuel argues for this by way of the relative wages that each 
is able to command). The fact that in reality the ratio is much higher still means that the 
                                                             
37 Interestingly, medieval writers contrasted the “just price” (iustum pretium) with the “natural price” (verum 
pretium) derived from Stoic philosophy. The latter was any price agreed to by willing seller and willing buyer. The 
natural price thus corresponds to the exchange value in free market transactions (see Glaeser 1957; cf. Suranovic 
2000, 298). 
38 So called labor theories of value, which define value with reference to the necessary time needed to produce 
the good in question, prevailed in different forms in classical economics with theorists such as Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo, an important exponent being also Karl Marx. 
 
58 
 
principle of equivalence is violated in the exchanges (ibid., cf. Miller 2010, 17). 
The proportionality relation required by the principle of equivalence focuses usually on single 
transactions or work contracts. It requires that if A worked x hours (multiplied by additional factors 
like quality, skill etc. of his work), he should be paid x multiplied by y pounds/dollars etc., whereby y 
constitutes the adequate pay for his kind of work per hour. 
According to labor theory of value accounts however, the adequate pay would have to be 
specified without being able to return to the market price. This is of course a highly elusive and 
complicated endeavor. It would require setting up a whole system of the value of different jobs 
within a society in relation to each other, according to a criterion (e.g. social utility), translated into 
monetary terms. How socially valuable exactly is the labor of an artist compared to the labor of a 
nurse compared to the labor of a professor compared to the labor of a cleaner compared to the labor 
of an engineer? Besides this problem of the assessment of different kinds of work, how do we extend 
this across the borders of particular societies? Are different wage levels justified by different living 
costs in different geographic areas? How should the contribution of capital to the production be 
weighed, including a legitimate interest rate? How should the founder’s credit for his idea and 
organization of the business be weighed? Another problem with accounts such as the above is that 
efficiency usually does not figure in them. Thus Emmanuel’s concept has been criticized on the basis 
that the wage inequalities he points to are actually closely correlated with differences in productivity, 
which are presumably measured in terms of the prices at which products exchange on the 
international market (cf. Miller 2010, 18; Barrat Brown 1993, 43). 
As becomes clear from these questions, approaches based on some form of the labor 
theory of value have the clear downside that must rely on several precarious estimates, whereas the 
market price offers an objective measure of value. 
Apart from the difficulties of devising a system in the above sense, we must note that it would 
undermine some highly useful functions of the market. Let me just mention one at this point: The 
market acts to coordinate demand and supply of goods and services by means of (pure) market 
prices. Simply put, this works as follows: When there is an overproduction of a certain good or 
service, prices for that good or service go down since there is more supply than demand. The lower 
prices give lower incentives to produce the good in question, leading to less being produced, which 
leads to the overproduction going back and adjusting to the demand. On the other hand, when there 
is an underproduction of a  certain  good,  market  prices  for  that  good  go  up,  which  gives  higher  
incentives  for producing that good, leading to more being produced and the underproduction going 
up and adjusting to the demand. In this way, pure market prices coordinate demand and supply in a 
decentralized, “natural” way, which is highly useful for society. If actual prices were to be 
determined by an “objective” theory of value, the coordination of supply and demand would have to 
be brought about by other mechanisms, which implies weighty problems. The badly failed attempts 
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of historical socialist regimes to coordinate supply and demand in a centralized way demonstrate this 
vividly. In chapter 5.2.1 we will come back to this and additional functions of the market when the 
arguments for free markets are explored. 
This is not the last word on the relevance of this issue for the topic of “fair trade” though. 
In chapter 7.3 I will present an attempt to include production inputs into fair wages and prices not 
across the whole economy,  but  across  the  supply  chains  of  MNEs,. I will, however, conclude 
that this is far too complicated to be practicable. What the last paragraphs should have shown 
preliminarily though is that it is very difficult to argue against the claim that market prices for goods 
and services are a sensible measure for the principle of equivalence demanded by commutative 
justice.  
3.9 Intergenerational Justice and Position 1) Fair Trade is Trade that Respects the Claims of 
Future Generations  
 
Lastly, I want to consider the perspective of intergenerational justice on trade. There is actually a first 
position on fair trade that I want to discuss under this heading, namely the position fair trade is trade 
that respects the claims of future generations. Since it doesn’t fit into my categorization of Part II, I 
discuss it here together with the corresponding dimension of justice. The position is denominated 
position 1) whereas all the other positions are denominated with letters from a) to j). However, this 
special “status” of position 1) is quite fitting since it is relevant with regard to all the levels of analysis 
discussed in Part II, and takes a perspective that is often forgotten in the debates on fair trade, 
although it is highly important from an ethical perspective.  
Intergenerational justice is a wide topic of its own on which a lot has been written lately.39 My 
aim in this section is clearly not to present the according vast debate, but merely to point out how 
intergenerational justice can generally be understood as being related to questions of “fair trade”. 
Position 1) fair trade is trade that respects the claims of future generations is defended by Boda 
(2001), who claims that “intergenerational justice requires that trade meet some more specific 
criteria in order to be considered fair” (Boda 2001, 27). He argues that our moral responsibilities to 
future generations imply that we need to transform trade in a way that leads to “sustainable 
development” and that the free trade dogma has to be complemented with guiding principle 
that ensure the legitimate claims of future generations are respected.  
Formulated as a claim about fair trade, the position reads: trade is fair if it respects the claims 
of future generations. The basic argument goes as follows: 
 
(P1) Trade is fair if it respects the claims of future generations 
(P2) Trade respects the claims of future generations if it is sustainable  
(C) Trade is fair if it is sustainable 
                                                             
39 For an excellent introduction to intergenerational justice see Gosseries / Meyer 2009. 
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(P1) is to be understood as a necessary but not sufficient condition for trade to qualify as fair in a broad 
sense.  
In my terminology, this position concerns both just trade and ethical trade, since it concerns 
the fulfillment of stringent claims which both institutions and individual economic actors have a duty 
to fulfill. The duty they have to comply with is the duty to structure and practice trade in a way that 
respects the claims of future generations to an intact environment. In terms of analytical classification 
position 1) is concerned with the outcomes of trade.  
So, what are the ethical bases of position 1)? The second part of (P1) states the basic assumption 
of the perspective of intergenerational justice, namely that it is not only the people living today who have 
ethically relevant claims that must be respected, but also the people that will follow us on this earth as 
part of future generations. If one accepts that future generations have claims on us at all, which is 
plausible in my view, we all must refrain from activities that violate those claims, or put their fulfillment in 
serious jeopardy. And this is true for trading activities too, as the first part of (P1) claims. Actually, this is 
crucial, because in our current context of profit-maximizing capitalism, trade and the activities it is based 
on notoriously contribute massively to the destruction of nature. And nature is the basis of future 
generations’ survival. So, (P2) states that to respect the claims of future generations trade has to be 
sustainable in the sense of us leaving the planet to future generations in a condition that can ensure their 
continued survival and good life.  
Sustainability as a demand of intergenerational justice implies that future human beings have 
stringent claims vis-à-vis the people living today, and one of these claims is that present generations 
may not pursue policies that create benefits for themselves without regard to the costs on those 
who will live in the future. A prime example is of course an unsustainable exploitation of the 
environment, which generates benefits for the current generation while imposing the cost of a 
destroyed environment on future generations.  
Boda argues that since the “free trade dogma” for international trade has led to the massive 
destruction of natural resources which endanger the lives of future generations, it has to be 
adjusted. But in what ways should  this  happen  so  the  demands  of  intergenerational justice  are  
satisfied?  Boda argues in line with ecological economists like Gowdy/McDaniel (1995) and Daly 
(1993) that in order to achieve sustainable development, international trade should be on the one 
hand more regulated in terms of social and environmental standards, and on the other hand also 
reduced in absolute terms.  The former claim is rather uncontroversial, but the latter one is in need 
of further explanation. Boda argues that intergenerational justice demands that global trade must be 
reduced in absolute terms because some inherent features of it per se impede long term 
sustainability. He bases this claim on the following main considerations: 
1. In the context of the highly competitive global market it is extremely difficult to make 
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businesses pay for the external (environmental) costs of their operations. While an effective global 
environmental policy could internalize these external costs in theory, this is very hard to put into 
practice. 
2. Specialization to particular kinds of plants and animals which enhances efficiency leads  to  
a  homogenization  and  an ensuing  massive  loss  of  biological  diversity  (Noorgard 1988). 40 
3. According to Gowdy (1995) and Daly (1994) historical evidence suggests that in times of 
intensive international trade both local and global revenue inequalities increase. These inequalities 
are then transformed into unequal access to environmental resources, creating a special type of 
deprivation (Lipietz 1995), which in turn makes it difficult to implement any efficient environmental 
policy. An example would be poor people cutting down scarce trees in natural reserves for their 
survival. 
4. The ever growing global economy is too big for the capacity of the natural eco- 
systems. Since according to free trade theory trade fuels economic growth, it is problematic from an 
ecological point of view since this growth is not limited in time by the carrying capacity of the natural 
eco-systems. Rather as Daly/Goodland (1994) argue, sustainability requires a radical cutback of the 
throughput (including energy and material flow) of the economy. In theory this cutback could be 
achieved by technological development and more efficient resource use, but in reality up to now 
any increase in energy efficiency has been eaten up by absolute increase in energy use. This leads 
Boda to argue that the only way to cut the energy and material use back is to reduce the level of 
present production and consumption  “through  a  radical  restructuring  and  reorientation  of  
economic  activities” (Boda 2001, 25) back to the local level. 
5. Increased trade increases transportation which contributes to environmental problems (on 
the local as well as the global level). 
6. The current global economy is based on operations that are separated in time and space. 
Because of the psychological phenomenon of spatial and temporary discounting people hardly give 
due weight to the consequences of actions that occur somewhere else or in the future. And because 
we cannot exactly know what would be the ecological criteria of long term sustainability, Boda argues 
that we must act in the spirit of the precautionary principle, that is, we must avoid any action which 
might be harmful to the eco-system. Therefore achieving sustainability cannot  be  guaranteed  only  
through  meeting  some  ecological (quantifiable)  thresholds, but  through  securing  the  
institutional  conditions  of  long  term sustainability. This means according to Boda that small scale 
and local activities should be predominant over large scale and global activities. The predominance 
of local economic activities might not be a sufficient, but is according to him a necessary condition of 
achieving sustainable development (Boda 2001, 25, cf. Gowdy 1995, Redclifft 1992, Ghai/Vivian 1992). 
                                                             40 Scientists estimate that in the past twenty years several thousands of plant varieties have disappeared as a 
consequence of the extensive use of some specifically bred new plant varieties (Gowdy 1995). 
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Without being able to go into theories of intergenerational justice here, I assume the claim of 
future generations to an intact environment to be highly plausible. I also agree with Boda that 
concerns of intergenerational justice must be included in an encompassing ethical assessment of 
global trade. And I share his concerns voiced in the points above.  
However, I think that the question about the right means to this end might be answered 
differently. Assuming that global trade does in fact lead to global raising living standards, this 
important benefit is a weighty reason against going back to mainly local economies. I would 
accordingly argue that we might try to find other means for ensuring the sustainability of global trade. 
If this is not possible, then I agree with Boda that we would have to localize our economies again.  
Although I cannot develop this further here, as I see it, there are mostly two courses of action 
to be pursued: 1) strict global regimes regarding the internalization of environmental costs; and 2) 
massive investment in technological solutions aimed at reducing the environmental impact on all 
stages of the supply chains to close to zero. The latter includes energy and raw materials from 
renewable sources, technological solutions to avoid pollution (such as meticulous cleaning of 
water used by the industry etc.). 
With this, we will leave our reflections on the aspects and dimensions of the concept of 
justice of relevance for normative questions of global trade. In the next step, we will finally turn to 
examining the specific moral fairness concept. 
4. Fairness 
 
Let us start with the contexts where specific moral fairness questions arise. These contexts are very 
broad, ranging from games and sporting competitions to education, politics, administration and 
jurisdiction, to economic activities like bargaining, to everyday activities like queuing etc. 
Nevertheless, they have certain characteristics in common. Their common denominator is that they 
are contest contexts in a broad sense where comparative advantages or the avoidance of comparative 
losses can be sought at the expense of others (cf. Carr 2000). Examples where this is easily visible are 
the distribution of limited goods, the awarding of prizes and offices, and the assessment of 
comparative desert.  
Although empirically many people share agreement with regard to judgments of unfairness, 
the precise content of the concept of specific moral fairness is hard to grasp (cf. Finkel 2001, Carr 
2000). As we said above, the concept of specific moral fairness implies the absence of specific kinds of 
moral flaws that consist in certain morally connoted transgressions, breaches or violations of certain 
moral standards, while the antonym unfairness implies that some of those standards are violated 
and morally connoted transgressions, breaches etc. are present (Carr 2000,  9). But what exactly are 
the relevant moral fairness standards? And where do they apply? 
There is considerable controversy with regard to the correct answer to this question, and 
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different authors suggest different standards. Suranovic (2000) for example provides seven fairness 
principles that he infers from usages of fairness in social and public policy settings (Suranovic 2000, 
286). He argues that it is impossible to clearly distinguish between considerations of general 
morality, justice and fairness, and recognizes that his principles incorporate elements of all three. 
Further, he claims that these principles are all plausible in their own right and it is not sensible to 
argue that some are mistaken while others are correct. 
Suranovic distinguishes broadly between what he calls a) equality fairness and b) reciprocity 
fairness (ibid.). He argues that the moral basis for equality fairness is the recognition that people are 
fundamentally the same in important respects (ibid., 288), while the moral basis for reciprocity-
fairness is an understanding of justice as reciprocity (ibid., 294f).  Under  equality-fairness  he  
subsumes  non-discrimination  fairness,  distributional fairness, and golden rule fairness (ibid., 286), 
under reciprocity fairness he subsumes positive reciprocity fairness, negative reciprocity fairness, 
privacy fairness, and maximum benefit fairness. 
Although I discuss all the principles he mentions as well, my way of structuring is different in 
that I try to distinguish between issues of general morality, justice, and fairness. I assume what he 
cal ls  golden rule fairness to be about reciprocity, which I see, together with the concept of equality, 
as moral bases of justice, fairness, and general ethics. Further, we have discussed issues of 
distributional fairness in a broader perspective under the heading of distributional justice to embed 
them in the relevant context, and part of what Suranovic calls positive reciprocity fairness under the 
heading of commutative justice. What he calls privacy fairness is basically about self-determination, 
which I don’t take to be an issue of fairness proper, but which I will consider in chapter 5.2. What 
Suranovic calls maximum benefit fairness will be discussed in chapter 5.2.1 with respect to welfare 
justifications of free trade. What he calls non-discrimination fairness will be discussed under the 
heading of several fairness standards in the following. 
In what follows, I will focus of what I consider to be the most common proposals for specific 
moral fairness standards. There seem to be mainly seven conceptions of what exactly specific 
moral fairness means in the literature on the topic.41 They are the following: 
 
a) Fairness as respect for persons  
b) Fairness as Impartiality 
c) Fairness as Treating Equal Cases Equally, and Similar Cases Similarly 
 
d) Fairness as compliance with rules 
 
e) Fairness as fidelity to the aims of social practices 
 
f) Fairness as proportional fulfillment of stringent claims 
g) Fairness as sharing burdens and benefits equally or proportionally  
h) Fairness as not disadvantaging and taking advantage of others 
                                                             
41 These are similar to the fairness standards discussed by Carr (2000). 
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In the following I will present these different fairness-standards, their grounds, implications and 
problems, and their relevance and plausibility for the topic of “fair trade”. These reflections will 
serve as a conceptual basis for our analysis of claims of fair trade proper in Part II. 
 
4.1 Fairness as Respect for Persons 
 
One quite common conception of fairness understands it as involving treating persons with adequate 
concern and respect. More formally speaking, a necessary condition for an action or practice to be fair 
is that it treats persons with adequate concern and respect. 
Since fairness in this sense is sometimes used as a technical term in deontic moral theories, 
Carr calls this  understanding  of  fairness  „Kantian fairness“  (Carr 2000, 11). In deontic   moral   
theories   persons   are   understood   as   autonomous   beings   capable   of formulating and pursuing 
their own ends, and as such as having dignity and being of incomparable worth. Fairness understood 
in the said sense requires us to treat others as autonomous agents by respecting their interests. 
The incomparable worth of each individual gives rise to a presumption of equality among 
them which requires the equal treatment of all persons, unless there are morally justifiable reasons 
for treating them differently. Arbitrary discriminations between people are contrary to this 
presumptive equality of individuals and are considered unfair since they fail to show the respect due 
to others (Wolff 1998, 106). 
This understanding of fairness is usually implied when someone says that fairness requires us 
to respect the interests of others. Koslowski (1996) for example argues that fairness always implies a 
fair equalization of interests (Koslowski 1996, 72). In this sense, it could be claimed that “a trade 
transaction is unfair because it fails to respect the interests of one trade partner”, or that “the 
workers are treated unfairly since their interests (regarding pay, safety conditions etc.) are not 
respected”. In the same vein, we could claim that it is unfair to someone not to pay her a living wage, 
since this doesn’t respect her interests, which implies that she is not respected as a person. 
A corollary of understanding fairness as respect for persons is that it requires treating all 
persons with the very same respect they are due as persons. In this sense one can say that 
Kantian fairness requires one to treat people as equals. This is the sense in which e.g. Dworkin (1985) 
uses the notion of fairness. It is quite different from the sense of treating people equally discussed 
below which is concerned with a formal equality of treatment (this distinction has been explored by 
Katzner 1971, cf. Carr 2006, 12). 
However, there are two basic problems with understanding specific moral fairness as respect 
for persons: 1) It is certainly not applicable to a range of contexts where we usually use the notion of 
fairness. For example, athletic competitions would seem to be always unfair according to the notion 
of Kantian fairness: trying to win seems to involve arbitrarily privileging one’s own interest in 
winning above the similar interest of the opponent. To avoid this implausible conclusion, we 
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would have to take recourse to making amendments with regard to certain contexts, where respect 
for persons is not directly relevant for moral conduct, but rather mediated “through the lens provided 
by putatively reasonable and conventionally (as well as historically) accepted practices” (Carr 2000, 
13). However, in these cases then the context would seem to be paramount with regard to 
determining the demands of fairness, leaving respect for persons with no role to play. 
2) But even assuming that at least in some contexts the concept of fairness is aptly explicated 
as respect for persons is not convincing from an analytical perspective: used in this sense, 
“fairness” doesn’t seem to capture a specific kind of wrong. Rather it merely reiterates what is owed 
to others as moral beings anyway from within a deontic morality. As a matter of fact, this 
understanding of fairness doesn’t seem to add anything to our general understanding of moral 
obligations, since the obligations referred to as requirements of fairness are duties owed to others as 
moral beings anyway from within a deontic morality. Accordingly the “fair” and the “right” fall 
together (cf. Carr 2000, 12f), which would make the concept of fairness analytically redundant. 
In our terminology, this understanding of fairness would then fall under the heading of  the  
general  fairness  concept,  that  is,  the  general  deontic  understanding  of  moral rightness. To 
avoid confusion, in what follows I will therefore treat this understanding of fairness under the heading 
of ethical rightness (or wrongness). Accordingly, we will treat a claim that “the workers’ interests are 
not respected” as a claim about an ethical wrong, but not a flaw in terms of specific moral fairness. 
4.2 Fairness as Impartiality 
 
A widespread and appealing understanding of fairness explicates it as impartiality. Impartiality is a 
procedural fairness standard that rules out all forms of partiality and  discrimination  that  treat  some  
better  or  worse  than  others  for  morally  irrelevant reasons. Consider the following examples: 
Lottery: What is necessary for a lottery to be considered fair is that no participator is treated 
preferentially and all are granted exactly the same chances for winning; the rule of law: what is 
necessary for the rule of law to be considered fair is that laws are applied to everybody in the same 
way and nobody is treated preferentially; the awarding of prizes: all candidates should be treated 
equally and judged according to the same criteria. Note that all these examples concern institutional 
settings (in a wide sense of the notion). In such contexts, both the rules of the institutions and 
the actions of the agents implementing those rules are supposed to be impartial to qualify as fair. 
When concerned with individual agents, impartiality is usually seen to be concerned with the 
reasons for certain actions as opposed to the actions themselves (cf. e.g. Nagel 1970 und 1986). 
More concretely, impartiality on this level means to act from impartial or neutral reasons that are 
informed by standards of universality and objectivity. The former, universality, means that an actor 
would want to allow that everybody acts in this way, the latter, objectivity, that the reason for action 
is one that everybody could have and according to which everybody could act (Nagel 1970, 90-95). 
In other words, impartial reasons are blind for personal preferences and must accordingly be 
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distinguished from self-regarding or egoistic-partial reasons, the two kinds of reasons being mutually 
exclusive (Carr 2000, 17). 
The understanding of fairness as impartiality is on display in Rawls's famous notion of justice 
as fairness. As we saw earlier, his Theory of Justice (1971) seeks to identify principles of justice for the 
basic structure of society in an impartial, i.e. fair, way. It does so by devising the  setting  in  which  the  
basic  institutional  structure  is  determined  as  a  hypothetical situation, the original position, which 
makes partiality in the determination of what is to count as the principles of justice impossible. We 
recall that this is reached by imagining the representatives who decide on the principles of justice 
behind a veil of ignorance, which obscures to them the knowledge of their social belonging and 
thereby makes it impossible for them to be partial in their own favor when deciding on the principles 
of justice. The latter will thus be impartial, or in Rawls terminology, fair. 
I take it that impartiality is a plausible fairness standard for institutional contexts. However, the 
explication of fairness as impartiality does not work for the perspective of participants in social 
practices. Actually, in many contexts where fairness is relevant it is very natural and 
uncontroversial for actors to be partial, especially in favor of themselves. Examples are again 
competitions, where wanting to win is certainly not unfair.  
As we said before, in institutional contexts fairness can often be plausibly explicated as 
impartiality: with regard to the general rules and workings of institutions, the actions of agents in 
charge of  implementing institutional rules, and  the  actions  of agents in  their function as certain 
professionals. Accordingly, in the context of global trade, fairness as impartiality is presumably 
relevant with regard to the rules and workings of the WTO (see chapter 5.1), and possibly with 
regard to the trade policies of states (see chapter 6). 
Coming  back  to  our  original  formulation,  note  that  we  said  that  fairness  as 
impartiality rules out all forms of partiality and discrimination that treat some better or worse 
than others for morally irrelevant reasons. And indeed, it is often also claimed that, as a matter of 
fairness, the rules of institutions and the actions of agents should distinguish between actors in 
situations that are different in morally relevant ways. This concern for differentiation as a 
necessary aspect of  fairness  is captured  by what I will call the  concept of qualified impartiality 
(see chapter 4.8). At first sight, this might be captured in the next understanding of fairness I will 
discuss. 
 
4.3 Fairness as Treating Equal Cases Equally, and Similar Cases Similarly 
 
According to George Klosko, the “general idea of fairness” is that “similar individuals should be 
treated similarly” (Klosko 1992, 34). Put more generally, this view can be expressed as the principle 
Treat equal cases equally, and unequal cases unequally. Carr calls this the Equal Treatment 
Principle (ETP) (Carr 1981, 211). Fairness in this understanding is accordingly thought to require the 
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equal treatment of equal cases, and a different treatment of different cases in proportion to the 
nature of the difference. With regard to the context of global trade, this principle resounds in the 
claim that developing countries should be treated differently in trade agreements than industrialized 
countries (see chapter 5.2.3). 
This understanding of fairness can be expressed as demanding a formal equality of 
treatment for all parties, and as such approximates the notion of formal justice. Formal justice is 
usually conceptualized together with its counterpart material justice: whereas the latter establishes 
“the rightness or justness of a certain treatment for a given subject”, usually on the basis of claim 
considerations, the former “generalizes the requirements of the material element for all relevantly 
similar cases” (Carr 1981, 212, my emphasis. Cf. e.g. Hart 1961, 155-161; Perelman 1967). ETP or 
formal justice is thus “substantively empty and formally neutral between subjects. It does not contain 
or specify any substantive grounds for the determination of relevant equalities or inequalities; nor 
does it presume any basic equality between subjects prior to the establishment of such grounds” 
(Carr 1981, 212). 
But why should one treat people according to this formal, proportional equality of 
treatment? Or in other words, where does the normative force of fairness come from according to 
this understanding? 
Aristotle supposed that equal cases should be treated equally (and different cases differently 
in proportion to the nature of the difference) because logical consistency or rationality demands it. 
However, logical consistency per se is hardly a virtue in moral matters: After having treated some 
person horribly, consistency concerning equal treatment would require us to treat everybody in a 
similar situation equally horribly (Frankena 1962, 9-13; Carr 1981, 212). To claim that this is what 
fairness demands is not plausible in light of the understanding of fairness as a thick ethical concept. 
Even with regard solely to good treatment, equal treatment seems not generally warranted, 
as becomes evident when considering supererogatory moral acts. If fairness would require equal 
treatment, performing one supererogatory act – e.g. giving money to a beggar on the street – would 
require us to act equally in every comparable situation – e.g. by giving money to all the beggars we 
encounter. This however again seems to contrast with our intuitions concerning the demands of 
fairness. 
What is primarily relevant concerning how we should treat others then seems not to be 
logical consistency but moral propriety: “If we have moral reasons for treating someone in a 
particular way, these reasons will apply equally to all similar cases. But the reasons in question, and 
not the fact of logical consistency, supply the normative grounds that dictate what we ought to do” 
(Carr 2000, 31). Accordingly, the equal treatment of equal cases “is a consequence of acting upon 
general moral reasons of following acceptable moral rules, and we get things backwards if we 
suppose that it is itself a moral reason for treating others in a particular way (Carr 2000, 32; cf. Hart 
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1961,  156; Perelman 1963,  41; Rawls 1971,  58; Gerwirth 1978, 161f). 
It seems then that the notion of formal equality of treatment and consistency is a 
consequence – not a condition – of morally proper conduct. Consequently, it cannot explain the 
normative force of fairness claims, nor does it seem to be convincing as a explication of the concept of 
fairness. 
If we want to make sense of the above idea, we have to understand it as stating that strict 
equality of treatment might not be morally right if there are weighty moral reasons for treating some 
cases differently. To understand this as a demand of fairness however would require basing the claim 
on another fairness standard – presumably not disadvantaging others, or possibly equality of 
opportunity.  
 
4.4 Fairness as Compliance with Rules 
 
Another common view has it that fairness amounts to complying with the rules that govern certain 
activities. There is a simple reason that seems to suggest this view: breaking the rules to one’s own 
advantage is cheating and a clear intuitive case of unfairness. 
However, understanding fairness as compliance with rules is faced with grave problems. For 
one, rules and procedures are themselves subject to fairness  concerns  –  accordingly they  cannot  
be  seen as  the  (sole)  normative  source  of fairness considerations. Second (and relatedly), following 
rules can sometimes result in unfairness – namely if the rules themselves are unfair. If, for example, 
I follow a rule that allows women to use a dictionary in a language exam while it prohibits men from 
doing so, my using a dictionary doesn’t seem fair even if I am not thereby breaking the rules. Further, 
fairness seems to be relevant in social activities that are not governed by explicit rules, such as 
children using the swing on a playground – although there is no explicit rule stating how that should 
happen, we would consider it unfair if a few kids claimed the swing for themselves, keeping the others 
from using it. It seems then that understanding fairness as compliance with explicit rules does not 
capture the core of the concept of fairness. 
I conclude that explicating fairness as compliance with rules is not plausible, and I will 
therefore not accept it as an appropriate fairness standard in our discussion in Part II. However, there 
is a related suggestion that might be more promising. 
 
4.5 Fairness as Fidelity to the Aims of Social Practice 
 
The position that explicates fairness as fidelity to the aims or guiding principles of social practices can 
be illustrated by coming back to the popular distinction between procedural and background 
fairness and Brian Barry’s comments on the topic (see 3.5).   As we saw there, Barry claimed that 
„procedural fairness rules out one boxer having a piece of lead inside his gloves; but background 
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fairness would also rule out any undue disparity in the weight of the boxers; similarly background 
fairness would rule out sailing boats or cars of different sizes being raced against one another 
unless suitably handicapped” (Barry 1965, 98-99). Thus, the rules must be in accordance with 
background fairness to qualify as fair. But what are the appropriate criteria for background fairness? 
Barry goes on to argue: “The criteria of background fairness… vary according to the ‘right 
result’. If all that is being tested is the ability to knock out an opponent, there is no need for any 
limits on the disparity of size between boxers; but if the boxing match is supposed to be a test of skill, 
‘background fairness’ must be brought in to specify the maximum disparity beyond which skill is 
secondary in determining the result to brute force” (Barry 1965, 103). 
Carr argues that this is actually a way of saying that the criteria for background fairness are 
dependent on the particular activity itself, and this is the perspective on fairness he himself proposes: 
“So then, the fairness of the prescriptive rules that regulate and govern some event or practice 
apparently depends upon the way these rules facilitate the spirit, ideals, purpose, or point that 
underlies and inspires the event itself; they rely, that is, on the way these rules promote an end, or 
telos, of the practice they govern” (Carr 2000, 47). Accordingly,  “fairness  is  more  profitably  
understood  in  terms  of  fidelity  to  the  telos, objective, or ideals – to the pursuit of the ‘right 
result’ – of some social practice than in terms of adherence to rule” (ibid., 48).  
In Carr’s sense, fairness “reminds us that even in contested practices we are, and should 
therefore consider ourselves, fellow participants in a common enterprise first and competitors 
second. Fairness, then, calls us to our responsibilities to specific others, to our fellow co-operators, 
and emphasizes our specific attachments and identifications with particular others, regardless of 
whatever else might separate us” (Carr 2000, 62). And further: “Participants in contested practices … 
have divided concerns. On the one hand, they have a personal interest in winning the competition, 
promoting their own well-being, and/or reaping the rewards available. But as fellow cooperators42  in 
a social practice, they must also accept and adhere to the purpose and ideals of the practice, even 
though this will almost surely mean putting aside their personal interests on occasion.” (ibid., 61).  
As a model case of unfairness, cheating “is an instance of putting one’s personal interests 
above one’s responsibilities as a fellow cooperator, and this is the sort of thing that violates our 
sense of fairness. Conversely, a person plays or participates fairly in some purposive social practice 
if she remains steadfast to the telos of the practice and honors her commitments to her fellow 
cooperators” (ibid., 62). In other words again, “… the type of defection from the practice associated 
with unfairness will … frustrate efforts to achieve a telos of the practice and thus constitute a 
type of betrayal” (ibid., 63). 
According to this perspective, the distinction between procedural and background fairness 
fades away, since both can be understood as being about fidelity to the goals of a social  practice: 
                                                             
42 Note that the term “cooperator” here is again used in a very loose sense. 
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actions,  rules,  conditions  etc. are fair  when  they  are  conducive  to  the purpose of the social 
practice in question and unfair when they are against the purpose of the practice. 
A similar understanding of fairness shines through in some places in Rawls’ writing too, 
such as in the following passage: “Usually acting unfairly is not so much the breaking of any particular 
rule, even if the infraction is difficult to detect (cheating), but of taking advantage of loopholes or 
ambiguities in rules, availing oneself of unexpected or special circumstances which make it impossible 
to enforce them, insisting that rules be enforced to one’s advantage when they should be suspended, 
and more generally, acting contrary to the intention of the practice” (Rawls 1958, 180). Aaron 
James’ theory of fairness in trade is to some extent also based on a similar account (see chapter 
5.2.5). 
To illustrate the relation between fairness and the goals of purposive associative practices, 
consider the practice of sporting competitions: their aim is, quite uncontroversially, to identify the 
most skilled athletes. If someone tries to gain an advantage that goes against this aim, e.g. by fouling 
when the referee is not watching, this is thus to be considered unfair. If someone acts in accordance 
with this aim, possibly even above what the official rules require, it is to be considered fair. For an 
example of the latter, consider the example of a bike race where a mass-crash involving the whole 
leading group happens. Now imagine that the following group slows down to let the victims of the 
mass-crash catch up. We would think, or so I take it, that this is an especially fair act. Carr’s 
perspective on fairness can explain why: it promotes the goal of the practice of sporting 
competitions, namely to determine the most skilled athletes.  
The same applies on the level of competition rules: to be fair they must be such as to favor 
the aim of identifying the most skilled athletes. Another way of expressing this for cases of the 
distribution of burdens and benefits is that the relevant claim bases for a fair distribution depend on 
the social practice at hand (more on this below). 
Another example is queuing. Here the aim/rationale of the social practice presumably is to 
coordinate the waiting process on the claim base of order of arrival. If somebody is overtaken by 
someone who came later, he is unfairly disadvantaged. 
On this understanding of fairness, determining what the demands of fairness are in the 
context of a certain associative practice requires reflection on what should be seen as its aims. This is 
of course not an unproblematic matter: social practices don’t come with a tag on them which 
identifies their goals – rather they have evolved over time, their social goal being inherent in them. It 
is thus undoubtedly controversial what should be seen as the purpose of certain social practices 
(cf. James 2009). Above that, one can of course question the fairness and legitimacy of certain 
existing social practices and their goals. Carr is aware of that and suggests that their legitimacy can be 
tested by checking if they are in agreement with the ideals of social justice of the society where they 
are situated. This amounts to a second order fairness assessment: the fairness of actions is judged 
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with regard to their being in accordance with the aims or ideals of the social practices in which they 
are situated, and the fairness of those practices in turn is judged with regard to their being in 
accordance with the ideals of social justice of the society as a whole. Carr stops at this level 
(obviously because he subscribes to a communitarian position). 
In general, I take Carr’s proposal to be interesting and plausible in many respects. However, it 
is not exhaustive of the moral content of the concept of fairness. First, I first take it to be implausible 
to assess the rules or aims of particular social practices with regard to some community-specific ideal 
of social justice. Rather, besides being related to particular social practices, I take it that fairness is 
based on standards of general morality. As such, the equality of all people is implied in the concept of 
fairness. In this sense, I take it that we must broaden this notion of fairness to make reference to 
people’s basic equality. 
Second,  I  don’t  see  any  convincing  reason  that  would  confine  the  relevance  of fairness 
considerations in his sense to particular societies – after all, if fairness is about what we owe to our 
fellow participators in purposive social practices, why should the fact that a certain practice 
transcends state borders annul this normative relation? Rather, it seems to be against the very spirit 
of Carr’s own understanding of the nature of fairness to claim that in the case of international 
practices fairness concerns are simply irrelevant.  
I will take up the plausible aspects of Carr’s explication of fairness in my own proposal of how 
fairness should be understood in chapter 4.9. 
4.6. Fairness as Proportional Fulfillment of Stringent claims  
 
A prominent explication of fairness was proposed by John Broome (1999, 1994, 1990-91). He 
understands fairness in the sense of the proportional fulfillment of stringent claims in the context of the 
distribution of goods (1990, 95). In the case of equal claims, fairness requires equal treatment. In 
general, fairness requires that “claims should be satisfied in proportion to their strength” (ibid.). It 
accordingly concerns the relative satisfaction of claims: “The heart of my suggestion is that fairness is 
concerned only with how well each person's claim is satisfied compared with how well other people's 
are satisfied” (ibid.).  
Broome distinguishes fairness-reasons from two other classes of reasons with regard to their 
respective claim bases, namely benefit, which can be maximized (teleology and particularly 
utilitarianism), and absolute side-constraints (1990-91). Whereas justice in Broome’s sense is concerned 
with all kinds claims, fairness is only concerned with the sub-category of fairness claims (ibid., 96). 
Broome does not offer a complete theory or list of the bases of fairness claims but leaves room for 
different claim bases on purpose: ‘In different circumstances claims will have different sources. 
Sometimes they may arise from the candidates’ needs, from their general rights such as property rights 
or a right to life, from a debt of gratitude, or from something else.” (Broome 1984, 44). Elsewhere he 
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suggests that desert, need, and contracts might be among the relevant claim bases (1990-91, 93). 
According to Broome’s conception of fairness, if someone owes somebody 100 units of corn and 
another person 200 units on the base of contracts, but doesn’t have enough units of corn to fully fulfill 
both claims, fairness requires that he fulfils each in proportion – that is, the first person has to get the 
double amount relative to the second person. 
Broome argues for his theory among others on the grounds that it explains best why lotteries 
are a fair means to distribute indivisible goods to which several people have conflicting claims. And 
indeed, I take it that his theory of fairness is plausible for such distributions, and generally also for 
situations where divisible goods are to be distributed.  
However, there are several problems with regard to Broome’s theory of fairness. First and 
foremost, as far as I can see, it only applies to fairness questions with regard to distributions. With 
regard to trade, it accordingly only applies to its outcome dimension, whereas it doesn’t say anything 
about the structural and the procedural dimension. Especially the latter is definitely central to most 
understandings of fairness.  
With regard to distributions, second, the biggest problem with the theory in my view is that it 
rests unclear how we are to determine the relevant claim bases in particular situations. And third, it also 
remains unclear how we are to compare claims that arise on different bases. For this it seems we would 
need another reference point from outside the theory.43  
As we saw before, there are other fairness explications that might offer a solution with regard to 
those problems. As such, we could try to specify the relevant claim bases by reference to the aims of the 
particular practice at hand.  
4.7 Fairness as Sharing Burdens and Benefits Proportionally 
 
As was mentioned before, in cases of cooperation, fairness is often thought to require that people 
get a proportional share from goods that they contribute to producing, and that they take on a 
proportional share of the costs or burdens when consuming cooperatively produced goods (cf. e.g. 
Lyons 1965). This is an outcome oriented fairness standard since it concerns a distribution. 
In some cases of cooperation (e.g. cooperation in the context of whole societies), the 
participants in the practice might have the same presumptive claim to shares of the goods their  
participation  helps  to  create  (according  to  the  practice’s  generally  understood purpose), and 
accordingly not distributing the shares equally would arbitrarily discriminate against those who 
receive lesser shares, unless special reasons can be given why an unequal distribution is acceptable to 
all. 44 
                                                             
43 There are other criticisms of the theory as well, such as in Hooker 2005, where it is argues that Broome’s theory 
is not convincing in situations where claims are very different in weight. cf. Hooker 2005. 
44 While non-participants would not have a claim to a share of the cooperatively produced goods on the basis of 
their contribution, they could still raise other potentially reasonable objections, for instance, against harm done to 
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One  of  the  most  famous  principles  with regard to the fairness standard of distributing 
burdens and benefits proportionally in cases of cooperation  is  the  so-called  “principle  of fairness”. It 
postulates a normative relation between the goods produced in cooperative arrangements and the 
responsibility of those who profit from them to contribute to them. The according fairness principle 
is importantly directed against free-riding with regard to non-excludable goods, i.e. goods that, once 
existent, benefit all with no possibility to exclude some from the benefits (cf. Rawls 1971; Carr 2000, 
26). A well-known example to illustrate this is public transport. Public transport is a public good 
since, once operating, everybody can use it and profit from it. Now, the principle of fairness demands 
that those who benefit from the public good by using it also contribute to its costs, in this case by 
buying a ticket. Just benefitting from public transport without contributing to its costs would be free-
riding on  the  efforts  or  costs  of  others,  which would  imply  an  unproportional  distribution  of 
burdens and benefits. According to the “principle of fairness” this would thus have to be considered 
unfair. Another example might be the public good of intact environmental resources, such as e.g. a 
clean river. When a group of cloth manufacturing firms that operate in the area refrain from leading 
their wastewater into the river and incur costs for disposing of it in an environmental friendly way, 
but one firm drains it into the river (which doesn’t reach the critical amount of pollution necessary 
for the river to be damaged in a substantive way), the latter firm can be said to be free-riding on the 
efforts of the others. 
John Rawls popularized the principle of fairness (which he adapted from Broad (1916, 388) 
and Hart (1955, 185) and gave it it’s probably most famous expression: „The main idea“ behind 
the principle of fairness, he writes, “is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually 
advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty in ways 
necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a 
similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefitted from their submission“ (Rawls 1971,  
112, see also Rawls 1958,  179). And:  „We are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others 
without doing our fair share“ (Rawls 1971,112). 
More recently, Philipp Van Parijs suggested a “principle of fair cooperation” along the lines of 
the principle of fairness. It centers on the idea of sharing burdens and benefits proportionally in 
cooperation: for a cooperation to be fair, the ratio of benefits to costs of one party should equal the 
ratio of benefits to costs of the other parties (Van Parijs 2011). Van Parijs framed the principle in the 
context of linguistic justice with regard to the costs and benefits of a lingua franca, but it is basically 
thought to apply to any kind of cooperation. 
Aaron James holds a position on fair global trade which is based on a similar understanding 
when he argues for establishing a fair distribution of burdens and benefits of global trade among the 
countries involved (see 5.2.5). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
them or their exclusion from the practice. 
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The claim that there is a normative relation between the goods produced in a cooperative 
endeavor and the responsibility of those who profit from them to equally contribute to them (if they 
can) seems intuitively very appealing. If one accepts this, the question then is of course where 
exactly the principle applies. In other words, what is needed for something to count as a 
cooperation that triggers the principle of proportionality of burdens and benefits? We will look at this 
question in chapter 7.3. 
 
4.8 Fairness as Not Taking Advantage of Someone or Something, or Not Disadvantaging 
Others 
 
The last way to understand the specific moral fairness concept that I want to discuss is fairness as not 
taking advantage of someone or something, or as not disadvantaging others. 
In everyday life, people often complain that they have been treated unfairly when they have 
been taken advantage of by others. In this sense, fairness is often used in the sense of “not taking 
advantage of people” – even if one could. This seems to be an attractive position as to the specific 
content of the concept of fairness, since in real live situations “Considerations of fairness involve a 
concern for relative advantages and disadvantages which is foreign to the concerns of justice” (Carr 
1981, 214f). 
But should we understand “taking advantage of someone”? Gauthier proposed that taking 
advantage of someone means to improve one’s situation through an interaction that worsens the 
situation of another (Gauthier 1986, 205). But this account doesn’t seem plausible in general, since 
there are compelling counterexamples to seeing this as generally unfair. One such example is direct 
wagers: the party that wins the wager certainly improves his situation through an interaction that 
worsens the situation of the party that loses the wager – however, we wouldn’t say that the winner 
acted unfairly. 
Another way of understanding advantage taking relates it to taking advantage of a certain 
weakness of another person, instead of the person herself. Accordingly it has the form of taking 
advantage of something (Carr 2000, 13f). This weakness can be a “weakness” of the person herself 
(like, someone’s having low self-esteem, being bad at mathematics, etc.),  or  due  to  certain  
background  conditions  (like  someone’s  being  in  a  desperate situation). Consciously using this 
weakness or weak position for one’s own advantage, we could suspect, is unfair. 
But in many cases it seems perfectly acceptable to take advantage of another’s weakness. For 
example, in a tennis match it is not considered unfair to take advantage of the opponent’s weak 
backhand, or in economic competition for a firm to take advantage of its competitors weaker 
technology. Accordingly, we would need an additional criterion for determining what kinds of taking 
advantage are unfair. 
Before exploring this, let us consider if it might be more straightforward to explicate 
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unfairness as the terminologically related behavior of disadvantaging someone. Disadvantaging 
someone means something along the lines of impairing the relative persons in the reaching of their 
goals, often (but not necessarily) in the sense of comparative disadvantaging which implies that 
somebody else gains as a consequence of the disadvantaging (cf. Carr 2000, 14). This can happen in 
the form of taking advantage of someone or something in the sense stated above (for example, 
again, the opponent’s weak backhand  in  a  tennis  match),  but  it  can  also  happen  in  ways  that  
don’t  imply  taking advantage of something, e.g. by cheating in economic exchanges or treating 
applicants for a job in a biased way. 
In any case, many examples show that disadvantaging someone is not necessarily unfair: 
disadvantaging an opponent in a tennis match by taking advantage of his weak backhand is again a 
case in point, or disadvantaging a competitor on the market by establishing a business the 
comparative success of which drives him eventually out of the market. Again then, we would need 
a criterion to distinguish the unfair cases of disadvantaging from the unproblematic ones. 
However, many cases of taking advantage of something and of disadvantaging are indeed 
among the clearest intuitive instances of unfair behavior. Examples are cheating in contexts such as 
competitions and games, or comparative advantaging of some in the awarding of prizes, offices etc. 
This is not surprising since, as we said at the outset, fairness concerns arise in contested contexts 
where comparative gains are sought at the expense of others. “Contested contexts invariably involve 
comparative advantaging and disadvantaging; that is, they involve making discriminations that may 
benefit some and that risk either worsening the situation of others or leaving their situation 
unchanged” (Carr 2000, 14). 
So the question we need to ask is what exactly makes certain forms of taking advantage of 
something or disadvantaging unfair. 
A promising candidate for such a criterion for deciding between fair and unfair advantage 
taking and disadvantaging could be consent: one could suspect that non- consensual disadvantaging 
implies unfairness, whereas consensual disadvantaging doesn’t. Participating in certain activities 
such as games, sporting competitions or wagers, it could be argued, implies consenting to the rules 
that govern these activities, which in turn specify that certain forms of disadvantaging are allowed 
(e.g. taking advantage of a weak backhand), whereas others are forbidden (e.g. cheating). 
Disadvantaging consistent with the rules would accordingly constitute consensual (and therefore fair) 
disadvantaging, whereas disadvantaging against the rules would constitute non-consensual (and 
therefore unfair) disadvantaging (Carr 2000, 15). 
But upon a closer look we find that in the connection just depicted the crucial point seems not 
to be the consent of people. In many contexts where fairness is relevant, such as games, 
competitions, queuing, etc. the partaking in the activity in itself implies accepting the rules and 
guiding principles that govern the activity, which in turn form the reasonable expectations of the 
participants concerning the behavior of other participants. It is then not disadvantaging others in the 
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absence of consent but rather disadvantaging others by acting against the rules or guiding principles 
of the relevant practice that constitutes the unfairness. 
However, there is more. Above that, it seems unfair to take advantage of specific 
situations, namely those where the other person in disadvantaged already. For example, if someone 
has no bargaining power in a negotiation because he has no reasonable other options than accepting 
whatever outcome the “negotiation” yields, it seems unfair to take advantage of this situation to 
get a maximal benefit oneself. Goodin argues along these lines when he claims that: “The generic 
unfairness (…) lies (…) in playing for advantage in situations where it is inappropriate to do so” 
(Goodin 1987, 184). Goodin suggests four different situations where it seems inappropriate to seize 
strategic advantages (Goodin 1987, 185f) 45: 
 
1. Against players who themselves have renounced to do so. 
 
2. Against players who are unfit/unable to play. 
 
3. Against far weaker players. 
 
4. If ones profit would result from another’s grave misfortune. 
 
 
 
Like my example above, Goodin’s examples suggest that in some cases there is a connection of the 
unfairness to the relation between the background, procedural and the outcome dimension of 
interactions. In all the examples, the background conditions of the interaction are such that one party 
is severely disadvantaged compared to the other already before the interaction, in the sense of the 
parties having highly unequal opportunities in the interaction itself. Taking advantage of this 
background disadvantage seems clearly unfair. 
4.9 Fairness Revisited 
 
Let me bring together the results of our reflections on fairness. I propose the following 
understanding of fairness: Fairness can be explicated as not disadvantaging any party in an 
associative practice, as measured against the rationale of the practice, 46 and the equality-based ideal 
that all parties should be able to participate in the practice on equal terms. This sounds complicated, 
but is actually just another way of expressing what is often called qualified impartiality, applied to 
particular contexts, and formulated in a way that makes it applicable not only to institutional 
contexts, but also to the perspective of participants in the practices. Understood in this sense,  
fairness  is  sensitive  to  disadvantages  of  some  parties  in  the  background conditions of the 
practice and aims at correcting them so as to enable their fair participation in the practice. 
                                                             
45 The list is not necessarily thought to be exhaustive. 
46 That is, fairness prohibits disadvantaging someone based on bases other than the ones that are tied to the 
rationale of the practice. 
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To identify the rationale or “aim” of a particular practice, we use a morally informed 
“constructive interpretation” of the aims of the social practice in question.47  In doing this, we 
make as uncontroversial assumptions as possible. In this sense, for the practice of trade I assume 
“mutual gain” or “mutual benefit” as the aim of the practice (more on this in Part II). 
Fairness in this understanding then is primarily a procedural standard, the requirements of 
which vary according to the particular context, but are always measured against an assumption of 
basic equality among the parties. 
Understood in this sense, fairness requires more than just the fulfillment of general negative 
duties. But where do the additional duties come from?  
I propose to conceive fairness duties as duties of special relations. We recall that fairness 
considerations are relevant in situations where individuals are connected to each other as co-
participants in purposive social practices, and that what they demand is owed to the other 
participants in the practice. In this sense, participation in purposive associative practices should be 
seen as generating a special relation among the participants, which in turn generates the specified 
fairness duty.  
Does this apply to the practice of trade? As I said, I consider “mutual benefit” to be the aim of 
the practice of trade. So let me consider this question by discussing the general case of mutually 
beneficial interactions between actors, which is often assumed to generate certain duties: the so-
called Interaction-Principle.48 
The Interaction-Principle (IP) holds that “one has special responsibilities to those with whom 
one interacts beneficially that one would not have if one had chosen not to interact with them” 
(Wertheimer, cited in: Zwolinski 2007, 708). In other words, IP claims that interacting beneficially with 
others puts one in a special relation to them that generates special obligations or associative duties 
(Scheffler 2001, 49) towards them.  
Take Wertheimer’s example to illustrate this: “Lawn Mowing. A proposes to hire B to mow his 
lawn for a fee (X). B agrees to mow A’ lawn for X. Call (X) ‘the contractual level’ of benefits” 
(Wertheimer 2011, 256). Clearly, A has no obligation to hire B or anybody to mow his lawn – he could 
just do it by himself. But IP holds that if he hires B (or somebody else) to mow his lawn and thereby 
benefits from B’s labor, there is a minimum level of benefits that B should receive – namely a fair one.  
This fair level of benefits is not defined by the contract which A and B negotiated, but is somehow 
defined independently.49  
The argument behind this can be spelled out as follows: Interacting beneficially with others 
puts one in a special relation to them that generates special obligations or associative duties (Scheffler 
                                                             
47 Cf. James 2005a, 33. 
 
48 However, note that IP is controversial. For my argument this does not constitute a problem though. See below, 
and chapter 7. 
49 What this is supposed to mean is of course not trivial at all. The question is discussed in chapter 7. 
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2001, 49) towards them. In the case of beneficial transactions, these special obligations demand that 
we reciprocate the benefits received, or, in other words, we make sure that the benefactor is 
sufficiently benefitted in the interaction or cooperation himself. 
In this sense, we could say that IP holds that benefitting from an interaction generates a 
prospective responsibility50 for making sure that the benefactor is sufficiently benefitted in the 
interaction scheme as well. Combined with the idea of proportionality as part of the idea of justice, 
“sufficiently” spells out as “proportionally”: the Interaction-Principle then claims that in interactions 
that are to ones benefit, one has a prospective responsibility to make sure that the benefactor is 
proportionately benefitted as well. In other words: the Interaction-Principle demands a fair or just 
outcome of transactions in the context of economic exchanges. 
The  Interaction-Principle seems  to  rest on  (or to  be  an  expression  of)  the  norm  of positive 
reciprocity, which holds essentially that someone who benefits from the beneficial actions of others is 
morally required to reciprocate by equally beneficial actions. The (complicated!) question what 
exactly this might amount to will be discussed in chapter 7.  
 In my view, the mutually beneficial interactions of the Interaction-Principle should be 
understood as particular cases of associative practices which generate duties of fairness. I do not 
claim, however, that IP is correct in claiming that it triggers an outcome related fairness assessment. 
Rather, the discussion of IP should have given us a reason to consider trade as a mutually beneficial 
interaction as an associative practice that triggers the less demanding procedural duty of fairness I 
have specified above. However, this might spell out in the sense of the Interaction-Principle, since 
above being an associative practice, trade is a mutually beneficial interaction as well (more on this in 
chapter 7.). 
Conclusions on Part I 
 
Let me revisit the course of our analysis so far. At the outset we specified the general question of our 
analysis as being: what is fair trade?  
We then had a first look at the term “trade” which in a primary sense refers to economic 
exchanges between trading entities (usually individuals or companies). In a secondary sense it refers 
to trade between states, meaning that trade takes place between trading entities from different 
countries, its background conditions being set by trade policies of and trade agreements between the 
respective states. These background conditions of trade, we said, are referred to as “the trading 
system”, which is sometimes also shortened to “trade”. 
Next, we examined the term “fair”, distinguishing different general meanings of the term: a 
non-moral concept (not relevant for our topic), a general moral concept (fair=morally right), and a 
specific moral concept (fair=absence of a specific moral flaw, similar to just). We presented different 
                                                             
50 What this means exactly is explained in the next chapter. For now, just read “responsibility”. 
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views on the relation between justice and fairness: a) that they are the same, b) that justice is about 
outcomes and fairness about processes,  and  c)  that  justice  is  about  encompassing  institutions  
and  fairness  about particular social practices. 
We then turned to reciprocity and proportionality and argued that they are important 
elements of traditional understandings of justice and also present in certain understanding of fairness 
in the context of global trade. We shortly considered claim bases and said we would be operating 
with a pluralist understanding of claim bases. We then examined imperfect duties of benevolence 
and perfect duties of justice and duties of special relations. We argued that requiring the fulfillment 
of stringent claims and perfect moral duties can be understood as the demands of general morality, 
and that we would therefore consider positions on “fair trade” which are based on the fulfillment of 
general stringent claims as being about ethical trade. W ith regard to ethical trade, we want to know 
what perfect duties of justice there are for which actors in the realm of global trade which need to be 
fulfilled for trade to count as ethical. We said that these include first, uncontroversial negative duties 
(i.e. prohibiting the violation of basic rights). Second, they include possibly positive duties of 
assistance which are, however, controversial and would have to be justified carefully. Third, they 
include duties of special relations, namely fairness duties. The latter, however, I consider not under 
ethical trade in general, but under fair trade in particular. 
Next we considered how different claim bases can be at the base of diverging positions on 
what morality demands in the context of global trade, and why I consider a pluralistic deontological 
position on claim bases to be plausible. 
We then explored different dimension of justice and their relevance for positions on fair 
trade. I distinguished between the structural, procedural and outcome dimension of justice and 
elaborated on their relation. I introduced two forms of outcome justice, namely allocative and 
cooperative justice, with only the latter being of relevance for questions of fair trade. We then 
examined equality as a central aspect of justice, fairness and general morality, and the concept of 
equality of opportunity, which is of high relevance for debates on fair trade. Subsequently we 
shortly had a look at conceptions of negative and positive equality.  
Next, we then turned to distributive justice, considering first different positions in the 
national realm, and second positions on distributive global justice which can be found in the 
background on positions on fair trade. We then turned to commutative justice and its idea that in 
just exchanges equivalents are traded, an idea that is highly relevant for certain positions on fair 
trade. I discussed the difficulties of subjective value theories in accounting for our moral discomfort 
with regard to certain exchanges, turned to objective value theories in an attempt to overcome 
them and showed them running into much worse difficulties, thereby forcing us to abandon them. 
As a last dimension of justice we considered intergenerational justice, and I argued that its focus on 
the claims of future generations is an important additional perspective we need to include in any 
plausible account of ethical trade.  
80 
 
Later we turned to the narrow (specific moral) fairness concept and examined different 
fairness standards as to their plausibility, range of application, and implications for positions on fair 
trade. I concluded that respect for persons should be seen as a general ethical standard instead of a 
specific moral fairness standard, that qualified impartiality is a plausible fairness standard in 
institutional settings, that treating equal cases equally and different cases differently is not per se a 
convincing fairness standard, and neither is compliance with rules. I argued that fairness as fidelity to 
the aims of social practices has quite some plausibility in general but is also confronted with weighty 
problems, and finally that not taking advantage of certain things is plausible fairness standard if 
adjusted.  
Finally and based on this analysis, I proposed my own understanding of fairness as not 
disadvantaging any party participating in the associative practice at hand, as measured against the 
rationale of the institution or practice, and the equality-based ideal that all parties should be able to 
participate in the practice on equal terms. I said that importantly, understood in this sense,  fairness  
is  sensitive  to  disadvantages  of  some  parties  in  the  background conditions of the practice and 
aims at correcting them so as to enable their fair participation in the practice. Fairness in this 
understanding then is primarily a procedural standard, the requirements of which vary according to 
the particular context, but are always measured against an assumption of basic equality among the 
parties. I explained the fact that fairness demands more than just the fulfillment of general negative 
duties by arguing that fairness duties should be conceived as duties of special relations, and illustrated 
this by discussing the Interaction-Principle. I suggested that trade should be seen as an associative 
practice and accordingly as triggering the specified fairness standard.  
By way of concluding our analysis of central moral concepts concerning debates on fair 
trade, let us consider what they result in with regard to our understanding of different general 
concepts of fair trade. In this sense, I suggest we establish an analytical distinction between ethical 
trade, just trade, and fair trade, in the following way: 
1) Ethical trade: Ethical trade refers to the actions of trading actors. The basic condition of 
ethical trade is that trading actors fulfill their perfect moral duties with regard to trade. This means 
most importantly that they don’t violate negative rights in the context of trade, and are not co-
responsible for other actors violating negative rights either. The extent of trading actors’ duties is 
defined by the scope of their corresponding responsibility (see chapter 3.4 and 7.4). The 
counterpart of this is that for trade to qualify as ethical, the stringent trade-related moral claims of 
the people involved must be fulfilled. 
2) Just trade: Just trade refers to trading systems. The conditions of just trade are that the 
background conditions and the distributive outcomes of the trading system are just with regard to 
the fulfillment of people’s stringent moral rights and claims. In this sense, just trade is embedded in 
the context of whole institutional systems and linked to a conception of distributive social justice. 
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With regard to global trade, positions on just trade are accordingly related to positions on global 
justice. Assuming the international context is a context of justice in a minimal sense that respects 
people’s basic moral equality, I take it that for the global background conditions of trade to be 
considered just, it is at least required that people’s basic rights are fulfilled in a sufficientarian sense. 
According  to  our  examination  of  the  relation  between  the  three  dimensions  of justice, if 
background conditions of trade are just, pure procedural justice/fairness in trading interactions is 
enough for them to qualify as morally legitimate. But if just background conditions are absent, either 
procedural conditions must be conceived in a more demanding way to ensure people’s basic moral 
equality is respected (which is mainly what I will argue for), or outcomes of trade must be judged in 
their own right in terms of how they satisfy the parties’ substantive claims (which is, however, 
difficult). 
3) Fair trade: The basic condition of fair trade with regard to the trading system is that the 
rules or terms of trade (background fairness) are fair. In my understanding, for them to be fair 
means that no party is disadvantaged with regard to the rationale of the practice, against a 
presumption of basic equality of the parties, and an ideal of equality of opportunity among them.  
With regard to trade among trading actors, the main condition of fair trade is a procedural  
standard, namely that no party is disadvantaged in transactions, with regard to the rationale of the 
practice, against a presumption of basic equality of the parties, and an ideal of equality of opportunity 
among them. This takes background conditions into account in the sense of (hypothetically) 
correcting them so as to enable the equal participation of the disadvantaged parties in trade 
exchanges. Accordingly, as long as background conditions disadvantage some parties in a process, 
fairness requires us to adjust the process in a way that makes up for the disadvantage, or to 
hypothetically “imagine the disadvantage away” when deciding on the outcome. Since just 
background conditions are not given in the current non-ideal situation, to ensure people’s basic moral 
equality is respected, the conditions of fair global trade are more demanding than they would 
otherwise be. With regard to procedural conditions, fairness in trade requires that no advantage is 
taken from other’s being disadvantaged by the background conditions of the interaction, which 
implies correcting for the disadvantage in the trade exchanges itself. 
In the special case of cooperation, the additional outcome related fairness standard of sharing 
burdens and benefits proportionally applies and has to be fulfilled for the outcomes of the cooperation 
to qualify as fair. I call this standard “outcome fairness”. 
 
The reflections of Part I should have equipped us with a more substantive understanding of 
the most relevant ethical concepts in the background of debates on “fair trade” and should enable 
us to see concrete positions on fair trade in their philosophical context. Let us then turn to Part II, 
where we will examine 10 widespread positions on what constitutes “fair trade” on different levels 
of conceptualization, and critically analyze their ethical underpinnings. 
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Part II: The Normative Foundations of Positions on Fair Trade 
 
5. Fair Trade on the Level of the World Trading System 
 
The level of the world trade system is clearly a highly important focus for reflections on fair and just 
trade. As we said earlier, from the perspective of political philosophy it might in fact look like the only 
level on which one can sensibly discuss the question of fair or just global trade since it concerns the 
overarching institutional background conditions of global trade. 
Since the governance of global trade is crucially determined by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) which is the “”unique supplier of the global public good of universal rules” (Low 2009, 331) 
for international trade, the focus in this chapter will be on the global multilateral trade system of 
the WTO.51 The positions on “fair trade” which are discussed in chapter 5 accordingly concern, strictly 
speaking, the fairness of the world trading system as constituted by the WTO. 
When looking at the fairness of the world trading system in the context of the WTO, it makes 
sense to distinguish between two dimensions: 1) The institutional structure and workings of the 
World Trade Organization and 2) the rules of the world trade system devised by the WTO. In what 
follows I will give a short overview over each of these dimensions and then introduce the positions on 
“fair trade” I want to discuss on each of them. Let us start with a). 
5.1 The Institutional Structure and Workings of the World Trade Organization 
 
The Word Trade Organization, which was formally established in 1995 and is located in Geneva, 
Switzerland, is the product of international negotiations among countries. It developed out of 
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 1986-94 
international trade negotiations called the “Uruguay Round”. Its main functions consist in being a 
forum for trade negotiations, administering the WTO trade agreements, monitoring national trade 
policies, and settling trade disputes. It also offers technical training for developing countries and 
cooperates with other international organizations. At date the WTO has 164 member states (out of 
196 existing countries). 
The WTO is by structure and process an institution that works on the principle of self-interested 
bargaining and negotiation. Its institutional design and its decision making processes are neither 
democratic nor guided by underlying principles of justice, but rather consist in each party trying to 
foster its own interests. As a result of its institutional setup, rich countries with high bargaining power 
have so far clearly dominated the negotiations, while poor countries with little bargaining power have 
had little influence over them (Steinberg 2002). A factor that reinforces this power asymmetry is a 
corresponding asymmetry of information among WTO members in favor of the industrialized countries.  
Fairness-related criticisms of the WTO accordingly usually contend that, as a result of its 
                                                             
51 States are also involved in regulating trade among themselves unilaterally, bilaterally and regionally. 
83 
 
institutional structure, the WTO negotiations, which define the rules of global trade, are characterized  
by  power  inequalities,  and  are  neither  inclusive  of  all  its  members  nor deliberative in 
character 52 (Goff 2011, 6-7). 
The situation is similar with regard to the WTO dispute settlement process, one of its crucial 
enforcement mechanisms and also a major target for criticism for being unfair (see below).  
I take it that the claim underlying these criticisms concerning the WTO negotiations and 
enforcement processes can be expressed in the following claim: Current global trade institutions (i.e. 
the WTO) are unfair because they determine and enforce the rules of trade through unfair processes, 
which leads to the trading system as a whole being unfair. The converse claim is accordingly: fair 
trade institutions (i.e. a fair WTO) determine and enforce the rules of trade through fair processes, 
and this in turn is a necessary condition for a fair global trading system. This is the first position on 
fair trade that I want to discuss in the following in relation to the criticism of the WTO.  
 
5.1.1 Position (a) Fair trade is trade the rules of which are determined and enforced by fair 
processes 
 
The idea of position a) is that a fair world trading system (i.e. a world trading system with fair rules) can 
only be the outcome of a fair decision making process in the WTO, and a fair enforcement process 
regarding these rules. Position (a) can be reconstructed in terms of the conditions it specifies for trade 
to qualify as fair as follows: trade is fair if its rules are determined and enforced by fair processes. 
Trade here is understood in the sense of the global trading system, and the processes concern the 
WTO negotiations and enforcement processes. The basic normative argument goes as follows: 
 
(P1) If the processes of WTO decision making and rule enforcement are fair, the world trading system is 
fair. 
(P2) The WTO decision making process is unfair 
(P3) The WTO rule enforcement process is unfair 
(C) The global trading system is unfair  
 
Should (P1) be understood as specifying necessary or sufficient conditions for the trading system to 
qualify as fair? Regarding the enforcement process, presumably yes. But what about the negotiation 
process? It would only be a sufficient condition if the case at hand were a case of pure procedural justice 
(where just outcomes are determined through a just process, see chapter 3.6.). But this is not plausible, 
since apart from being the outcome of the WTO negotiations, the rules of the world trading system 
                                                             
52 With regard to these and related issues, there is controversy among international legal theorists regarding the 
question whether the WTO (and other international organizations) either already have, or are in need of, a 
constitution (Dunoff 2009; Trachtman, 2009).  Cf. Goff 2011, 8. 
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constitute the background conditions of global trade, and as such they have to be assessed with regard to 
their fairness or justice in their own right. Let us therefore assume that with regard to the 
negotiations, P1 is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the fairness of the global trading 
system. We will look at positions that assess the fairness of the global trading system as such in 
chapter 5.2. 
 With regard to our analytical questions, note that the subject of the normative assessment here 
is the WTO as an institution, or, more precisely, its processes. Regarding this subject, the assessment 
concerns the procedural dimension, and is based on fairness proper. The subject of the position’s 
presumed moral duties to ensure fairness are the member states of the WTO.  
Let us look at (P2). Note at the outset that the claim that the WTO decision making processes in the 
WTO are unfair presupposes that the dealings between its member states are a subject for judgements of 
fairness or justice at all. But this is controversial: a position which puts strong emphasis on state 
sovereignty might not consider the fact that the WTO is based solely on self-interested bargaining as 
problematic. This view, which asserts the right of states to mind their own business, reflects the 
current realities of the international state system, and is highly influential among policy-makers, 
lawyers, and social scientist (Risse 2007, 360). The respective view of the international order is often 
called the Westphalien view, since it goes back to the historical Westphalien peace system of 1648 
which asserted the principle of states’ sovereignty from foreign intrusion in Europe. What Risse calls 
the strong Westphalien view (ibid.) amounts to a so-called realist view of international politics, which 
was famously formulated by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes argued that, although true principles of justice 
as a property of the relations among human beings can be discovered by moral reasoning, actual 
justice can only be achieved under a government with the monopoly on force, i.e. in a sovereign 
state.  Since there is no government on the international level, in this realm separate sovereigns face 
each other in the pre-institutional state of nature, where there are no such things as just or unjust or 
fair or unfair – at least until a contract is signed, in which case justice requires to fulfil its terms. 
Accordingly, on the international level nation-states representing the interests of their own societies 
are dealing with each other under no idea of justice (besides the one mentioned), and the fact that 
negotiations in the WTO are based on self-interested bargaining alone is nothing but normal and 
normatively unproblematic. International organizations, including the WTO, are not considered as 
proper entities for being guided by an ideal of justice. 
However, most theorists besides the ones taking a realist view on global politics argue in 
some way or another that issues of fairness or justice do arise on the international level. If they do, 
this presumably applies to the WTO as the institution that sets the rules for global trade. Note that this is 
far from requiring some sort of global distributive justice53 - it only requires that member states makes 
decisions by way of fair processes. On the basis of the understanding of fairness developed in Part I, we 
                                                             
53 Though this might be required too – for such positions see the next chapter. 
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can argue that fairness duties do apply in this context since the negotiations in the WTO – like any other 
negotiation – are a purposive associative practice. Let us consider the practice of negotiating to examine 
what fairness demands in the context of negotiations.  
Negotiations are joint decision-making processes in which parties, with initially opposing 
positions and conflicting interests, arrive at mutually beneficial and satisfactory agreements. The 
method can lend legitimacy to outcomes if they have been agreed upon in a process of deliberation, 
and can facilitate their implementation (cf. Albin 2001, 1f). Negotiations normally include “dialogue 
with problem-solving and discussion on merits, as well as bargaining and the exchange of concessions 
with the use of competitive tactics” (ibid.,1). They usually give the parties considerable control over 
the process and outcome, since every party can normally exercise leverage based on various sources – 
at the very least based on their ability to threaten to walk away from the negotiation table. 
Traditional negotiation analysis distinguishes between integrative and distributive processes (Walton 
/ McKersie 1965, Pruitt 1981). The former refers to “win-win” negotiations in which parties cooperate 
to identify or create solutions of high joint gains which eliminate the need for costly concessions. 
The latter refers to competitive “win-lose” bargaining in which selfish parties seek merely to 
maximize their own gains. This equals the realist view of international politics, where a party’s 
readiness to make concessions is based on a calculation of its relative strength vis-à-vis the other 
parties. If parties act according to the realist view, the outcomes of negotiations will accordingly 
largely reflect the relative power of the parties, particularly in the case of substantial power 
asymmetries. “Power” here can be understood in various ways, “ranging from conventional 
military and economic resources to the possession of skills, access to information and the 
exercise of leadership. A key element is certainly the value of a party’s best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement (cf. Fisher/Ury 1981). The higher that value a party’s best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement the less dependent the party is on reaching an agreement and the more it can 
afford to concede little, take risks and wait out the other side. It cannot be so abusive as to remove all 
incentives to negotiate, but may “appease a weaker party by offering some advantage over a 
continued state of conflict on unequal terms” (Albin 2001, 5). As mentioned, this is considered 
morally unproblematic from a realist view and from the perspective of theories of justice (based on 
the former) which understand justice as “mutual advantage” and require only the formal 
voluntariness of agreements for them to be legitimate (e.g. Gauthier 1986). As we saw in Part I, 
these theories are difficult to defend against the plausible view that justice entails an elements of 
normative justifiability on impartial grounds which can elicit substantially voluntary agreement and 
cooperation. 
Let’s apply our understanding of fairness to the practice of negotiations. Fairness in the 
specified sense requests a negotiation process that does not disadvantage some parties compared 
to others as measured against the rationale of negotiations, understood presumably as something 
along the lines of finding solutions of high joint gains among the parties, and the presumption of 
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equality and equal opportunity of the parties. As we saw, this means that we have to include the 
structural dimension of the negotiations in the assessment of their procedural fairness. 
With this in mind, let us look at how the structural dimension of WTO negotiations is 
constituted. The structural conditions of negotiations can be understood to comprise the context and 
forum of the negotiation including the criteria for the determination of participants to the 
negotiation, the rules and codes of conduct for the negotiations, and the criteria for agenda setting 
specifying which issues are discussed (cf. Albin 2001, 53). “Most structural elements are determined 
in earlier preparatory discussions or by extraneous factors, and remain constant once formal talks 
have begun” (Albin 2001, 26). 
In the sense of our understanding of fairness, structural justice in negotiations should honor 
the claims of actors to equal chances for participation and success in the finding of joint 
agreements. With regard to the criteria for participation it is often argued that it is required that all 
parties whose legitimate interests are at stake should be allowed to participate in the negotiations 
(cf. Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). This, however, would possibly suggest that formal participation 
should be expanded from states alone to other actors such as international organizations, NGO’s, 
and MNE’s, a suggestion which is hotly debated (cf. Albin 1999). However, it is of course 
controversial who the legitimate parties are regarding each particular issue. Much would be gained 
already though if this question was open for debate instead of being predetermined. 
With regard to the rules and codes of conduct of the negotiations, they concern among 
others methods of decision making, the use of deadlines, and procedures for communication. In line 
with our understanding of fair negotiations, the idea of many critics seems to be that WTO member 
states should all have equal weight in the negotiations. But for parties having equal weight in the 
strict sense it would be required to move to another form of decision making altogether, namely a 
highly deliberative, consensual or a democratic process. In practice, democratizing the WTO is 
currently certainly not a viable option, and neither would it be considered a morally legitimate one 
from a broadly nationalist standpoint. However, it might be tried to come closer to the ideal of an 
equal say of participants in the WTO negotiations without restructuring the WTO democratically. This 
might be achieved by favoring deliberative approaches over confrontational ones, since the former 
mitigate the influence of power inequalities while the latter enhance it. In the terms of negotiation 
analysis literature, this would amount to favoring integrative negotiation processes above 
distributive ones. 
Regarding agenda setting for negotiations (another area of common criticism with regard to 
the WTO), a broad background framework is often already given by the norms, principles and 
objective set out in earlier agreements, such as the norms of reciprocity, fair competition and non-
discrimination which were incorporated in the GATT (more on these in chapter 4.2). Nevertheless, 
agenda setting for particular negotiations, including the order in which issues as discussed and the 
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linkages between issues, has a large effect on their outcome. Negotiators usually try to get maximum 
coverage of the issues of most interest for them, and linkages which improve their own basis of 
bargaining and terms of trade. Linkages can thus be used to improve one side’s leverage over the 
other side. “One party can tie its readiness to move and make a deal on a particular issue to a 
willingness of the other to concede on another matter added to the agenda. Linkages of issues also 
suggest that legitimate trade-offs can be made between them” (Albin 2001, 30). 
From the perspective of fairness it seems warranted that for each negotiation a 
sufficiently broad agenda is established “which includes, orders and links issues in a way which takes 
into account essential interests and concerns of all parties” (ibid., 30). 
Let  us  turn  to  the  procedural  fairness  dimension  of  WTO  negotiations  now. 
Procedural fairness in negotiations refers to how the parties treat each other in the process of 
negotiating, the pattern of interaction between them as they attempt to reach an agreement. It 
includes the use of strategies and tactics by individual actors promoting their interests, of joint 
problem-solving and concession-making and the specific mechanisms used to arrive at an agreement. 
There are two issues that are often discussed in the literature on the topic (Albin 
2001, cf. Early/Lind 1987, Lind/Tyler 1988). The first concerns how the parties’ inputs are treated (“fair 
input”), which is highly relevant with regard to the social perception of fairness. From our perspective, 
fairness as not disadvantaging demands that the inputs of all parties be taken up and considered 
seriously, and none be marginalized. 
Second, there are the general main procedural conditions thought to hold for any 
negotiation. They include abidance to the law and rules of the practice, no deceit, and voluntariness. 
The first and the third condition, abidance to the law and rules and no deceit certainly apply with 
regard to WTO negotiations. Nevertheless, there are certain grey areas, such as parties “bluffing” 
about their interests, alternative solutions, and the costs of making particular concessions. To judge 
this behavior it is important to consider if this is something all parties do and expect from each other 
or not, i.e. if it is part of the unwritten rules of the practice. In this sense it can be argued that bluffing 
is unacceptable unless all parties know and accept that it is part of the game (cf. Lax / Sebenius, 1986). 
The condition of voluntariness figures prominently in the debates of the fairness of WTO 
negotiations. Indeed, as the moral basis of their claims defenders of the WTO often resort to 
voluntariness. They argue that agreements in the WTO are based on voluntary consent, since 
developing countries are not forced to sign up to them. Additionally it is sometimes argued that 
membership in the WTO as a whole is voluntary since countries can withdraw from the WTO, and that 
the fact that they do not do so expresses their consent. These interpretations of the voluntary consent 
requirement however are highly questionable from a moral point of view. That someone does not exit 
from an organization or refuses to sign an agreement obviously only implies that all things considered, 
he thinks he is better off with the agreement or within the organization than without it. It does not 
necessarily imply that he finds the agreement acceptable or considers it to be just. Countries may 
88 
 
benefit from having the ‚rule of law’ that the WTO provides for trade between nations but that does 
not mean that they consent to the particular rules themselves. Accordingly it is highly doubtful  that  
the  minimalistic  interpretation  of  the  voluntariness  condition  mentioned above carries enough 
moral weight to guarantee the moral legitimacy of the outcome (in this case, the agreement). 54 
Moreover, those who put forward this argument fail to note the relevance of group actions. 
Given that others have agreed to sign it may pay to sign for an individual country as well, „but it still 
may be true that the developing countries as a whole (or a subgroup of these countries) would  
have  been  better off  if  they, as  a  group,  had  not  signed.  (The prisoner’s dilemma arises not only 
in the case of prisoners, but also in the case of poor countries engaged in bargaining with the rich.)” 
(Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 75). 
There is another problem regarding the fulfilment of the voluntariness condition in the 
WTO negotiations. It is often criticized that the industrialized countries get their way in the WTO 
bargaining process by withholding their development aid payments unless developing countries 
accept their demands – which is often seen as a form of coercion. While  coercion  is  clearly  
forbidden  by  procedural  fairness,  it  is  less  clear  if  the  said proceeding amounts to coercion in a 
morally justified sense. 
It seems then that the condition of voluntary consent seems crucial for our assessment of the 
procedural fairness of WTO negotiations. We will have to leave it at that for now, but we will return 
to the issue and engage in a thorough examination of the voluntariness condition in chapter 6.4.1.5 
b). 
Are there additional conditions for fair processes in the WTO negotiations? Let me shortly 
mention a few. Candidates for such conditions are openness and transparency of the negotiation 
process (cf. Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 82). „Transparency is essential because it enables more voices to 
be heard in the negotiating process and limits abuses by the powerful“ (ibid). Additionally, it can be 
argued that technical assistance should be made available when it is needed. According to 
Stiglitz/Charlton, both conditions are not met to a satisfying extent in WTO negotiations. We can 
interpret both of these concerns in the sense of the understanding of fairness we have suggested, 
since they aim at correcting the power asymmetries or their relevance for the negotiation process. 
Finally, let us shortly look at (P3), which concerns the enforcement of the rules of the world trading 
system, as exemplified by one of its crucial enforcement mechanisms: the dispute settlement process. 
Roughly sketched, the dispute settlement process works in the following way: A member state of 
the WTO (the “complainant”) can file a complaint against a fellow member state (the “defendant”) 
with the Dispute Settlement Body for violations of WTO rules, such as e.g. a country's imposition of 
(illegal) tariffs on the complainant's exports. If the case is ruled in favor of the complainant, this entails 
a legally binding recommendation for the defendant to change its according policies, and gives the 
                                                             
54 I will discuss the voluntariness condition in detail in chapter 7.4. 
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complainant the right to levy a retaliatory tariff. However, since countries with big economies that 
can impose costly countervailing measures while countries with small economies cannot, the latter are 
much less likely to achieve resolution in their favor than the former (cf. Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 76). 55  
How can we understand the fairness problem here? From the perspective of our suggestion 
for understanding fairness, we need to ask about the rationale of the dispute settlement process. We 
might argue that this rationale is, in effect, to ensure compliance with the rules of the WTO for all 
member states. Accordingly for it to be considered fair it should not disadvantage any party as 
measured against this rationale, a general presumption of equality of the parties, and equal 
opportunity. In the case at hand, this clearly doesn’t seem to be the given. A fair process in this 
case would require a mechanism that does not disadvantage any party in the pursuit of the aim of 
promoting general compliance with the rules. 
 
5.2 The Rules of the World Trading System 
 
At the heart of the WTO are contracts or agreements which have been negotiated and signed by 
most of the world’s trading nations. These documents provide the legal rules for international trade, 
binding the signatory governments to keep their trade policies within the limits specified by the 
documents. 
The WTO system’s goals include the securing of the stability, predictability and transparency 
of the conditions for international trade. But the system’s declared main purpose is ensuring free 
trade. 56  
  
5.2.1 Position (b) Fair Trade is Free Trade  
 
In debates on “fair trade” we often find the implicit claim that “trade is fair if it is free”, sometimes 
also explicitly in the form: “free trade is fair trade”. “Trade” here means the trading system, which the 
position claims has to be free to be fair, that is, it has to be a free market. The subject of the claim’s 
presumed moral duties to ensure fair trade is accordingly the institutions that set the rules for the 
trading system, be they national or international, and the moral actors that shape these institutions. 
The according duties ask of them to set the rules in such a way that they allow and ensure free trade. 
These points hold for all the positions that will be discussed in chapter 5.2.  
On the most general level and put very simply, the argument for the claim that “trade is fair if it 
is free”, goes as follows:  
 
                                                             
55 Christina Davis argues that the WTO dispute settlement process is at least more favorable to developing 
countries than the dispute settlement processes of bilateral trade agreements (Davis, 2006). See also Hudec, 
2002). Cf. Goff 2011, 7. 
56 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm. 
90 
 
(P1) Trade is fair if x57  
(P2) If x then trade is free 
(C) Trade is fair if it is free 
 
There are several ethical lines of argument for position b), the three most important ones of which will 
be examined in the following: the argument from liberty, the argument from desert, and the 
argument from welfare.58 In each line of argument for claim (C), x is different and spells out as either: 
 
a) it is non-coercive (argument from liberty) 
b) it gives to each what they deserve (argument from desert) 
c) it best improves human well- being (argument from welfare) 
 
Before examining the moral arguments, it  is   helpful  at  the  outset  to  distinguish them from  
efficiency  arguments,  which  figure prominently  in  justifications  of  the  free  market.  This 
distinction is rather unproblematic, since it can be shown that the two kinds of arguments can 
point in opposite directions. It is, for example, possible to consistently argue that the free  market  
is  morally  so  defective  that  it  should  be  reformed  or  even  abandoned altogether, even if 
doing so would result in a loss of efficiency. On the other hand it is possible to acknowledge 
that the   free market has certain moral deficiencies, and nevertheless conclude consistently that 
they are not weighty enough as to require us to forgo its efficiency in favor of a less efficient, but 
morally preferable system. 
However, many defenders of the free market assume or argue that efficiency and morality 
both convene in the assessment that the free market is desirable. In this vein, efficiency and moral 
arguments can merge, and often do so, into “welfare” arguments for the free market. On the other 
hand there are moral arguments for the free market based on liberty (or liberal moral rights) and 
some based on desert that sometimes appear in debates on “fair trade” too. In the following we will 
shortly look at liberty-based and desert-based arguments for the free market, and in more detail at 
the arguments based on welfare since they are by far the most important ones with regard to debates 
on global “fair trade”. 59 
 The classification of positions with regard to the distinction between ethical, just, and fair trade 
will be mentioned in the discussion of the respective positions, as will their respective focus on either 
the structural, procedural or the outcome dimension of trade in the sense of the trading system.  
                                                             
57 With x being the condition of the particular line of argument; see below. 
58 The following account of the different lines of argument for the free market is mostly based on Buchanan 1985, 
O’Neill 1998, and Olsaretti 2004. 
59 There are also arguments from neutrality, autonomy, epistemic considerations and self-interest for the free 
market, which I will not pursue further since they seem to be of limited importance in the debates on “fair trade”. 
For a discussion see O’Neill 1998. 
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5.2.1.1 The argument from liberty for free trade 
 
The arguments for the free market from liberty are based on a non-instrumental conception of the 
value of liberty, that is, a conception that values freedom as an end in itself. As Milton Friedman puts it, 
“economic freedom, in and of itself, is an extremely important part of total freedom” (Friedman 1962, 
9). While there are several arguments from liberty for the free market, sometimes using different 
concepts of liberty, their common denominator is that they are based on a negative conception of 
liberty in the spirit of Mills’ “harm principle”.60 This principle holds that “the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others” (Mill [1859], 2009, 34). In all other cases no coercion is allowed, not even 
benevolent paternalism. The choices of individuals have to be respected even if they might seem 
unreasonable or misguided to the observer. This relates back to Nozick’s (1974) libertarian 
argumentation as presented in chapter 3.6.2. 
Why does this speak in favor of free markets? Friedman states several reasons for this, the 
most important one being a healthy limitation of (market) power resulting from competition in free 
markets: “So long as effective freedom of exchange is maintained, the central feature of the market 
organization of economic activity is that it prevents one person from interfering with another in 
respect of most of his activities. The consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because of the 
presence of other sellers with whom he can deal. The seller is protected from coercion by the 
consumer because of other consumers to whom he can sell. The employee is protected from coercion 
by the employer because of other employers for whom he can work, and so on. And the market 
does this impersonally and without centralized authority”( Friedman 1962, 15). 
In this sense, the argument from liberty is an argument against political obstructions of free 
trade in the sense of voluntary exchanges between individual trading actors because this would mean 
coercing them.  
The position concerns the background conditions of trade and argues that they must be just in 
the sense of being non-coercive for the trading system to be just. The institutions that set the rules 
of the trading system have the according duty not to coerce individuals by restricting their trading 
activities.  
Applied to the above claim about “fair trade”, (P1) then spells out as “trade is fair if it is non-
coercive”, and the corresponding position “Fair trade is free trade” spells out as “Fair trade is trade 
that is non-coercive”. In my terminology, this position is a position on just trade in the sense of 
                                                             
60 It is also possible to argue for a free market on the grounds of a positive notion of liberty in the sense of 
freedom of choice. This argument holds that, apart from not coercing people to make a certain choice, free 
markets guarantee that the goods being produced give the consumers a maximal range of choices that match 
their preferences. Free markets are accordingly valued because they provide every individual with the freedom to 
make her own choices out of a variety of options.  In  addition  some  instrumental arguments  in  favor  of  
economic  freedom  can  be brought forward.  Milton  Friedman  for  instance  believed  economic  freedom  to  
be  a necessary prerequisite of  political  freedom  (Friedman 1962, 8  and  10).  I will not pursue them further 
here because of both reasons of scope and because they are not common in debates on fair global trade. 
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concerning just background institutions of trade. Accordingly the argument actually reads: 
 
(P1) The trading system is just if it is non-coercive 
(P2) The trading system is non-coercive if it is free  
(C) The trading system is just if it is free 
 
In general, I take it that the argument from liberty is strong. Non-coercion is a basic requirement for 
institutions, and coercion can only be justified with very strong reasons in particular cases61 (cf. 
sections 3.6.-3.7).  
There is an important implication of the argument’s emphasis on the value of people’s freedom 
and accordingly the voluntariness of economic exchanges: It generates duties not only for institutions 
but also for individual trading actors to respect the right of other individuals not to be coerced in 
economic transactions. The duty not to coerce does not only apply to institutions, but is a perfect duty 
for individuals too. Accordingly, the argument from liberty must be understood as having a corollary 
argument with regard to economic exchanges between individual trading actors. This argument 
establishes a procedural criterion, namely non-coercion, as the condition of free (that is, voluntary) 
trade, and trading actors accordingly have the duty to ensure this is the case. It goes like this: 
 
(P1) Economic exchanges are ethical if they are non-coercive 
(P2) If economic exchanges are non-coercive then they are voluntary 
(C) Economic exchanges are ethical if they are voluntary 
 
I will discuss this issue how non-coercion and voluntariness are related in detail in chapter 6.4.1.5 
where we are concerned with transactions in the supply chains of MNEs. At this point, let me 
anticipate my suggestion that the said concern is due to the fact that, for trade to qualify as 
ethical all trade-related perfect duties have to be fulfilled – which includes duties of fairness that 
might go further than mere non-coercion. I will argue that the fairness-explication I elaborated in 
chapter 4.9 gives us reason to argue that indeed a stronger criterion of voluntariness is needed for the 
above claim “economic exchanges are ethical if they are voluntary” to be plausible.  
For now though, let us turn to the second line of argument for the claim that trade is fair if it is 
free: The argument from desert. 
 
  
                                                             
61 Such as for example in the case of detaining criminals, or possibly, forcing citizens to pay taxes.  
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5.2.1.2 The argument from desert for free trade 
 
The argument from desert holds that the free market distributes wealth according to desert and is 
therefore, according to a definition of justice based on desert, just (cf.   Feinberg 1970). The 
respective position claims that free trade is just in the sense of leading to just (market) outcomes. As 
such, the position concerns the outcome dimension of trade. It is a position on just trade, because it 
concerns the justice of the distribution resulting from trade. The argument from desert for the free 
market reads: 
 
(P1) The trading system is just if it gives to each what they deserve 
(P2) The trading system gives to each what they deserve if it is free   
(C) The trading system is just if it is free 
 
Let us examine the ethical foundations of the argument. The desert-based version of the position 
“trade is fair (just) if it is free” rests on two main claims: that the principle of desert is a defensible 
principle of justice (P1), and that the free market distributes according to desert (cf. Olsaretti 2004, 37.) 
For reasons of scope I will not discuss (P1) myself, but rather quickly sketch Olsaretti’s 
analysis. It suggests that a defensible principle of desert that can lend itself to justifying market 
outcomes as just must meet the following conditions: 1) desert must be non-virtue based; 2) it must 
be pre-institutional; and 3) it must be independent of other values in defining justice. Additionally, for 
distributions on the basis of the principle of desert to qualify as just, 4) inequalities in desert may not 
reflect an unjustified advantage of some, which implies some sort of fair opportunity for all (which, it 
turns out, means that it must imply that people are responsible for being more or less deserving). 
Finally, 5) everyone must be treated equally relative to their desert.  
Olsaretti comes to the conclusion that a defensible notion of desert resulting from these 
conditions could be construed, namely in the form of responsibility-sensitive or active desert (ibid., 
38). Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that she is correct, and turn to (P2), the claim that the 
free market distributes according to desert.  
I agree with Olsaretti that the most promising  argument  for (P2)  holds  that  the  market  
distributes  income  (and/or  wealth)  in proportion to the individual's productive contribution to 
society or to the good of others (accepting only this as a desert base). This argument rests on two 
assumptions: a) the share of wealth a person obtains in the market system is proportional to her 
marginal productivity (the additional amount of "output" she produces for each additional amount of 
"input"); and b) a person's marginal productivity is an accurate measure of her contribution to the 
good of others. How plausible are these assumptions? 
Let’s start with a). The problem with a) is that it overlooks that human beings start their 
lives as unproductive children, receiving a share of wealth which is not correlated at all with 
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their contribution to the good of others (cf. Buchanan 1985, 52). This undeserved wealth has a 
high influence on how somebody fares in the market and generally wealth-wise later on in life. 
The assumption therefore quickly turns out to be implausible. 
Regarding b) on the other hand, people with high marginal productivity (and according high 
income) don’t necessarily contribute much to the well-being of others – think for example of people 
selling weapons, drugs etc. Above that, the assumption ignores the externalities  generated  by  
economic  activity,  which  is  not  reflected  in  an  individual's marginal productivity. As a 
consequence, this assumption turns out to be implausible too (cf. Buchanan 1985, 53). 62 
In sum, (P2) is clearly not plausible. Accordingly, I take it that the argument from desert as a 
whole is implausible as a moral basis for the claim that “fair trade is free trade”. 
Let’s now turn to the most important line of argument for the claim that “fair trade is free 
trade” in current debates: The arguments from welfare. 
 5.2.1.3 Arguments from welfare for free trade 
 
Welfare arguments are central to the defense of the free market and free trade. The free market, 
so the basic argument is the economic system that best improves human well- being. This argument 
runs through economic theory from classical economists such as Adam Smith through to modern neo-
classical and Austrian schools (cf. O’Neill 1998, 35). 
The basic welfare argument for the free market goes as follows: 
 
(P1) The trading system is ethical if it best improves human well-being63 
(P2) The trading system best improves human well-being if it is free 
(C) The trading system is ethical if it is free 
 
Regarding the procedural-outcome distinction, the argument claims that a free trading system leads 
to the best outcome for human well-being, that is, it focuses on the outcome dimension of trade. 
Further, it claims that free trade is morally required because, compared to the alternatives, it has the 
best consequences for human well-being. As such, it is based on a consequentialist theory of general 
ethics (cf. chapter 3.2) that considers people’s well-being as central to morality. With regard to my 
terminology, the respective position is accordingly a position on ethical trade, and (P1) specifies a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the trade system to be ethical.  
Let us examine the ethical foundations of the argument. The argument from welfare usually 
takes a utilitarian form.64 This is not surprising, since the founding figures of neo-classical economics 
                                                             
62 For a discussion of additional arguments leading to the conclusion that (P2) is implausible, see Olsaretti 2004. 
63 “Best improves human well-being” is short for “it is the economic system that best improves human well-being”. 
64 There are also arguments based on mutual advantage – more on them shortly. 
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were Hedonists. „Jevons explicitly attempts to develop economics from Benthamite foundations: 
‚The theory ( …) is entirely based on a calculus of pleasure and pain: the object of economics is to 
maximize happiness by purchasing pleasure, as it were, at the lowest cost of pain’“ (O’Neill 1998, 36). 
While in early welfare defenses of the market, well-being was understood in substantive terms, in 
modern neo-classical economics the concept of welfare or utility has been re-defined in a formal 
way, namely in terms of preferences. This shift happened due to methodological reasons concerning 
the „subjectivist“ revolution in economics, and worries about hedonistic and objectivist accounts of 
well-being (cf. ibid., 37). 65 The modern textbook economic agent is characterized by a set of 
preference rules. In particular, the agent is assumed to be rational in the sense that she has 
consistent, transitive preferences. 66 The utility, welfare or well-being of the agent is taken to be a 
function of these preferences. In neo-classical welfare economics “The term utility is defined in 
terms of a preference ordering, such that is x is preferred to y then x has a higher utility function than 
y. Willingness to pay (…) is used as a measure of preference rankings“ (ibid., 36f). 
The reliance of modern economics on this formal concept of utility for a welfare justification of 
the free market is a possible ground for criticism from an ethical perspective. O’Neill for example 
maintains that „Whether or not something is of value to a person depends on the nature of the 
object, its capacities to contribute to the flourishing of a person. Whether an object is valued by 
someone depends upon the nature of the person’s beliefs about the object. This logical difference 
points to the central problem with the subjective determination thesis stated in its crude form, a 
problem which lies at the heart of both neo-classical and Austrian defenses of the market that employ 
it. It doesn’t appear to allow for mistakes about what is of value“ (ibid., 40f). O’Neill suggests that 
an adjustment would be needed to ensure its plausibility, namely to understand what is of value 
for a person as “what the person would desire or value when cognitively competent and fully 
informed“ (ibid, 41). 
In  the  same  vein,  Sen  argues  for  a  return  to  substantive  (as  opposed  to  formal) 
concepts of well-being for welfare economics. As we saw in chapter 3.6.3, he employs a broadly 
objectivist account of well-being which is defined in terms of „functionings“ constitutive of a person’s 
life, e.g. adequate nourishment, good health, self-respect, participation in a community etc. The 
measurement of well-being is approached in terms of a persons’ capacities and freedoms to achieve 
well-being thus characterized (cf. O’Neill 1998, 41). 
This being said, let us turn to the general utilitarian argument for the free market on the 
                                                             
65 This parallels a shift within modern utilitarianism from the classical hedonistic account to the modern form of 
preference utilitarianism“ (O’Neill 1998, 37f). 
66 That preferences are transitive means that if she prefers a to b and c to c, then she prefers a to c, if she is 
indifferent between a and b, and b and c, then she is indifferent between a and c. (cf. O’Neill 1998, 35) Above that, 
„Her preferences are also taken to be complete, i.e. for all alternatives a and b, either a is preferred to b, b is 
preferred to a, or the agent is indifferent between them. Her preference structure is also taken to have other 
formal characteristics: preferences are reflexive and separable.“ (O’Neill 1998, 181, FN 2). 
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grounds that it maximizes well-being. This argument is based on its superior efficiency. More 
precisely, the utilitarian argument for the free market is translated into economic terms in the 
form of an argument from Paretian efficiency and an argument from productive efficiency: "While 
exchange in the ideal market ensures that an economic pie of a given size will be distributed in a 
Pareto Optimal fashion, competition – by placing resources in the hands of producers who most closely 
approximate the least-costly methods of production – increases the size of the economic pie” 
(Buchanan 1985, 18). In other words, the argument from Paretian efficiency (see below) holds that the 
free market distributes resources in an optimal way, whereas the argument from productive efficiency 
maintains that the free market leads to the biggest possible “economic pie”. 
Let us shortly mention the features of the free market that are taken to lead to the maximal 
productive efficiency of the system. The first was mentioned in the quotation above: 
competition puts resources in the hands of the most efficient producers (since the inefficient ones 
are driven out of the market by the more efficient ones, or forced to become more efficient 
themselves). Second, the prospect of gaining more in the free market through higher risk-taking or 
more effort provides the individual with a strong incentive for heightened productivity, which in turn 
results in increased social utility. Third, the market maximizes efficiency and utility through its 
decentralized coordination of demand and supply (see chapter 3.8.2). 
Interestingly, the argument from productive efficiency has a corollary with regard to moral 
behavior, which already some of the earliest advocates of the free market, such as Adam Smith 
and Bernard Mandeville, have suggested. 67 It holds that the market does not rely on altruistic 
behavior in satisfying human needs and preferences and that in this sense it economizes on the scarce 
resource of altruism. 
There are several assumptions behind this argument. One is that the scarcity of moral or 
altruistic behavior is a fact about human nature. As Hume put it, men are generally only capable of 
"limited altruism" directed toward a small circle of family and friends. It seems to be a psychological 
reality that the sentiment of altruism tends to lose its effectiveness when we try to extend it to more 
distant individuals. If this is the case, the free market as a system that organizes large numbers of 
individuals without depending upon altruism will be more effective in securing human well-being 
than reliance on people’s morality. Besides, it will also “free up” the limited resources of altruism 
for their realistic, natural function: the effective concern for our close circle of family and friends. In 
this sense, the argument goes, the free market uses altruism more efficiently than alternative systems. 
In challenge to this argument it is usually argued that the empirical assumption at its basis, 
namely that people’ resources of altruism are extremely limited, is mistaken. The counter-argument 
suggests that limited altruism might not be an unchangeable feature of the human condition, but 
rather a product of the free market system itself. If we are taught that we don’t need to behave 
                                                             
67 Mandeville (1988) [1732]; Smith 1976, 14.. 
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altruistically because it is not necessary (or even counterproductive) since the free market with its 
“invisible hand” takes care of this for us, we are presumably considerably less motivated to do so. If 
this is true, the fact that the market system “economizes” on altruism is, of course, not a 
convincing argument for the market system (cf. Buchanan 1985, 18). On the other hand, said mind 
set might be highly problematic in settings that are so far from the ideal market that the argument 
from efficiency doesn’t hold straightforwardly since it might seemingly “absolve” people of their 
moral responsibility regarding trade actions on the mistaken ground that the market system somehow 
has them covered. The global trade system might presumably be a case in point (more on this below). 
Let us come back to the welfare economic argument for the desirability of the free market, 
and accordingly its “fairness” in the broad moral sense of the notion. The argument is closely tied to 
the free markets efficiency. Arguments on the grounds of Paretian efficiency for the free market 
usually rest on two main claims: (1) a theoretical statement that exchanges in the ideal market reach 
an equilibrium state that is Pareto Optimal (which is a second-best substitute for utilitarian 
maximization) – the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, and (2) the assumption that 
actual (non-ideal) markets (at least with feasible modifications) sufficiently approximate the 
efficiency of the ideal market to make them  preferable  to  other  arrangements.  Central to 
arguments for the free market on grounds of welfare is accordingly the concept of Paretian efficiency 
and the theoretical concept of the ideal market. Both will be examined in the following. 
 
  5.2.1.3.1 The Paretian concept of efficiency 
 
The most widely accepted concept of efficiency is that of “Pareto efficiency” developed by Wilfredo 
Pareto. What it amounts to is explained in the following passage: “A state of a given system is 
Pareto optimal is and only if there is no feasible alternative state of that system in which at least one 
person is better off and no one is worse off.   A state, S1, is Pareto Superior to another state, S2, if 
and only if there is at least one person who is better off in S1 than in S2 and no one is worse off in S1 
than in S2. These are the most inclusive formulations of the Paretian principles” (Buchanan 1985, 4). 
The Pareto principle can be formulated more narrowly to refer exclusively to distributional states with 
regard to consumer goods (distributive Pareto efficiency), or to allocations of resources for producing 
goods (productive Pareto efficiency). It is important to note that a system can be Pareto superior to 
another without making anyone better off, if the additional goods produced make no 
contribution to anyone's well-being. To compare two systems on grounds of productivity one must 
select some particular set of outputs (e.g. steel and bread) and compare the amount produced to 
some constant quantity of a type of input. “… it is also necessary to assume that the particular 
products (outputs) and resources (inputs) that provide the basis for the comparison are equally 
valuable to individuals in the two systems, if productivity comparisons are to be reliable indicators of 
comparative efficiency, and if we are to assume that efficiency has some relationship to how well 
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people are” (ibid., 6) This is to assume that interpersonal utility comparisons are possible, that is 
comparisons of how well off some individual is relative to how well of another is. Productivity as 
such, as well as the  growth  rate,  or  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation are  no  satisfactory  
measure  of  a system's efficiency since they might not make people better off, if, for  example, it 
suffered from an inefficient distribution, unless the concept is completely divorced from that of well- 
being altogether. 
Among different principles of efficiency, Pareto Optimality and Pareto Superiority “appear 
to provide the most comprehensive tools for assessing a system's efficiency, since the notion of a 
social state they employ is inclusive enough to take into account the way productive resources are 
allocated, the way production is organized, and the distribution of consumer goods so far as all of 
these affect how well off individuals are.” (Buchanan 1985, 7) Nevertheless, the fact that a state is 
pareto-inferior to another does not tell us which of the above factors constitutes the problem. The 
wide acceptance of the two principles is in part due to the fact that they provide a way of assessing 
social states that does not require interpersonal utility comparisons. While there are different 
problems with regard to interpersonal utility comparisons, probably the weightiest one is that there 
seems to be no non-arbitrary way of selecting  a  common  baseline  from  which  different  
individual's  utilities  could  all  be measured, and no non-arbitrary unit of measurement. “Against 
this background, the two Paretian principles … are usually seen as second-best alternatives to 
utilitarianism, the assumption being that assessing social states according to the overall utility they 
produce would be preferable, were it not for the unfortunate fact that interpersonal utility 
comparisons  cannot  be  made.  The Paretian principles avoid interpersonal utility comparisons by 
requiring only determining whether each individual is better off or worse off relative to his own former 
condition (ibid., 8). 
Examination  of  this  rationale  for  understanding  efficiency  in  the  Paretian  way “quickly 
dispels the illusion that the choice of a concept of efficiency for evaluating social states is morally 
neutral. (…) Identifying the efficiency of a social state with its tendency to maximize overall utility 
presupposes a morally controversial view of what society is. This point can be best appreciated if 
we recall … the most common, nontechnical notion of efficiency: that of an individual's taking the 
least costly, effective means to achieving some particular end. The concept of efficiency as overall 
utility maximization involves a twofold extension of the commonsense notion of efficiency: First, it 
assumes that the utility of all particular ends can be aggregated into the abstraction of a “total 
social product” or “overall utility”. Second, it assumes that comparing social states according to their 
tendencies to maximize  this  abstract  “superend”  is  an  appropriate  basis  for  making  practical,  
action- guiding judgments about how society should be organized." (ibid., 8f, emphasis added) This 
second assumption implies that, at least for purposes of practical evaluation, “society is to be viewed 
as an apparatus for maximizing overall utility. This view of society might be incompatible with 
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according proper respect to individual persons, who ought not to be regarded merely  as  
contributors  to  ends  that  are  not  their  own,  including  the  end  of maximizing overall utility. The 
notion of efficiency as using the least-costly, effective means toward one's own end is not liable to 
this charge because it assumes unity of purpose, abstracts from conflicts of interest, and does not 
involve using the individual to achieve ends that are not his own.” (ibid., 9, emphasis added) 
Besides, the principle of utility is also morally controversial because it has no space for the 
intuitively plausible conception that society should be a mutually advantageous arrangement (more 
on this later). 
Although the Pareto Optimality Principle avoids the problem of interpersonal utility 
comparison it is liable against the latter charge against utilitarianism as well: a situation in which a few 
have everything while most have nothing may in fact be Pareto Optimal, if improving the condition of 
the unfortunate majority would require worsening the condition of the privileged minority. 
Accordingly, a social state might be Pareto Optimal without being mutually advantageous in any 
plausible sense. This is due to the fact that Pareto O focuses only on the satisfaction of preferences, 
while being blind to other issues that are generally held to be morally relevant, such as the moral 
assessment of the preferences themselves, or the moral assessment of the process by which a Pareto 
O State came about. For this reason, i.e. that a social system may satisfy the Pareto Optimality 
Principle while being highly unjust (or unfair) at the same time, the Pareto Optimality principle does 
not by itself provide a sufficient standard for moral evaluation. Besides, even a person who benefits 
from a change may have grounds for complaint, for example, if the change was imposed on her by 
others without her consent.  (cf. ibid., 10) In  this  sense,  the  Paretian  principles  are  morally 
uncontroversial only if they are treated as open to the possibility of opposing moral evaluations. This 
makes clear that the decision of how much weight is to be given to the efficiency criterion, and 
how much to moral criteria with regard to the assessment of a particular social arrangement is not a 
morally neutral decision. 
At this point we need to have a closer look at the theoretical conception of the ideal market. 
We recall that the first claim on which arguments on the grounds of efficiency for the free market 
usually rest holds that exchanges in the ideal market reach an equilibrium State that is Pareto 
Optimal, and the second claims that actual (non-ideal) markets (at least with feasible modifications) 
sufficiently approximate the efficiency of the ideal market to make them preferable to other 
arrangements. The theoretical concept of the ideal market is accordingly central to arguments for the 
free market on grounds of welfare. 
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5.2.1.3.2 The ideal market 
 
According to economic theory, the following conditions define the ideal market: 68 
 
1. Full information is available on supply and demand, market prices and consumer 
preferences, the quality of goods and Services, and the costs of all alternative ways of producing 
them. The cost of this information is zero. 
2. Costs  of  enforcing  contracts  and  property  rights  are  zero,  and  property  rights, 
including rights to the means of production, are established and stable. 
3. Individuals are rational in the following sense: their preferences are organized in a transitive 
ordering (such that if an individual prefers A to ß and B to C, he also prefers A to C) and they are 
capable of selecting appropriate means toward their ends. 
4. (a) Transaction costs are zero (transaction costs include costs of bringing goods and 
Services together for exchange, and costs of reaching agreements for exchange, for example, costs of 
formulating mutually acceptable contracts, and costs of information about potential offers to buy 
and sell) or (b) there is perfect competition. That is, no buyer or seller can influence prices by his 
own independent actions, which implies that there  are  no  monopolies. There is complete freedom 
to enter and exit the market, freedom to switch from one product to another, and unrestricted access 
to product markets, capital market and credit markets. There are no externalities (n externality is a 
"neighborhood" or "third-party" effect of a market exchange: an effect on some one's well-being which 
is not taken into account in the market exchange). 
5. Products offered in the market are undifferentiated, meaning that buyers cannot distinguish 
between the products offered by various sellers, and vice versa. 
 
Pareto Optimal outcomes are guaranteed only if all of these conditions are satisfied. Since these 
extremely strong conditions that define the ideal market are never met in actual markets, the case for 
the market on grounds of efficiency depends on the extent to which actual markets do approximate, or 
can be modified to approximate, the ideal market. 
Some approximations to the ideal market are inherent in the theory, namely as a result  
from  competition  over  time  (these  are  called  the  Diachronic  efficiencies  of  the market): 
Competition among producers reduces costs of production, since producers who fail to develop 
and utilize less-costly methods of production are replaced by others who do. Competition among 
entrepreneurs reduces transaction costs, since those with the least expenditure of their own 
resources can charge less for their Services and capture a larger share of the market. Finally, the 
need for information on the part of producers, consumers, and entrepreneurs creates a market for 
information. In each of these respects, competition in non-ideal markets generates incentives for 
                                                             
68 Cf. for example Buchanan 1985, 14f. 
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behavior that tends toward the more perfect satisfaction of the conditions of the ideal market, in 
particular, zero transaction costs, full information, and zero information costs (cf. ibid., 16). 
In this context, it can be argued that trade is “fair” (in the general sense) to the extent that it 
corresponds to trade in the ideal market, because it is only to this extent that it leads to the most 
efficient results.69 Sometimes this is used counterfactually, in the sense that trade is understood as 
“fair” to the extent that the exchanges would occur in an ideal, perfectly competitive market (cf. e.g. 
Arnold 1994, 80f). We will consider this position in chapter 6 when discussing exploitation. 
On the level of the world trade system, an analogous position claims that the system of trade 
between states is fair to the extent that corresponds to an ideal market, because here too it is to 
this extent that it leads to the most efficient results. In what follows I will look at this position and 
its moral grounds. 
 
5.2.1.3.3 Efficiency and welfare arguments for free trade between states 
 
Economic theory clearly suggests that international trade puts the participating countries in a better 
situation that autarky. It also suggests that the freer trade is conducted, the more beneficial it is for 
the countries involved. For the common sense, this intuitively makes sense: countries possess 
different natural resources, their climate allows for the cultivation of different foods, they have 
different traditional, specialized industries etc., so it seems only sensible to profit from a certain 
division of labor by trade in between them – just as it is sensible to profit from the division of labor 
inside one country.  
Standard economic theory teaches that trade benefits all countries involved, at least in the 
long run, for another reason. This other factor which according to economic theory speaks in favor 
of extensive trade is called comparative advantage. If country A is better at producing cheese than at 
producing wine, it should obtain wine by specializing in cheese while trade some of it for wine. If the 
reverse is true for B, B should trade wine for cheese. A has a comparative advantage in cheese and B 
in wine, even if A is better at (has an absolute advantage in) producing both. While there are other 
reasons for trade liberalization, this insight, going back to Ricardo’s 1817 Principles of Political 
Economy, continues to underlie international economics.  Trade theory supports free trade:  barriers 
such as tariffs and quotas obstruct mutually beneficial transactions, and countries should undo them, 
even unilaterally. The best way for A to get wine is by trade cheese, even if B fails to obtain its 
wine in a parallel manner (see e.g. Krugman/Obstfeld 2003). 
Generally, economists maintain that, while international trade always generates winners and 
losers, if trade is liberalized by reducing or abolishing protectionist measures the liberalizing 
country as a whole will win. The reason for this is that, while workers in certain sectors might 
face unemployment, millions of consumers see small savings because goods get cheaper, and overall 
                                                             
69 For a counterargument on these bases against the claim that the current market is fair see 5.2.1.3 d). 
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what gets lost through unemployment is more than offset by what is gained through lower prices. In 
technical terms, freer trade satisfies Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, an 
outcome is considered more efficient if a Pareto optimal  outcome  can  hypothetically  be  reached  
by  compensating  the  losers  from  the winners so that no one would end up worse-off than 
before (Cf. Brandi 2011; Hicks 1939, Kaldor 1939).The evidence and the opinion of most economists 
suggests that in many cases trade liberalization is conducive to growth, given that background 
conditions crucial for economic activity are favorable. These include most importantly a stable 
political situation and reliable rule of law (see e.g. USITC 1997; Wacziarg et al. 2003; Anderson 2004; 
Panagariya 2004). 
In sum, free trade between countries is considered to lead to national income gains as a 
result from comparative advantage, economies of scale and the spread of technology and ideas, 
which increase gains by reducing production costs and increasing productivity. The resulting gains 
in turn are considered to contribute (indirectly, and in conjunction with factors such as geography 
and institutional quality) to economic growth (c.f. e.g. Krugmann/Obstfeld 2003). 
It is important to note that economists emphasize that the basic argument for free trade 
between countries, which is based purely on rational self-interest, is unilateral.  The value of trade 
concerns imports, which allow for greater productive efficiency and introduce new embedded 
technologies.   The role of exports is that they pay for imports. From this perspective it is argued 
that a country benefits by dropping trade barriers unilaterally, there being no need for export market 
access in order gain from trade. In this perspective then, there is no need for mutuality. As Paul 
Krugman writes “If economists ruled the world, (…) [G]lobal free trade would emerge spontaneously 
from the unrestricted pursuit of national interest” (Krugman 1977, 113).   Nevertheless, the 
standard economic case for free trade does also suggest that free trade is not purely matter of 
national self-interest. According to both “terms of trade” and “strategic trade” theory, under the 
appropriate conditions market barriers can be optimal for countries. But since the optimal trade 
barriers are quite difficult to set in practice, the costs of regularly getting it wrong, so it is often 
argued, outweigh the modest benefits of   occasional success. Besides, in reality self-interested 
unilateral optimizing might trigger retaliation from other countries, which could result in mutually 
destructive trade war.  Hence it is in the best self-interest of countries to forgo temporary gains for 
the sake of mutually beneficial cooperation over the longer haul (cf. Irvin 1996, 216). In fact, 
historically it was precisely such reasoning that led countries to establish an international trade 
system, the GATT, in the aftermath of the mutually destructive interwar years. 
Stiglitz  and  Charlton  point  out  that  the  relation  between  trade  liberalization  and growth 
depends on several factors and is accordingly context dependent. According to them, there are 
situations in which liberalization may not be an advisable course of action for developing countries (at 
least in the short run) (Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, ch. 2). They do advise them though to open up their 
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markets at least to countries that have a smaller economy than them (ibid., 94). This, however is 
an empirical question and will therefore not be pursued further here. 
What is important for connecting efficiency arguments to moral welfare arguments is that it is 
generally agreed that growth is necessary for achieving broad social benefits (see e.g. UNDP 2003; 
World Bank 2004). The latter could be understood, for example, in terms of the UN Millennium 
Development Goals, which are formulated as follows: reducing extreme poverty by half, realizing 
universal primary education and gender equality in education, reducing maternal mortality by three-
fourths and mortality among children under five by two-thirds, reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS 
and assisting AIDS orphans, and improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers. 70 So how does the 
relation between growth and the social Millennium Development Goals look like? 
There are mainly two reasons that are mentioned: first, growth directly reduces poverty for 
many households, and, second, it increases tax revenues to governments which can (theoretically) be 
used for improving health care, education etc. 
On this basis, what I call the economic argument from future benefits is often used to justify 
bad working conditions and low wages in developing countries. It goes more or less as follows: The 
main cost advantage of developing countries in export markets is their cheap labor, and this should 
be fully used in order for their economies to grow (Cf. Chapman 1994, 3). The resulting growth in 
turn creates more jobs, which benefits the population through more income. Sweatshops (i.e. 
production sites with bad working conditions) are the necessary first stage in this development. 
Working conditions improve at a later stage of development as a matter of economic necessity: more 
demand for labor in relation to its supply leads to companies having to improve their working 
conditions to attract workers. Besides, sweatshops raise standards of living over time through 
systemic spillover effects: By drawing people away from rural areas, thereby reducing the labor 
supply there, rural wages tend to rise too. 
Because  of  the  assumed  beneficial  long  term  consequences  of  economic development for 
whole societies, the “overwhelming mainstream view among economists is that growth of this kind of 
employment [i.e. sweatshop labor] is tremendous good news for the world’s poor” (Paul Krugman’s 
statements, Myerson 1997, 3). Even from the perspective of individual laborers, in this view “the best 
hope for workers in substandard conditions lies in the sustainable improved economic and social 
conditions that economic growth brings – a durable economic growth that will occur only if 
developing countries can capitalize on their low-cost advantage to attract development”71 (Myerson 
1997, 2-3). So, “however much we may not like some of what we see in the labor conditions of 
developing nations, this is the market at  work, and  the  market works  to  generate overall 
improvements in  economic welfare for a society” (Hartman et al. 2003, 3). 
                                                             
70 See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.html. 
71 Of course cost advantages are not the only factor encouraging foreign investment. Highly relevant are factors 
that minimize the (real and perceive) risks of investing in a certain place, like political stability, the rule of law, 
exchange rate stability, protection against market intervention, and monopoly structures (Murray 1997, 21). 
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Assuming that the predictions of economic theory are correct, this argument might give us a 
reason for accepting, all things considered, some working conditions that we would otherwise not be 
ready to accept. However, note that it has clear limits. The claim (as voiced in the quotation above) 
that we should accept whatever negative “collateral damage” the market does on its way to 
eventual economic improvement is certainly off limits. Outside a very crude from of utilitarianism we 
are not allowed to sacrifice some people’s life and well- being for overall social benefit. It is the task 
of morality and law to define the limits of the market to protect people. The question is not if we 
should set limits to the market but where we should set them. This question will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 6 on “fair trade” in the supply chains of MNEs. As we said before, violations of 
negative rights are a clear case. 
However, there is a consequentialist line of argument that challenges economic theory’s 
account of the benefits, or positive externalities, that employment under poor conditions allegedly 
brings to a society in the long term. Critics argue for example that the kinds of skills developed in 
much routine factory work hold no real promise of economic and social  development,  neither  for  
the  individual  employee  nor  for  the  entire  society. Moreover, they argue that the transition 
from agricultural and cottage industries to factory- based work actually produces negative 
externalities, i.e. social costs that are not covered by the wages paid by an MNE to its employees. 
An example in point is the social disruption caused  by  urban  migration,  as  people  move  away  
from  their  informal  social  support networks of family and village to urban anonymity, being left 
without any support network at all in the process because public social services are not working or 
are overstressed (c.f. Hartman et al. 2003, 4). 
Which  version  is  more  accurate  is  an  empirical  question,  and  accordingly  for 
empirical scientists to decide. I imagine that both arguments might be true under certain 
circumstances. For the sake of the argument I will assume that the former account is commonly right, 
that is, that allowing Sweatshop labor actually does have beneficial economic consequences in the 
long run. 
However, as has been mentioned before, per capita growth per se does not necessarily mean 
that the situation of the poorest people is improved. Often the wealth created benefits only a few, 
and the poorest are not usually among them. In fact, since most of them live in rural areas they are 
not the ones who will easily find employment in new factories which are usually located in the 
proximity of cities – a fact that leads to massive migration from the villages to the big cities, which in 
turn leads to the creation of huge slums in the outskirts of those cities. As we said, growth is only a 
morally worthy goal if it is tied to other social benefits. 
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5.2.1.3.4 Counterarguments against the claim that fair trade is free trade  
 
A first group of important arguments in debates on global fair trade attack the second premise of the 
argument, that is, they argue that actual markets fail to approximate the efficiency of the ideal 
market to such an extent as to bring the whole argument down. These arguments point to major 
sources of inefficiency in actual markets, and especially global ones. 
The aims of the Fair Trade movement can to a large extent be understood in in this 
context. The movement argues that especially with regard to the situation of producers and workers 
in developing countries many of the conditions of the ideal market are not fulfilled which leads to 
market failures. For this reason, a big part of the Fair Trade principles aim at correcting these market 
imperfections. With respect to the moral bases of “fair trade”, this can be understood in terms of 
fairness in our sense: the market failures disadvantage the producers and workers with regard to 
their equal opportunity to profit from the free market system. The measure of the Fair Trade 
movement aim at correcting these disadvantages in the background conditions of market 
transactions to give producers in developing countries the  possibility  to  participate  in  the  practice  
of  global  trade  on  grounds  approximating equality of opportunity. 
The main sources of inefficiency, some of which are also being referred to in attacks of the 
second premise of the argument for free markets on grounds of efficiency are the following:72 
 
(a) lack of information on the part of producers and consumers 
 
(b) monopolistic and monopsonistic tendencies,  
(c) negative externalities 
(d) unemployment 
 
(e) high transaction costs 
 
(f) the existence of barriers to successful voluntary collective action to secure certain goods which 
the market cannot provide (public goods problem) 
(g) lack of congruence between the satisfaction  of the individual's preferences as they are revealed 
in the market and the individual's actual well-being. 
 
The most relevant ones with regard to debates on “fair trade” are (a)-(d). Let us have a look at them 
and how the Fair Trade system attempts to mitigate them. 
Ad (a) On the part of producers in developing countries, especially in remote areas, 
information on market prices, consumer preferences, demand etc. is often very difficult to come by. 
The Fair Trade movement tries to counteract this problem by providing the necessary information  
through  direct  and  long-term  trade  relationships.  An additional, highly promising strategy to this 
                                                             
72 Cf. Buchanan 1985, 19, additions by the author. 
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aim focuses on bringing information technology such as cell- phones and internet to remote areas. 73 
On  the  part  of  MNEs  and  consumers,  information  on  the  social  conditions  of 
production, the environmental impact etc. of goods is notoriously resource intensive and sometimes 
difficult to come by. This is information which (at least certain) individuals themselves, “upon 
considered judgment, would agree is relevant to the making of a reasonable choice, granted … 
(their) own stable preferences” (Buchanan 1985, 20). This is the reason why so many advocate 
transparency with regard to social production conditions and environmental impact as a 
requirement of “fair trade” (e.g. Starmanns 2011). Only if people knew about these things, so the 
assumption, their purchases could reflect their preferences and thereby integrate them into the 
market. That they don’t know about these “moral characteristics” of the goods they purchase distorts 
the market in the sense that their purchases in this respect are not fully informed. 
Economic theory is right insofar as this problem has led to the emergence of a market for 
information on these issues. Most notably, the information is provided by means of certain labels and 
certifications (like the organic or Fair Trade label).  Additionally, many NGO’s are devoted to gather 
the relative information and make it available to firms and consumers, thereby massively reducing 
their costs of attaining that information. Nevertheless the general problem persists: it takes a 
morally very conscious consumer to go through all the trouble for getting the relevant information in 
all realms all the time – it is simply still too resource intensive. For this reason, some demand that 
certain information regarding the social and environmental conditions of production should be 
mandatorily supplied with the product by the seller (e.g. Zervas 2008). This seems like an interesting 
suggestion, especially since the demand for transparency is clearly one of the most universally 
backed and least controversial demands for fairer trade. In this respect it is important to 
understand that this demand can be voiced from within economic theory and sticking to the free 
market system – via the conditions for the ideal market. However, the verification of this 
information would entail massive costs and complications, a problem which according proposals 
would have to solve. 
Ad b) Monopolistic tendencies exist when some economic actor can unilaterally influence 
prices. There are different circumstances which make this possible: restrictions on entry into markets 
due to licensure, prohibitions against advertising, and trade secrets. Monopolistic tendencies can also 
result from government support or from collusion among firms to fix prices or drive out competitors. 
If some firms happen to enjoy unique access to certain raw materials, or if economies of scale make 
it difficult for new firms to survive long enough to amass sufficient capital to produce competitively, 
so-called natural monopolies can arise and persist without government support. Economist will often 
argue that both “natural” and collusive monopolies are inherently unstable and tend to break 
down with time through competition. Advocates of the market often infer, then, that government- 
                                                             
73 This strategy is e.g. pursued by social businesses in Muhammed Yunus’ organizations. Cf. Yunus 2007. 
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supported monopoly is the only serious threat to efficiency in the long run (Buchanan 1985, 20f). 
Whatever the theory says, in the context of global trade there are additional phenomena of 
monopsonistic tendencies that are highly relevant in practice: In remote regions, producers often 
have not choice of traders they sell their products to, but are faced with a single option.  This factual 
quasi-monopsony is often ruthlessly exploited by the traders holding them, by buying goods at prices 
way below the market price.74 The Fair Trade movement tries to counteract this problem by 
organizing producers into cooperatives to strengthen their bargaining power towards buyers with 
quasi-monopsony power, and by circumventing intermediary buyers prone to abuse their monopsony 
power by direct trade relationships with producers. 
Ad c) Negative externalities of economic exchanges are negative effects (costs) on the well-
being of third parties or the environment which are not taken into account in the market 
exchange and are not included in the equilibrium price of the goods exchanged. From within 
economic theory negative externalities can be understood and criticized as inefficiencies. Buchanan 
explains this as follows with the example of a chemical product: “negative externalities can be 
viewed as inefficiencies of overproduction. More of the chemical is produced than would be produced 
if the total costs of production, including the costs to breathers of polluted air, were taken into 
account in establishing the equilibrium price for the product. Because the cost to the producer of 
producing the chemical is less than it would be if the costs to third parties were included in his 
costs, the producer can sell the chemical at a lower price and still make a profit. But since more will 
be sold at this lower price, more will be produced than would be if the total costs, including 
detrimental third- party effects, were taken into account” (Buchanan 1985, 22). 
Negative externalities are an important topic in debates on fair trade. The fact that, contrary to 
the conditions of the ideal market, negative externalities such as environmental degradation, 
negative health effects on workers in unsafe environments etc. are pervasive is rather 
uncontroversially  seen  as  a  big  problem.  Suggestions as  to  how  this  might  be remedied include 
voluntary agreements, but usually turn to institutional regulation. This is because voluntary 
measures can easily be blocked by free-rider and assurance problems. On both accounts, each firm 
has an incentive for noncompliance: it may not comply in order to take a free ride on the compliance 
of others, or it may not comply because this is the option which maximizes utility in a situation of 
insecurity regarding the action of the other parties. 
There are several ways in which institutional regulatory interventions in the market can try to 
remedy the problem of negative externalities. Let us quickly look at them. 1. Institutional regulatory 
bodies might prohibit the behavior that produces the negative externality.  2.  Institutional  regulatory  
bodies  can  allow  the  activity  that  produces  the negative externality to continue, but tax the 
producer either in order to a)  reduce the volume of production by increasing production costs, 
                                                             
74 A related issue is temporary quasi-monopolies that arise in extraordinary situations of need. This is discussed in 
chapter 7 with regard to exploitation. 
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and/or b) in order to use the tax- proceeds to compensate those who bear the negative effects of the 
activity. 3. Institutional regulatory bodies can set and enforce standards which those engaged in the 
activity must meet. 4. Institutional regulatory bodies can enforce a legal system which allows 
affected third  parties  (either  individually  or  in  class-actions)  to  sue  for  compensation  for  costs 
imposed  on  them  by  the  actions  of  others.  5.  Institutional  regulatory  bodies  might 
strengthen voluntary measures by enforcing their agreements. 6. Institutional regulatory bodies may 
create and enforce private property rights in order to "internalize" externalities. 
With regard to global trade, the most relevant global institutional regulatory body is the 
WTO. It would therefore fall unto the WTO to device strategies like the ones mentioned to counter 
the efficiency problems of the global free market. As we have seen before, the problem is of course 
that the WTO doesn’t work as a body for finding collective solutions for collective problems (like a 
national government is supposed to), but rather as a bargaining forum where self-interested parties 
try to promote their own interests. For the position that free global trade is fair trade this is clearly 
highly problematic. 
Ad d) Unemployment is a highly relevant issue in the context of discussions on free and “fair” 
trade, mainly with regard to minimal and living wages. For this reason I will dwell on the efficiency 
arguments on this topic a little longer. 
Many economists argue that unemployment, far from being an imperfection of the market,  is  
the  result  of  failure  to  allow  the  market  to  function  without  interference. Especially minimum 
wage laws and restrictions on competition for wages due to successful labor unions, so the argument, 
make it too costly for some employers to hire less-productive workers, which leads to 
unemployment. The neoclassical argument for the claim that the truly free market eradicates 
unemployment in some goes like this: “If there is free competition for jobs, then (since the supply of 
labor relative to the demand for it is high), the price of labor, that is, wages, will decrease. As wages 
decrease, production costs decrease. In attempting to maximize profits, firms act so as to make the 
marginal cost of their products (the cost of producing one additional unit of the product) equal to 
the price of the product. In order to equalize marginal costs and price, firms expand production. But 
expanding production requires hiring more workers. Therefore unemployment is reduced.” 
(Buchanan 1985, 33f). What can be replied to this argument from within the economic theory? 
As Marx and other early critics of capitalism pointed out, there is at least one problem which 
this argument overlooks: if the additional output is not being bought by consumers firms will not 
expand production. But the level of consumption and wages are linked: if wages are very low 
(and a large portion of the consumers pays for its consumption through wages) then aggregate 
demand will be insufficient, expansion of production will not occur, additional  workers  will  not  be  
hired,  and  unemployment will  persist  (this  is  called  the problem of decreasing aggregate demand) 
(cf. ibid., 34). 
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To this economists may reply, relying on the work of the eighteenth-century economist J. B. Say, that 
at market equilibrium every good produced generates an equivalent value of income, and therefore a 
shortfall of aggregate demand could not exist at equilibrium. But this argument is based on a 
hidden assumption, namely that enough of the income from what is produced is spent on 
consumption instead of being saved in some way (Keynes [1936]). Since continued expansion of 
production (and accordingly the reduction of unemployment) depends on the proportion of income 
devoted to consumption and investment, unless enough of the income from what is produced is spent 
on consumption and thereby back into production, not enough expansion will occur to overcome the 
problem of insufficient aggregate demand and unemployment will continue to exist (cf. Buchanan 
1985, 34). However, there is some contrary evidence that suggests that an increase in wages does not 
necessarily cause a raise in unemployment (e.g. Card/Krueger 1995). 
This is not a question I can try to decide. Nevertheless, the majority of economists support 
the claim that minimum wages and union activity do indeed contribute to unemployment, although 
due to the mentioned problems it assumedly would not go back to zero as neoclassical theory 
suggests even without them. Assuming this is correct leaves us with a moral puzzle: how should the 
value of any work and accordingly some income (even if it pays at sub-subsistence level) for the 
highest possible number of people be compared with the value of “decently” or “fairly” paid work for 
the ones currently in the workforce? We will examine this puzzle, which can be seen as central to 
questions of fair trade, in the section on the level of trade practices of MNEs. 
With regard to global trade, according to Stiglitz/Charlton much of the opposition to trade 
liberalization is based on its negative effects on employment, which flies in the face of the economic 
standard model. The reason for this seems to be that the models typically assume that there is full 
employment. Trade liberalization measures are good for a country according to the theory because, 
as the country’s  economy  specializes  in  their  areas  of  comparative  advantage,  they  enable 
resources to be redirected from protected low-productivity sectors to more productive sectors. But 
with widespread unemployment the picture changes. Trade liberalization is now not needed to 
‚release’ resources into more productive sectors because there are enough human resources 
available, and accordingly trade liberalization may simply move workers from low-productivity 
protected sectors into unemployment. If this happens, it lowers the country’s national income and 
increases poverty. Since there can be multiplier effects the total impact might even be far greater 
than the direct effect (cf. Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 70). 
Let us turn to a second utilitarian counterargument to the free market now, which is based on 
the concept of diminishing marginal utility. It holds that the highly unequal distribution produced by 
the market fails to maximize social utility (even when outcomes are Pareto Optimal) because a certain 
redistribution from the better off to the worse off would increase the utility of the worse off more 
than it would decrease the utility of the better off, according to the law diminishing marginal utility. 
The solution suggested for maximizing social utility and welfare is combining the free 
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market with a social “safety net” that provides a “decent minimum” of basic goods and services 
for those who cannot attain them for themselves. Giving the market a large role makes use of its 
(relative) efficiency, including heightened productivity resulting from unequal distribution and its 
powerful, decentralized way of coordinating supply and demand; ensuring a safety net for the 
worse off incorporates the fact that, at least for basic goods or capabilities, marginal utility is 
relatively uniform for all individuals. This solution is implemented in some form in all liberal 
welfare states. Regarding reaching the ideal balance, “The trick (…) is to set the level of taxation 
needed to provide the safety net high enough to reap utilities that would not be obtainable in the 
more inegalitarian distribution of an unfettered market but low enough to avoid excessive reductions 
of incentives for productivity” (Buchanan 1985, 59). 
When relying on welfare arguments for the global free market and accordingly the perspective 
that everybody’s well-being is central to its justification, this counter argument and the suggestions 
for remedying the utility problem necessarily seem to apply to the global level as well as a 
matter of consistency. If this is correct, it implies that someone relying on a welfare argument for 
global free trade would have to take at least a sufficientarian cosmopolitan position in the Global 
Justice debate that was sketched in part I (how exactly they apply to the global level seems to 
depend to a large extent on one’s position in the Global Justice debate). This is in fact what e.g. Sen 
(1980, 1993) does. As we said in chapter 3.6.3,  
Let us return to the Fair Trade movement. As we saw it tries to counteract market failures 
and in this sense can accordingly be seen as trying to enhance the efficiency of the global market. 
However, the Fair Trade movement is often criticized on precisely the opposite grounds: On the 
background of the position that free trade is “fair trade” in the sense of improving welfare through 
efficiency, the social Fair Trade movement is often attacked as promoting unfair trade, because it 
allegedly leads to inefficiencies. The crucial issue in this respect is the floor price for commodities in 
the Fair Trade system, which is situated outside free market theory.  The  floor  price  is  independent  
of  the  world  market  price that  is determined according to the product and the region of 
production. It is determined in the following way: 
 
Production costs + living costs + cost for compliance with the FT-standards = floor price 
 
If the world market price is higher than the floor price, the former is paid. If the world market 
price falls under the threshold of the floor price, the latter is paid. The aim of the floor price is to 
mitigate the risk of producers constituted by fluctuations of the world market price:  when they 
fall so low that they don’t even cover the production costs this constitutes an existential threat to 
the farmers. 
The argument criticizing the FT-movement on the grounds of the floor price goes that if the 
traded volumes are substantial, floor prices for commodities can lead to market distortions, mostly in 
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the form of overproduction, and accordingly to inefficiencies of the market. However, at the 
current time this argument is not strong because the volumes are much too low to have this effect. 
Kurjanska/Risse discuss this question by drawing a parallel between the case of the Fair Trade 
Movement and the case of subsidies (Kurjanska/Risse 2008). Their common denominator is that are 
both economically ‘inefficient’ in that they uphold production beyond what the world market would 
sustain (ibid., 29). Risse argues that the claims of developing country farmers to be kept in business 
through the floor price must be justified against the view that supporting Fair Trade harms the 
development of poor countries. The latter argues that Fair Trade keeps unproductive sectors in 
business instead of developing those that they are comparatively good at to become competitive on 
the world market. In this view, Fair Trade accordingly blocks the sustainable development of poor 
countries (ibid, 31). Although Risse does not say this explicitly, this amounts to arguing that we must 
weigh the claims of current farmers in developing countries to be kept in business against the claim of 
future inhabitants of developing countries to benefits from a competitive economy. 
The  question  if  this  criticism  is  justified  is  an  empirical  one,  and  accordingly 
answering it is not my task. However, it is important to note that the actual point of disagreement is 
not necessarily about the Fair Trade system being fair or unfair according to different understandings 
of fair trade. This perspective and the Fair Trade Movement agree on what would be fair trade, 
namely trade leading to development for developing countries and an according improvement of 
their inhabitants well-being. In this sense, they agree on the goal, but they disagree about the means 
to reach this goal. In line with economic theory, Risse’s argument relies on the premise that free 
trade is better able to serve this goal than Fair Trade in the long run because it is more efficient. 
Let us look at the position that trade is fair if it serves the development of the worst off in 
more detail. 
 
5.2.2 Position (c) Fair trade is Trade that Serves the Worst off 
 
A position that is often implicitly or explicitly at the base of criticisms of current global trade is the 
position that “fair trade is trade that serves the worst off”. This position can be called the development 
perspective on fair trade. As such, it is often considered an important part of the Fair Trade Movements’ 
understanding of fair trade. As Maseland/DeVaal put it: “The fair trade movement (…) argues that 
international trade constitutes an improvement if it has beneficial consequences for the poorest groups 
in the world. This is the moral criterion fair trade uses to judge the consequences of trade” 
(Maseland/De Vaal 2002, 256). Further, the second special trait of the Fair Trade system which is 
situated outside the market, namely the social Fair Trade premium, can be interpreted as being based 
on the development perspective on fair trade. The social premium is added to the price for the goods 
and paid to the producers’ cooperative with the proviso that it is used for social development 
projects in the community. It is the core of the FT-system as a business-based development strategy.  
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 But the Fair Trade movement is not alone with this understanding of “fair trade”. For example, 
Article 2 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, which focuses the Doha Round on the ‚alleviation of 
poverty’ in developing countries, can also be interpreted as containing this implicit normative principle 
(cf. Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 73). And for Stiglitz/Charlton 2005 it constitutes the relevant fairness-
standard for judging global trade. They write that “Every agreement that differentially hurts 
developing countries more or benefits the developed countries more (say, as measured by the net 
gains as a percentage of GDP) should be presumptively viewed as unfair. Indeed, it should be essential 
that any reform be progressive, i.e. that a larger share of the benefits accrue to the poorer countries“ 
(Stiglitz/ Charlton 2005, 75f). 
Formulated in our standard form, the position can be spelled out as the claim that “trade is fair 
if it serves the worst off”. In terms of analytical classification, the normative assessment of this position 
focuses on the outcome of trade. In my terminology it is a position on just trade since it concerns the 
distribution of benefits from trade and, more specifically, since it judges trade against a conception of 
(global) distributive justice. It accordingly reads “trade is just if it serves the worst off“. The subject of 
the claim’s presumed moral duties to ensure fair trade are countries. The according duties ask of them 
to ensure that global trade is structured in such a way that it benefits the worst off (these can be either 
countries or individuals, depending on the approach). 
The argument for the claim that “trade is fair if it benefits the worst off” can be understood as 
follows:  
 
(P1) Trade is just if it fulfills the relevant criterion of global justice 
(P2) The relevant criterion of global justice is that the worst off must be benefitted  
(C) Trade is just if it benefits the worst off 
 
Let us focus on the normative grounds of (P2). There are several principles of justice that could serve 
to ground (P2), the most prominent of them being the Difference principle (see chapter 3.7). It 
demands the evaluation of entire institutional structures from the point of view of the worst-off 
persons, or, in an interpretation of the case of the international economic system, the worst-off 
countries. If the difference principle is indeed the relevant criterion for just outcomes of the world 
trade system, its rules should be arranged in a such way that they are to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged countries; or at least that they are to a greater benefit of the least advantaged 
countries than of the developed ones.  
Stiglitz/Charlton invoke the Difference principle as a criterion for judging “the fairness of 
particular trade agreement proposals” in the following passage:  „Rawls method generates basic 
principles of justice that provide some guidance in evaluating the fairness of particular trade 
agreement proposals – in particular his ‚Difference Principle’, that ‚Social and economic inequalities 
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are to be arranged so that they are (…) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged’ (Rawls 1971, 
83)” (Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 81).  
As Boda (2001, 17) argues, Rawls’ concept of “justice as fairness” and his difference principle 
are useful conceptual tools for interpreting the claims that preferential treatment in trade policy is 
a demand of justice. On the assumption that free trade does not sufficiently benefit developing 
countries, according to the difference principle some mechanisms, like preferential treatment or 
compensatory schemes, might be needed in order for global trade to qualify as just. Additionally, 
Rawls’ concept of “justice as fairness” and his difference principle are useful conceptual tools for 
interpreting the normative content of the 1970s development discourse (ibid.). 
 Assuming for the sake of the argument that the Difference principle is plausible as the criterion 
for judging the outcomes of global trade, however, note that “some of the difficulties of evaluation and 
comparison which plague consequentialists recur here: in this context a maximin principle needs the 
information with which to make maximizing judgments about very complex phenomena. Since 
international interdependence is intricate, it is hard to know which institutional changes would most 
improve the lot of the poorest in the world” (O’Neill 2010, 72).  
Indeed, the discourse on the equity of the international order lost a part of its significance in the 
1980s and 1990s due not only to political, but also theoretical changes. The neoclassical economic 
discourse (historically fueled by the bad experiences of the 1970s’ government failures) stresses the 
importance of the liberalized market in creating welfare.  As we saw in the section on welfare 
arguments for the free market, they argue that development needs are best met by trade liberalization. 
In this sense, the welfare argument for a global  free market  could  as  well  be  construed  as  being 
based on  something  like  the  difference principle. If it were, the welfare argument and position c) 
could be said to agree on the normative principle of outcome justice, namely that the situation of the 
worst off needs to be improved, whereas they could disagree on the means to achieve this (defenders of 
position c) could e.g. claim that differential treatment measures were needed to implement the 
desired goal). 
With regard to the plausibility of (P2) and position c) as based on the Difference principle, it is 
important to note that it is dependent on a particular view in the debates on global justice, namely a 
particular cosmopolitan position (see chapter 3.7.2). As we saw there, it is highly controversial if the 
difference principle can plausibly be applied to the world as a whole. For my part, I doubt that this is 
plausible. 
However, (P2) and position (c) could also be  based on a less controversial principle, namely 
for example on a minimalist conception of global justice in a sufficientarian sense (see 3.7.2). 
Stiglitz/Charlton point to this possibility as well when they write that alternative frameworks to the 
Difference principle such as Sen’s capability approach would, in the current context, arrive at quite 
similar views (Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 81).  
Note that whatever criterion we accept regarding global justice, for (P1) to be plausible too we 
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need additional reasons to explain why it should be trade as opposed to other distributive 
mechanisms that has to ensure the fulfillment of the respective criterion of justice. That is, the 
question with regard to (P1) is if trade has to comply with a criterion of justice at all, or if its role 
should merely be seen as concerned with maximizing efficiency (see chapter 5.2.1.3). This refers back 
to general questions regarding the legitimation of free trade (see chapter 5.2.1). However, as 
position (c) explicitly refers to an ethical criterion for the assessment of trade we will not the dwell 
on this here.  
 
5.2.3 Position (d) Fair trade is Trade the Terms of Which Ensure Reciprocity and Impartiality 
 
The next position we will discuss is position d) Fair trade is trade the terms of which ensure reciprocity 
and impartiality. The subject of fairness judgements here is trade in the sense of a practice governed by 
certain “terms of trade”, whereas the fairness criterion applied is reciprocity and impartiality.  
Formulated in our standard form, the position can be spelled out as the claim that “trade is fair 
if the terms of trade are fair, and the terms of trade are fair if they ensure reciprocity and impartiality.”75 
It is accordingly a position on the structural or background fairness of trade. 
The demand for reciprocity and impartiality here concerns on the one hand trading countries 
,and on the other hand economic actors within them: e.g. a manufacturer in B should have the same 
chance to sell goods to consumers in A as a manufacturer in A has to sell to consumers in B. Cf. Miller 
2010, 9). The duty bearers are the states that set and apply the terms of trade, and their duty consists 
in setting fair, that is, reciprocal and impartial terms of trade.  
According to position d), fairness demands that trading partners apply the same terms of 
trade to the imports and exports of the others (cf. Miller 2010, 9). With regard to tariffs for example, if 
state A is trading with state B and B imposes a tariff on goods imported from A, position d) holds that A 
can impose the same level of tariffs on goods imported from B, but not a higher tariff; if B imposes no 
tariff at all, A mustn’t impose one either. The same applies to other aspects of trade, for example import 
quotas or export subsidies.  
In this sense, the principles of reciprocity and impartiality appear prominently in trade 
negotiations. The WTO operates on the basis of reciprocal tariff concessions (cf. Suranovic 2000, 298f), 
and the principles are incorporated in the so-called Most-Favored Nation rule, one of the most 
fundamental GATT/WTO principles. The principle holds that members may not discriminate among 
other WTO members with regard to tariffs they impose. This means that a country has to offer the 
lowest import tariff it offers another country on a particular good to all other signatory countries of the 
                                                             
75 In the literature this is sometimes expressed as a principle regarding trade negotiations, namely that each 
party should match the concessions offered by the other (ibid.; cf. Brown/Stern 2007). 
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WTO (cf. Suranovic 2000, 289).76  
Let us look at the ethical grounds of the claim that “trade is fair if the terms of trade are fair, 
that is, if they ensure reciprocity and impartiality”. The basic argument can be understood as follows:  
 
(P1) Trade is fair if the terms of trade are fair 
(P2) Terms of trade are fair if they are reciprocal and impartial  
 (C) Trade is fair if the terms of trade are reciprocal and impartial 
 
(P1) states that for trade as a practice to be fair, a necessary condition is that its structural or 
background dimension must be fair. As the reflections in chapter 3.5 showed, this is plausible.  
What about the normative grounds of (P2)? The demand for reciprocity can be understood 
directly in terms of justice as reciprocity (see chapter 3.1). Its subjects are the states themselves as 
actors who negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. As I see it, it doesn’t make sense to apply this 
criterion to producers in different countries because there is no reciprocity among them even if the 
terms of trade are fair. 
However, the demand for impartiality can be understood as applying both to states and 
economic actors with them. It is based on the fairness standard of impartiality (see chapter 4.2), or can 
be understood in the sense of not unfairly disadvantaging others (see chapter 4.7): If states offer the 
same trading conditions to all of their trading partners, they create impartial terms of trade and (at first 
sight) thereby don’t disadvantage any trading actors within their territories.  
However, when taking a closer look this position entails an obvious problematic when 
applied to trading actors from different countries: As we saw in our discussion of fairness 
standards, formal impartiality is only fair when participants are in a similar situation regarding the 
relevant respects, and if that is not the case, we must compensate for existing disadvantages. In 
other words, on the basis of the fairness standards of not disadvantaging others established in 
chapter 4.8., if the competition is to be fair, some measures must be taken to counteract the 
disadvantage of the latter, e.g. by giving him a head start over the former. 
Applying this to the case of trading countries, formal impartiality doesn’t take the relative 
strength or weakness of the potential trading partners in to account – for example with regard to 
the scale and level of development of their industries. An analogy for this would be a race between 
a younger and an older child, where the difference in development due to the age difference puts the 
younger child at a clear disadvantage compared to the older one if the terms of the race are the same 
for both. I f  their situations are different in such relevant respects, producers in one country may be 
at a considerable disadvantage compared to the producers in the other when formally impartial or 
reciprocal terms of trade are in place. To counteract the disadvantages of less developed countries 
                                                             
76 For a further analysis of the fairness principles that were invoked in the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations 
see Albin 2001. 
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with regard to the rationale of trade (i.e. mutual benefit), a qualified version of impartiality is 
required, which calls for applying different sets of rules to various trade partners. In this vein, Stiglitz 
argues that the principle of “reciprocity for all and among all countries – regardless of 
circumstances” should  be  replaced  by  the  principle  of  “reciprocity  among  equals,  but  
differentiation between those in markedly different circumstances” (Stiglitz 2006, 83). 77 
Stiglitz/Charlton argue along these lines when they write: „One of the purposes of trade liberalization 
is to ensure that foreign producers are treated ‚fairly’. But again there are questions: ‚What does 
fairness mean in this context?’ Foreign producers and domestic producers are often inherently in 
different situations.  In  the  case  of  a  developing  country,  the  foreign  producer  may  have greater 
access to capital. He almost surely has greater access to international technology. Much of the 
debate about protection concerns ‘levelling the playing field’, correcting these initial inequities“ 
(Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 78). 
In other words, the different background conditions of countries and their producers in 
terms of access to capital and technology might require remedying on the basis of the fairness 
standard of non-disadvantaging and the principle of equality of opportunity. in the form of “special 
and differential treatment” of poor countries. At least in theory, this idea has also been accepted 
on the WTO level. 78 
A major argument brought forward along these lines is the infant industry argument. It 
roughly holds that exposing non-developed industries in developing countries to competition from 
highly developed industries from developed countries puts the former at a severe disadvantage 
compared to the latter (because of the level of technology, economies of scale, etc.), which makes it 
highly unlikely for them to develop and survive. Accordingly, the argument goes, protectionism is 
required until the industries in developing countries have caught up to a sufficient degree. This idea 
was for example incorporated in the GATT provisions that allowed developing countries to protect 
their infant industries against competition from big corporations in developed countries (cf. Miller 
2010, 10).  
Based on the same moral grounds, Stiglitz/Charlton argue: “(…) what cannot be justified in terms 
of either (efficiency and fairness) are developed country non-tariff barriers, such as dumping, which 
treat developing country producers disadvantageously relative to their own, subjecting them, for 
instance, to a far higher standard for what amounts to predatory behavior than that to which they 
subject their own firms. By the same token, it is hard to justify demanding developing countries to 
                                                             
77 In a similar way, Kapstein 2006 distinguishes between ‘specific’ and ‘diffused’ reciprocity in his discussion of 
international fair trade 
78 On 14 November 2001, a WTO Ministerial Declaration including the following paragraph was adopted: “We 
agree that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of 
negotiations and shall be embodied in the schedules and concession and commitments and as appropriate in the 
rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their 
development needs, including food security and rural development” (paragraph 13). 
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provide foreign firms with greater protections than provided to domestic firms. While there is some 
debate about the validity, or abuse, of the infant industry argument, there is no argument for 
protection of the ‚grown-up’ industry“ (Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 79, emphasis added). 
I agree with this judgment on the moral bases of our fairness standard. However, even if such 
fairness considerations speak against protecting domestic producers in developed countries, there 
might be arguments on different moral grounds for protecting (certain) producers in developed 
countries. One such argument holds that a country has more weighty obligations towards its own 
citizens than it has towards foreign ones and is therefore required to protect the former against 
harsh competition from the latter. Another argument which applies both to developed as to 
developing countries holds that a country has weighty moral reasons to protect specific domestic 
sectors, most notably the one that has led to most controversies regarding protectionist measures: the 
agricultural sector. The main moral bases for this argument are considerations of food security. 79 We 
will explore these arguments in chapter 5. 
 For now, let’s turn to another position on similar moral grounds.  
 
5.2.4 Position (e) Fair trade is Trade on a Level Playing Field  
 
Position e) understands “fair trade” as trade on a level playing field in terms of the standards that 
apply to producers (mainly ecological and social requirements). This understanding is at the base of 
the understanding of fair trade as requiring a harmonization of standards (cf. Bhagwati and Hudec 
1996). Reconstructed in our standard form, the position reads: “trade is fair if the same requirements 
apply to all trading actors.” The subjects of the claim’s presumed moral duties to ensure fair trade in 
this sense are the trading system, that is the WTO, or more precisely the member states who decide 
on the rules of the world trading system. The duties that exist according to position e) demand of 
them to establish harmonized standards on a global scale. With regard to our classifications, the 
position concerns background fairness. Since, formulated in the above sense, it focuses on relative 
advantages and disadvantages in the background conditions, it is a position on grounds of fairness 
proper. The argument reads:  
 
(P1) Trade is fair if it is impartial  
(P2) Trade is impartial if the same requirements apply to all trading actors 
(C) Trade is fair if the same requirements apply to all trading actors. 
 
On these grounds, an argument is sometimes brought forth in favor of protectionist measures in 
developed countries. It holds that it is unfair to domestic producers to expose them to the foreign 
                                                             
79 Other arguments point to the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions through shorter transport ways, the 
preservation of culture and traditional landscapes, etc. See e.g. Taka 2010, 148 and 150. 
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competition because the former are at a disadvantage compared to the latter who have to comply 
with lower standards, and have much cheaper labor costs. In this sense, protectionism is defended by 
arguing that trade is fair only it is takes place on a level playing field, and in case this is not given (which 
is the situation today) this gives countries the right to protect their producers against the unfair 
competition from abroad. 
 Before discussing the plausibility of this position, let me introduce a closely related position that 
is brought forth by Georgios Zervas (2008). Like the position just presented he argues that the 
current competition in the global market place is unfair because of the highly unequal conditions for 
different competitors. Zervas claims that “as long as the problem of a true neutrality of the market is 
not solved we don’t have fair trade” (ibid., 20). 80 According to him, the goal with regard to 
“fairness” in trade is the establishment of a level playing field, guaranteeing true neutrality of 
competition (ibid., 22). Zervas goes on to explain that what he means by neutrality of competition is 
that the same core standards apply globally for all entrepreneurs and firms (ibid., 22).  In other 
words, he advocates the “implementation of transparent eco-social background conditions for 
everybody who wants to participate in world trade” as a demand of “fairness” in trade (ibid., 19). 
He continues that competition under completely unequal conditions can be “free” but at the same 
time “highly unequal, antisocial and non-ecological, and accordingly deeply unfair”. The incorporation 
of all external costs and effects of the market into the market, he argues, is highly important for the 
correct and fair functioning of the market (ibid., 23). 
Like in the standard mentioned above, Zervas’ basic claim that fairness in global trade requires to 
the same standards for all participants  is  based  on  an  understanding  of  fairness  as  unqualified  
impartiality, and the normative grounds this part of his position accordingly concern fairness proper.  
However, Zervas also invokes another understanding of “fairness” when he claims that 
when market conditions are “unequal, antisocial and non-ecological” they are “accordingly deeply 
unfair”. Here he uses “unfair” in a general moral sense as meaning “ethically wrong”. In my 
terminology, this part of his position is accordingly about ethical trade. 
How plausible is position e) in general, and Zervas’ position in particular? 
The  aim  in  terms  of  ethical  trade  of  Zervas’ proposal  is  solving  the  problem  of negative 
social and ecological consequences of global trade on the systemic level of the institutional  
background  conditions  of  global  trade.  “The  firms  (…)  cannot  solve  this (problem) as long as they 
are caught in the system of unregulated competition. The current trade system forces them to 
implement the lowest possible production costs for the biggest part of the global market”(ibid., 18, 
emphasis added).81 With this, I agree. I take it that the global implementation of high ecological 
standards and higher social standards is a highly plausible demand from the perspective of ethical 
                                                             
80 Here and in the following: author’s translation. 
81 More on this argument in chapter 7. 
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trade.  
From the perspective of fair trade, as a demand of background fairness it is required that all 
participants can participate in trade on fair terms. This means that Zervas is right to claim that it is 
unfair from the perspective of institutional background conditions if producers from industrialized 
countries have to comply with high ecological and social standards whereas others don’t, because the 
additional costs this generates for them puts them at a disadvantage compared to the others. 
However, from the perspective of fair trade the picture is more complicated than Zervas 
assumes: Background fairness doesn’t look exclusively at rules with regard to the background 
conditions, but includes other aspects in its assessment as well. Recall the cartoon of the different 
animals that are all supposed to climb a tree according to the same rules, but where the competition is 
nevertheless deeply unfair because of other factors that make for highly unequal chances for success. 
In this sense, an assessment of background fairness takes into account that producers from developing 
countries are currently themselves disadvantaged with regard to many issues such as the state of their 
industries, technology in general, access to investment etc. In view of this, it is highly questionable 
that our assessment of background fairness, all things considered, would result in the conclusion that 
we must harmonize the standards to counteract the disadvantage of producers from industrialized 
countries.  
In view of the fact that we presumably should implement high ecological and social standards 
as a demand of ethical trade, fairness as qualified impartiality demands that we don’t simply impose 
such harmonized high standards overnight and require everybody to comply with them, because this 
would put high costs on producers in developing countries, who are often far from reaching the 
suggested standards, whereas they put almost no costs on producers in industrialized countries since 
they have implemented these standards already. This would obviously, at least in the short term,  
serve  the  companies  in  industrialized countries whereas  it  would  put  the  ones  from  developing 
countries under high pressure and possibly out of business. Fairness as qualified impartiality would 
require assisting developing country producers in the process of adjusting to the higher standards. 
 
5.2.5 Position (f) Fair trade is Trade the Burdens and Benefits of Which Are Distributed Fairly 
 
 
Let me now turn to position f) fair trade is trade the burdens and benefits of which are distributed 
fairly. A position along these lines, admittedly in a much more sophisticated and rather complex 
form, is prominently defended by Aaron James. James theory is to my knowledge the best developed 
theory of fairness in international trade to date.  
Before presenting his theory, let me anticipate the answers to our analytical questions with 
regard to position f): 1) It concerns the outcome dimension of trade, that is, the distribution of 
burdens and benefits from trade. In my terminology position f)is a position on outcome fairness, or, if 
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it is embedded in an encompassing conception of distributive social justice, a position on just trade. 
Formulated as a claim regarding the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for trade to qualify as fair, 
position f) reads: trade is fair if it distributes the burdens and benefits generated by it fairly. The 
subject of the claim’s presumed moral duties to ensure fair trade is the global trading system and with 
it the states that shape it, and those duties presumably ask of them to structure the global trading 
system in a way that leads to a fair distribution of burdens of benefits. 
The basic normative grounds of the claim consist in the following argument: 
 
(P1) Cooperation is fair if the burdens and benefits generated by it are distributed 
proportionally 
(P2) The global trading system is a case of cooperation  
(C) The global trading system is fair if it distributes the burdens and benefits generated by it 
proportionally 
 
Since in chapters 3.5 and 4.7 we saw that the fairness standard expressed in (P1) is plausible with 
regard to cases of cooperation, the plausibility of position f) accordingly hinges mainly on (P2).  
If one thinks that fairness in the context of trade should be understood as concerned with 
sharing burdens and benefits, it might be argued that fairness requires that those who face the main 
burdens of trade should get support from those who receive the main benefits from it, thereby 
leading to the burdens and benefits being more equally shared. Understood in this way, fairness 
might require that the people facing the main burdens of trade liberalization should be compensated 
with part of the gains of the winners. This amount to claiming that fairness requires that the 
compensation which is hypothetically possible in the Kaldor-Hicks efficient liberalization scenario 
should be effectuated in reality. Such a “Compensation View” is defended by James, who argues 
that trading nations should compensate the losers of international trade with part of the winners 
gains (James 2005a; 2012). In what follows I will present and explore James’ much more elaborate 
version of this basic claim. This is a highly interesting topic for our purpose since James explicitly 
develops the moral foundations of his theory in a thorough way. 
According to James (2012), a theory of fairness in international trade should answer at least 
three questions:  1. What subject exactly are we to assess as fair or unfair in the trade context?  
2. What sort of fairness issue does this basic subject of assessment raise?  3. What moral principles 
must be fulfilled if trade is to be fair in the relevant sense?  In his paper “A Theory of fairness in 
trade” James offers answers to these three questions which he derives from a broadly Rawlsian 
“constructivist” methodology. 
According to James, the basic subject of fairness in trade is an international social practice 
of market reliance, whereby countries mutually rely on common markets (in goods, services, or 
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capital) for the sake of the “gains of trade” (James 2009). Similar to Carr’s view on fairness, he 
accordingly understands fairness as relevant with regard to particular social practices. The relevant, 
existing social practice is in James’ view that countries do comply (more or less) with a system of 
“market reliance expectations” for the sake of mutually shared ends. A chief function of this practice 
is to regulate trade according to international rules, including formal trade law (e.g. WTO rules) and 
“informal understandings of how the balance between market and state is to be struck (e.g. the post-
war “embedded liberalism”   compromise)” (ibid).82 According to this perspective, these rules and 
understandings represent substantial market reliance expectations, which constitute the terms of 
participation in the larger market reliance practice. 
This market reliance practice can be organized in different ways, with varying consequences 
for different countries and their respective producers, consumers and various classes.   The collective 
choice of how to organize the practice, mainly through negotiated agreements, is therefore the 
subject of considerations of justice or fairness. In James’ view, these are requirements of structural 
fairness, which concern how a given system distributes the benefits and burdens it creates, among 
different countries and their respective classes. To judge the international market reliance practice as 
structurally fair (or equitable in his terminology) means that it distributes the benefits and burdens it 
creates according to a pattern that is reasonably acceptable to every country and class affected.   
Conversely, to judge the practice as unfair (or inequitable) is to judge that it is or would be 
reasonable for some not to accept the organization of the practice, given the available institutional 
alternatives (ibid). In this sense, James holds a social contract view of the international trade system. 
This  account  makes  questions  of  the  fairness  of  the  international  trade  system 
independent of  other moral issues,  like  humanitarian concerns with poverty, the Global Justice 
debate, or human rights external to the global economy. 
James argues that the basic requirements of structural fairness lead to certain principles 
which concern the distribution of, on the one hand, the harms of trade (such as unemployment, 
wage suppression, and income volatility that diminishes lifetime savings), and, on the other hand, 
the gains of trade (as specified by classical trade theory, including the national income gains due to 
greater allocative efficiency in the division of labor, economies of scale, and the spread of 
technology and ideas.  He formulates the following three principles: 
1)  The principle of Collective Due Care, which demands that trade nations must protect people 
against the harms of trade (either by temporary trade barriers etc., or, under free trade, by 
direct compensation or social insurance schemes).  Specifically, no person’s life prospects 
are to be worse than they would have been had his or her society of origin been a closed 
society. 
2)  The principle of Domestic Relative Gains, which demands that gains to a given trade society 
                                                             
82 Cf. John Ruggie 1982 and Robert Howse 2002. 
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are to be distributed equally among its affected members, unless inequality of gain is 
reasonably acceptable to them all (e.g. according to domestic distributional principles). 
3) The principle of International Relative Gains, which demands that gains to trade nations, are to 
be distributed equally (as adjusted according to the relevant endowments of each, like 
population size and level of development) , unless unequal gains flow to poor countries (e.g. 
via special trade privileges). 
 
James argues that his principles have the advantage of not requiring comparisons of gains for any 
two individuals of the world, since harm is understood in an absolute sense, whereas the gains are 
compared only between individuals within a single society (under the second principle) and the 
distribution of gains across societies is evaluated at the level of whole countries (under the third 
principle).  This distinguishes them from imaginable principles of “global” or “cosmopolitan” fairness 
that would directly compare and limit the relative gains of any two individuals anywhere in the 
world.  He opposes the latter since what raises the fairness issue in international trade is the special 
kind of social relationship that embeds the international market relations. In this international 
market reliance practice, the parties to the practice are countries, which makes them the holders of 
any egalitarian claims concerned with relative gains or losses. “For such claims are essentially tied 
to the type of good the trade relation is intended to create, and the ultimate aim of international 
market reliance is for  countries  to  mutually  increase  national  income  (via  productivity-enhancing 
specialization)” (ibid., 5).  This perspective on fairness in global trade has the benefit of generating 
significant (if limited) egalitarian requirements of distribution relying only on relatively undemanding, 
plausible assumptions. 
James’ position relies mainly on two moral grounds: 1) an account of the subject of 
fairness considerations along the lines of Carr’s suggestion of fairness as being concerned with the 
aims of social practices, and 2) a Rawlsian account of social justice as requiring the justifiability of 
collectively sustained social institutions and practices in light of their distributive   consequences   
(regarding   burdens   and   benefits)   to   everybody,  which   is egalitarian in the sense that 
differences in treatment under the common structure are assumed  to  be  arbitrary  unless  they  
can  be  justified  as  acceptable  (not  reasonably rejectable) to everyone affected (along the lines 
of Scanlon’s contractualism on what we “owe to each other” (in the context of international trade)). 
Ad 1) The focus on concrete social practices as the subject of fairness considerations is the 
reason why James objects to the idea of directly applying the original position to determine what 
principles would reflect a fair agreement. The latter would imply using the Rawlsian thought 
experiment to ask directly what system of international trade people would agree to live under 
behind the veil of ignorance regarding their country of origin and social position. This proceeding, 
James argues, would be methodologically unsound by making unjustified controversial assumptions 
regarding the represented interests, levels of ignorance, and form of the arrangement. To justify such 
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assumptions, James argues, an independent characterization of the nature of the social structure 
at issue is required, in light of its basic aims and organizational form, and a specified set of relevant 
interests and claims. For this, “The proper methodology, in the first instance, is a constructivist blend 
of morally informed “constructive interpretation” of the organization and aims of the social reality in 
question, of substantial moral explication of the morally relevant interests at stake, and of reasoning 
about what organization, if any, is reasonably acceptable to each person affected, in light of those 
relevant interests.  Then, but only then, can we consider with any confidence how the original 
position representation of reasonable acceptability might go.” 83 His basic thesis of social 
interpretation is that the global marketplace is currently fundamentally organized and shaped by an 
international market reliance practice, for the sake of mutual national income gains.  His basic 
moralized interpretive thesis is that this practice is of a sort that triggers the egalitarian 
considerations of structural equity, i.e. the fairness principle of sharing burdens and benefits fairly.  
He defends his three principles on the basis of substantial moral considerations about what people 
can reasonably accept (ibid., 8). 
Let’s look at these interpretations in detail one by one. First, it needs to be justified that trade 
is indeed best seen as an international market reliance practice, and particularly that this market 
reliance reflect a truly common practice, or cooperation, as opposed to a coincidence of purely 
unilateral decisions. James argues for this assumption by arguing that the choice of reliance is based 
on expectations of similar reliance by other countries, for the sake of mutually understood and shared 
purposes. He argues that the multilateral trade system is in fact a historical social contract in just this 
sense (ibid., 9). 
As we remember from above though, the basic economic argument for free trade is unilateral. 
If the practices of the world trade system were interpreted as a mere coincidence of  unilateral  action,  
this  would  not  imply  the  sort  of  mutuality  needed  for  a  common practice, and would not raise 
fairness demands either. But as we also remember, mutuality is built into the trade system because it 
is seen to be beneficial in the long run (ibid., 10). As James argues, in reality a country’s choice for 
free trade is taken in full awareness of the similar  choices  of  other  countries,  possibly  based  on  a  
common  understanding  of  its benefits, and this becomes an established arrangement which all 
countries rely on. This, he argues, justifies the interpretation that there is the sort of mutuality of the 
kind that triggers the fairness demands that require that the relative social practice be assessed on 
its own terms, according to the principle of sharing burdens and benefits equally (ibid., 10-11). 
James goes on to argue that if this is correct, then market reliance is a form of participation.  
“At the minimum, countries participate by maintaining trade policies (whether tariffs and quotas or 
“behind the border” measures such as subsidies, internal taxes, or preferential rules) that allow a 
common market to exist; if trade barriers are high enough, cross-border business will (aside from the 
                                                             
83 This approach is explained in detail in James 2005b. 
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occasional “black market”) all but cease.  Beyond the minimum, participation involves compliance 
with established market reliance expectations, including both treaty rules and informal 
understandings of what it takes for the common market relations to be beneficial in the intended 
ways.  Once a country meets a basic set of such expectations, it counts as full participant in the 
practice, thus enjoying the presumptive claim of every co-creator to a greater rather than a lesser 
share of the cooperative practice’s intended fruit” (ibid., 12). 
Let’s turn to the aim of the practice of market reliance expectations. The answer is according 
to James national income gains. (As was mentioned before, these are a result from comparative 
advantage, economies of scale and the spread of technology and ideas, which increase gains by 
reducing production costs and increasing productivity). “The basic, presumptively legitimate and 
generally understood aim of mutual market reliance, as first specified by Adam Smith and as refined 
by David Ricardo, Robert Torrens, and James Mill, is mutual augmentation of national income” (ibid., 
12).  The resulting gains in turn contribute (indirectly, and in conjunction with factors such as 
geography and institutional quality) to economic growth. 
James argues against assuming the welfarist position that the aim of trade is to promote  
mutually  beneficial  transactions  for  the  sake  of  human  well-being.  While  he believes that this 
might be one possible normative justification of international trade, he argues that it is not its basic 
presumptively legitimate and assumed aim of the international practice – national-level income gains 
are (ibid., 13). These may or may not translate into welfare for countries overall or for individuals. 
On the basis of the above arguments, James argues that the mere existence of the mutual 
market reliance practice suffices to generate a collective responsibility of fairness in the Rawlsian 
sense outlined above. Accordingly, each participating country has a duty to negotiate toward and 
comply with the terms required for a structurally fair practice, which implies that the burdens and 
benefits created by trade, across countries and within their respective classes, must be distributed 
in a way that no one can reasonably reject. “In particular, levels of relative loss or gain are crucial.   
If countries really are jointly creating goods that would not otherwise exist - goods that would not 
exist under universal autarky -then each such participant has a presumptive claim to greater rather 
than lesser shares. Perhaps special reasons for inequality of shares can be given, as particular 
cases require. The crucial point is that such special reasons have to be available if the shared practice 
is to be regarded as a reasonably acceptable, structurally equitable practice” (ibid, 13). 
In a next step James turns to the implications of his framework in terms of the requirements 
it leads to.  For deciding what should be understood as the burdens and benefits to be fairly 
distributed, they are the benefits and burdens that would not exist under general economic 
autarky (e.g., in a state system without economic globalization), and that are attributable specifically 
to the international market reliance practice. The question then is what this “international market 
reliance practice” entails, and what are to be considered the relevant gains and losses. The clearest 
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candidate seems to be the multilateral trade   system, especially   given   its   rule-based   nature   and   
judicial   and   enforcement mechanisms, and the gains and losses considered by classical trade theory. 
 
Regarding the distribution of gains and losses from trade, a standard suggestion in 
economics is that a society can choose to compensate the “losers” from trade with some part of 
the “winners” gains (e.g., via a tax and transfer scheme, or domestically funded social insurance 
institutions). As we saw before, the mere possibility of providing such compensation implies that free 
trade is “better for the nation” than market protection. Conversely, James argues that fairness 
demands that this compensation is actually provided – especially if the disaggregated cost of 
compensation amounts to a small or moderate part of each winner’s gains (ibid., 18). 
As James recognizes, a closer definition of the “losers” of trade in the relevant sense is 
necessary. He suggests three grounds for considering someone a loser in the required sense: reasons 
of harm to lifetime prospects, of acceptable risk, and of burden sharing. With regard to the first, 
someone’s life prospects are to be seen as harmed by trade if they are worse than they would have 
been had his or her society of origin been closed to trade. He argues that this applies e.g. to 
developing country farmers who are arguably net losers for their exposure to rich country agribusiness 
subsidies, in the sense that they would have been better off had their society never opened its borders 
(ibid., 19). In such cases, his principle of Due Care requires compensatory arrangements are made.  
These may include, in developed countries, “direct payments and/or social insurance, in the form of 
unemployment and wage insurance, pensions, education subsidies, job training and job placement, 
employment- stimulating public investment, and so on. In developing countries, where institutional 
schemes can be difficult to establish and maintain, appropriate measures include public investment, 
government purchase of goods and services, temporary, revenue-generating trade barriers, infant 
industry protection, and so forth” (ibid., 21). A crucial implication of Due Care is that the 
responsibility to fund and establish such compensatory measures does not stop at a given country’s 
borders, but rather is a collective responsibility of countries who participate in the practice. “When 
any country cannot afford the necessary compensatory schemes, its trade partners are obligated to 
help fund the measures needed for the shared market reliance practice to be fair to all” (ibid., 21). 
More particularly, he argues that it requires “the establishment of relatively autonomous international 
institutions for the maintenance of domestic social safety nets (as enforced, if need be, within 
the WTO)” (ibid.). 
James argues that the fact that the relatively less well-off bear the chief burden of a society’s  
enjoying  the  gains  of  trade  gives  them  an  especially weighty claim  to  greater shares.  Here the 
relevant “losers” are specified in terms of the relative hardships that relatively poor people face as 
compared to relatively rich people within the same society. For example, since  income volatility 
as  a  result  of  international trade  is  more  likely to diminish the displaced, low-skilled worker’s life 
time prospects by diminishing his ability to save and ultimately retire, “wage insurance, beyond mere 
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unemployment insurance, is arguably only fair” (ibid., 25f). 
 
Let’s turn to James claims and arguments regarding the gains of international trade. James 
argues that among those affected within a given society, gains are to be distributed equally, unless 
inequality admits of special justification which is reasonably acceptable to all of them. But what are 
the moral grounds for claiming that inequality of gain requires special justification? If everyone is 
made substantially better off, who could reasonably complain? 
James suggests that the nature of the good created in the trade relationship is relevant. This 
good is national-level gains across an economy, to which people contribute simply by promoting 
their personal economic interests.  No general class of market actors makes any special 
contribution to the gains of trade for society overall which would give them any proprietary claim to 
the gains (ibid., 26f). The default distribution then according to James, which recognizes every 
participant’s claim equally, is equality of gains, unless further reasons for a difference in treatment 
can be given. In this sense James opposes a libertarian view of property rights and subscribes to a 
Rawlsian one that understands them as what one gets in a fair scheme of cooperation (ibid., 27).  
Above that, James argues that a change in trade policy is not an intervention into any given 
transaction, but a change in the background conditions of exchange (especially relatively scarcity of 
goods).  Accordingly, redistribution of the gains of international trade is thus not analogous to the 
former case. “The more closely analogous situation is that in which a government deposits money 
into one’s bank account and reserves a right of fairness to give notice and take some of it back” 
(ibid.). 
The domestic distribution of the gains of international trade, according to James, bears 
on what is fair in the international system, in that a country’s inegalitarian policies can affect the 
relative gains of other countries and their members. Assuming that fairness asks for developing 
countries to get special privileges in the trade system on grounds of poverty (despite significant costs 
to rich countries), this argument will be considerably weakened if the rich in those developing 
countries gain to a degree which is not necessary to maximize prospects for the worst off.  “Even if 
we suppose that everyone in a developing country is made better off, the level of relative gain will 
matter.  Rich countries can reasonably expect limitations on inequality of gain, so that gains flow as 
much as possible to relatively poor people.  It won’t be fair to ask rich countries, including their own 
worst off, to pay for unnecessary gains to relatively rich people” (ibid., 28). 
How  does  James  argue  that  gains  across  trade  societies  are  to  be  assessed? 
According to International Relative Gains, the default is equality of gain. But he claims that there are 
two important exceptions. First, gains are to be adjusted (by approximation) according   to   relevant   
endowments   such   as   a   country’s   population   size,   level   of development, and any other factor 
not created by the trade relation, which predictably change how much a country gains from global 
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market integration. This endowment- sensitivity is supposed to reflect international trade’s limited 
aim, which is to improve upon endowments.  “Trade is legitimate and fair as long as the associated 
practice of market reliance  is  mutually  beneficial  and  the  improvements  it  creates  are  
distributed  in  a reasonably acceptable way” (ibid., 29). 
Second, James argues that inequality of gain is fair if greater benefits flow to people who are 
worse off in absolute terms. The principle thus reflects a limited form of “priority for the worse off,” 
as applied to levels of gain among trade partners.  The idea, in general, is that benefits matter 
more, from a fairness point of view, the worse off those people are in absolute terms (ibid., 29f). 
In what follows I want to take a critical stance towards James compensation view.84 In fact, it 
seems that if is faced with some relevant problems. One is that it has – without amendments – 
quite counterintuitive implications. First, it would require that very well-off people who lose out 
because of trade liberalization – for example an oligarch whose monopoly is undermined by new 
foreign competition – be compensated for their loss. James wants to avoid this counterintuitive 
outcome by claiming that compensation for the burdens of freer trade should be restricted to the 
worse-off in society, while those who remain well-off and secure after losing out because of freer 
trade don’t have a claim to compensation. He claims that ‘The fact that the relatively less well-off 
bear the chief burden of a society’s enjoying the gains of trade gives them an especially weighty claim 
to greater shares [of the gains from trade]” (James 2009, 25-6). It is unclear though how this can be 
justified on the basis of an understanding of fairness as sharing the burdens and benefits equally. 
Second, the compensation view raises the question why free international trade should 
trigger the fairness standard of sharing burdens and benefits inside a country (compensating the 
losers from the gains of the winners), whereas free domestic trade doesn’t. In other words, why 
should those people who lose out economically because of international trade be privileged (by 
getting special compensation) over those who lose out economically for some other reason – for 
example because of technical progress or domestic competition? Why, for example, should a milk 
producing famer who loses business because of international competition be privileged by getting 
special compensation over a restaurant owner who loses business because of new competition in the 
neighborhood? Why should a worker who loses his job because of foreign competition be privileged 
over one that loses his work due to technical progress? What morally relevant difference could 
there be from the perspective of a country between international trade and domestic economic 
developments that would justify applying the fairness standard of sharing burdens and benefits to 
international trade but not to domestic trade? 
It seems that to justify this one has to take the situation of national autarky as one’s moral 
starting point. Assuming that economic autarky is a morally favorable state and a sensible baseline 
to compare alternative states with, it could be argued that an autarkic country considering opening 
                                                             
84 The following section profited substantially from the reflections of Brandi 2011. 
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up its borders for trade should only do so when this leads to an outcome where domestically many 
end up better and no one ends up worse-off than before. The reason for this, it could be argued, is 
that leaving some worse off while others benefit of the change would be unfair, since this would 
amount to an unequal distribution of the burdens and benefits of the change. Since free trade is 
supposed to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient over autarchy, meaning that such an outcome can 
hypothetically be reached by compensating the losers from the winners, it is to be considered 
morally favorable, but only if the said compensation is actually carried out. 
The reference to an autarky baseline is found, among others, in Aaron James. He suggests 
that what matters from the perspective of fairness is that no person’s life prospects are worse than 
they would have been had his or her society of origin been closed to trade – more precisely, if it 
would have chosen economic autarky around the date of the person’s birth (James 2009, 19-20). If 
the person’s expected life prospects would have been better under autarky, then he or she is made 
worse-off by life in an open society, and is to be considered a “loser” from international trade of the 
sort who can claim compensation on the grounds of fairness. 
I take it that James doesn’t sufficiently justify his choice of the autarky baseline. Such a 
justification would be especially called for since the autarky baseline seems problematic for several 
reasons. First, it is clearly a purely hypothetic baseline that has nothing to do with the actual states 
countries which deal with trade liberalization are in. Economic interdependence has been the reality 
for many centuries, even millennia, so that this baseline is certainly not realistic with regard to the 
actual situation. Accordingly we have to consider if there are good reasons in favor of a hypothetical 
normative autarky baseline. 
In philosophy, hypothetical situations (such as economic autarky) are usually imagined as part 
of a thought experiment, which serves to derive general normative conclusions. What is important 
for those conclusions to be applicable to reality is that the hypothetical situation and the real 
situation are comparable with regard to the normatively relevant aspects. 
An example that illustrates this and is also directly relevant for the topic of autarky is Rawls’ 
original position. In this hypothetical situation, we remember, people decide on principles of justice 
behind a veil of ignorance which is designed to grant impartial results. These resulting principles of 
justice are then thought to apply also in reality. Now, interestingly for our case, for the sake of 
simplicity Rawls’ assumes his society to be autarkic, and includes reflections on international trade 
and interaction only after the principles of internal justice have been fixed. A reason for this is Rawls’ 
contractualist approach: he conceives of morality as being concerned with what a group of rational 
people would hypothetically mutually agree on – in the sense of a hypothetical contract between 
them (hence “contractualism”). Accordingly, the interests of all the parties to the contract must be 
figured into the agreement. But for this to be possible it is obviously crucial to know who the parties 
to the contract are. Rawls decided that the parties to the just social contract he was working out were 
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the citizens of the country in question – and only them. To make this unproblematic he imagined his 
society to be autarkic. 
 
In the debates on Rawls’ ToJ this has been reason for some criticism, since it is contended 
that the hypothetical situation abstracts from normatively relevant traits of the real situation, which 
makes the application of the normative results to reality unfeasible. Concretely, by hypothetically 
imagining the society as autarkic the potentially normatively relevant implications of cross-border 
trade and interaction get lost in the abstraction. Through  international  trade,  so  the  argument,  
foreigners  are  closely  connected  to  the citizens of a country and crucially contribute to the 
generation of wealth inside that country, which seems to be a morally relevant difference to the 
autarky scenario. These connections make it problematic to completely exclude the interests of 
foreigners from reflections on justice by excluding them from being party to the hypothetical 
contract. Choosing autarky as the context of the hypothetical contract in the ToJ therefore leads to an 
unjustified exclusion of the interests of foreigners connected to the society in question through trade 
and other interactions. 
Besides this problem, autarky is very clearly not an economically favorable state. There is 
empirical evidence on the costs of autarky to societies. Irwin (2001) e.g. assesses a trade embargo, 
which provides a rare opportunity – a natural experiment – to observe the effects of a nearly 
complete (although short-lived) elimination of international trade. The paper shows that the 
embargo inflicted substantial costs on the US economy while it was in effect. 
In fact, it seems to me that there is no convincing argument for James’ claim that the fairness 
standard of sharing burdens and benefits equally should be triggered by international trade but not 
by domestic trade. Instead it seems more plausible that all economic burdens be domestically treated 
in the same way. Since burdens created by the domestic economy are usually handled within an 
encompassing safety net funded by redistribution, it seems plausible to domestically handle burdens 
resulting from international trade in the same way. 
This is the position that Brandi (2011) argues for: in this sense, losers from international trade 
“should be compensated to the extent that this is required from the perspective of a more general 
principle of social justice – say, the difference principle – rather than from the perspective of a 
narrower principle of fairness in trade that the Compensation View proposes” (Brandi 2011, 3). This is 
what usually happens within affluent countries today. Nevertheless, the quality and extent of the 
social security net differs widely across different countries. Recognizing that those who lose out from 
economic competition, within and across countries, are the unavoidable “by-product” of the free 
market system, which is chosen because it is (allegedly), all in all, good for the country as a whole, 
provides a general argument for providing a strong social security net. This however does not 
follow from an argument of fairness as sharing the burdens and benefits of trade, but rather from a 
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more general argument for an ideal of social justice which “requires that the overall distribution of 
benefits and burdens in society is just, rather than the distribution of those specific benefits and 
burdens that are generated on the basis of international trade” (ibid., 2). 
5.3 Conclusions on Fair Trade on the Level of the World Trade System 
 
 
Let me summarize the findings of our examination of the moral bases of positions on fair trade on the 
level of the world trading system. The first position we considered understands fair trade as free 
trade. This position can be understood as being based on general moral fairness and accordingly as 
stating that free trade is morally desirable. It is a position on just trade in my terminology since it 
concerns the background conditions and outcomes of the whole trading system. Arguments for this 
view are made on grounds of liberty, desert, and welfare. The argument on grounds of liberty is 
based on the prohibition of coercion and is plausible and strong. The argument on grounds of desert 
for the moral desirability of the market is implausible. The arguments on grounds of welfare as based 
on the efficiency of the free market are highly important for debates on fair trade but are dependent 
on actual markets’ proximity to the ideal market of the theory. When operating with an 
understanding of fair trade as free trade, where actual markets are too far from the ideal market this 
requires corrective action, which is an important aim of the social Fair Trade movement. However, the 
Fair Trade movement is criticized with regard to the floor price they pay for commodities, which might 
lead to inefficiency if the trade volumes become higher. This might be negative for the development 
of the relevant countries, which in turn could be considered unfair in the sense of unethical. 
We then turned to consider the position that understands fair trade as trade leading to the 
development of the globally worst off. This is a position on just trade in my terminology as well, 
the moral base of which can be understood among others in the sense of Rawls’ difference principle 
or a sufficientarian position. As we saw in Part I, the application of principles of justice to the global 
realm depends on a one taking a non-nationalist position in the Global Justice debate, and especially 
the application of the Difference principle is highly controversial in that respect.  
In a next step we turned to positions that understand fair trade as being trade on terms that 
ensure reciprocity and impartiality. In my terminology, these positions concern fair trade proper. 
Based on my understanding of fairness I argued that they must be qualified so as to take 
disadvantages in the background conditions into account. This offers an argument against 
protectionism by industrialized countries but allows protectionism by developing countries in the 
case where this is presumably necessary to let them “catch up” economically.  
We then considered the position that fair trade is trade on a level playing field, and that this 
requires a harmonization of standards. In my terminology, this position concerns fair trade proper. I 
argued that on the base of my understanding of fairness this claim is not plausible as a fairness claim 
because it would disadvantage developing country producers even further. To avoid this, the latter 
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would have to be supported in the transition to the high standards. However, the requirement for 
harmonized high ecological and social standards can plausibly be understood as a claim of ethical 
trade, in the sense of leading to morally better trade results (less environmental degradation etc., see 
chapter 3.9). 
Finally we turned to the position that understands fair trade as requiring that trading 
nations distribute costs and gains from trade “fairly”. This position is based on fairness proper in the 
sense of the outcome related fairness standard of sharing burdens and benefits in a fair way. The 
latter is understood here in the sense of not being reasonably rejectable. The position depends on us 
understanding global trade as a case of cooperation. I argued that although James’ approach is 
highly interesting, it is faced with some weighty problems, the most important one being that it is 
unclear why losers from international trade should be compensated whereas losers of domestic 
trade are not.  
 
6. Fair Trade on the Level of Trade Policies of States 
 
A fair, just or ethical trade policy specifies the ways in which a state should relate to other states and 
their inhabitants   with   regard to   trade   related issues, through bilateral agreements, regional 
agreements, and the WTO's multilateral institutions. Of course this question is linked to the question 
from the previous chapter: what fairness demands regarding the trade policy of a country bears 
heavily on what fairness demands with regard to the world trade system, which is substantially 
constituted by countries. 
As central “fairness” issue with respect to countries’ trade policies concerns the question of 
protectionist measures, that is, measures which aim at protecting domestic producers from foreign 
competition. While we have discussed some “fairness” issues with regard to them on the level of the 
world trading system already, in this chapter I will at this issue from the perspective of individual 
countries. 
As we saw before, with regard to the question of protectionism, the concept of “fairness” is 
used in contradictory ways. In the US for example, “fairness” has been used to argue for import 
protection to save jobs in low-wage industries in the US, while it has also been used to argue against 
import barriers in Japan which are claimed to unfairly restrict access to US exports. This is of 
course inconsistent, since what is claimed in the name of “fairness” in this case obviously only 
takes one’s own country’s perspective into account, while not acknowledging that for matters of 
consistency, the same claims would apply from the other country’s perspective as well. 
 
6.1 Position (g) Fair Trade Policy Balances the Stringent Claims of Citizens and Foreigners 
Proportionally  
 
132 
 
In their influential papers “Fairness in trade I: obligations from trading and the Pauper-Labour 
Argument” (Risse 2007) and “Fairness in trade II: export subsidies and the Fair Trade movement” (Risse / 
Kurjanska 2008), Mathias Risse and Malgorzata Kurjanska discuss what fairness demands with regard to 
the trade policy of states. Their claim is that trade policy is fair if it balances the stringent claims of all 
affected parties proportionally. Formulated in our standard form, the position can be spelled out as the 
claim that “trade policy is fair if it balances the legitimate claims of citizens and foreigners in a fair way”. 
Their understanding of fairness is based on that of Broome (see chapter 4.2) and accordingly the 
normative assessment of this position focuses on the outcome dimension of trade.  
Understood in Risse and Kurjanska’s sense, the question of what a fair trade policy amounts 
to should be understood as the question which actors have which stringent claims towards the 
government of a country in the realm of trade policy. In my terminology this is a position on just 
trade since it judges this question from the perspective of different views on global distributive justice. 
The subject of the claim’s presumed moral duties to ensure fair trade are countries. The according 
duties ask of them to ensure that their trade policy proportionally balances the stringent claims of 
citizens and foreigners. 
The basic argument for the claim that “trade is fair if it balances the stringent claims of citizens 
and foreigners proportionally” can be understood as follows:  
 
(P1) Trade is fair if trade policy is fair  
(P2) Trade policy is fair if it balances the stringent claims of citizens and foreigners proportionally 
 (C) Trade is fair if it balances the stringent claims of citizens and foreigners proportionally  
 
Regarding (P1), there is obviously a tension between the fairness of trade, which is international trade, 
and the fairness of trade policy, which is national. Note therefore at the outset that if international 
trade is a practice that implies fairness requirements of its own, then we cannot reduce the fairness of 
international trade to the fairness of the trading policy of states as (P1) suggests. Rather, it is possible 
that fairness requirements of international trade make demand of countries that are in conflict with 
internal demands of justice. We will come back to this later. 
Regarding (P2), the crucial point is obviously the distinction between a countries’ own citizens 
and non- citizens. The central question with regard to this position is accordingly what stringent claims 
citizens and foreigners have in this context, and how they should be compared. Do only the former 
have stringent claims on a government regarding its trade policy? Or do also non-citizens who are 
afflicted by a country’s trade policy have claims towards the government? If both citizens and non-
citizens are considered to have claims, which claims are they exactly, and how are the claims of the 
former to be compared with the claims of the latter?  
A second distinction in this respect is the one between producers and consumers, since they 
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often have conflicting interests. Does the government have a primary duty to producers or 
consumers, and, in both cases, to which sub-group (different producing industries and poor, middle 
class, and wealthy consumers)? 
How we answer these questions about the demands of on the trade policies of countries  
depends   (among   others)  on  the  position   one   takes  in  the  nationalist  – cosmopolitan 
debate introduced in chapter 3.7.2). Very roughly speaking, nationalists assume that a country’s own 
citizens have exclusive or at least significantly stronger claims on their government as foreign citizens, 
and accordingly often argue that justice or fairness as comparative equality requires their 
government to protect them through their trade policy against foreign competition. We encountered 
this position, which Risse calls the “strong Westphalien view” before.  The  moral  basis  of  this  
argument  can  rest  on  the  different grounds that were presented in chapter 3.7.2 (e.g. 
communitarian grounds, or the concept of a social contract which that citizens have with each other 
which requires them to support each other, but not outsiders). 
So, let us examine how Risse and Kurjaska/Risse approach and answer these questions in their 
two papers. 
Risse and Kurjanska develop their position regarding fair trade policies of states from a 
broadly nationalist perspective. At the outset Risse emphasizes that his reflections start from the 
assumption that states are in principle legitimate, thereby asserting state sovereignty as a relevant 
principle for the moral assessment of the trade policies of countries. But as Risse argues, giving some 
moral weight to state sovereignty does not as a matter of principle “immunize a country against 
practically relevant moral criticisms of its trade policies” (Risse 2007, 356). Rather, it entails that 
“State sovereignty … must be understood as one relevant pro tanto consideration that must be 
balanced against competing moral claims” (ibid.). Put differently, according to Risse “principles  of  
fairness,  to  the  extent  that  they  apply  to  trade,  are  constrained  by  the [general] legitimacy of 
states” (ibid., FN 5; Risse 2005). As he stresses, investigating the topic of  fairness  in  trade  from  this  
starting  point  leads  to  very  different  results  from  those obtained when starting from another 
assumption (e.g. a cosmopolitan one). 
As mentioned, Risse takes the perspective that fairness in trade policy is to be understood as 
“proportional fulfilment of stringent claims” on grounds of deontological claim bases. His goal is 
accordingly to assess how stringent claims regarding trade that arise on different bases should be 
compared. From this starting point he sees three concrete fairness questions raised by international 
trade with regard to the trade policy of a country (B): First, in the case of A trade with B while parts 
of A’s population are oppressed, do the oppressed in A have a complaint of fairness against B, and 
should B cease to trade? Second, in the case of A trade with B and A’s products being cheaper 
because of oppression or lower social standards in A, do the affected industries in B have a legitimate 
claim of fairness that their government take measures to help them compete? Third, in the case of B 
subsidizing certain  industries  which  leads  to  lower  world  market  prices,  does  A  have  a  fairness 
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complaint against B? (Risse 2007, 356) In his two papers, Risse develops affirmative answers to all 
three questions. 
Risse’s methodology is to start from the Strong Westphalien View of people’s claims regarding 
trade policy and investigate if it can be justified on moral grounds. When his argumentation leads him 
to conclude that it cannot, he adjusts it to a weaker view with regard to the weight of state 
sovereignty, the Moderate Westphalian View, which he again subjects to critical examination.  He  
concludes  that  it  too  has  to  be  adjusted  on  moral grounds to his final position, the Weak 
Westphalien View. His analysis is divided into arguments for the transitions between these different 
views of what are the relevant claims. 
Let’s look at his arguments in some detail, with special focus on their moral grounds and their 
relation to concepts of fairness and justice. 
Risse justifies his nationalist starting point by arguing that economic fairness applies 
differently  within  and  across  states  because  domestic  markets,  contrary  to  the  global market, 
are embedded in the context of a shared legal corpus – particularly property law – that must be 
justifiable to all those that are subject to it. In this sense, especially the scope of property exchanges 
subject to markets, and the methods of market regulation specified by property law must be 
justifiable to individuals qua free and equal citizens in a system of cooperation, “and is subject to an 
evaluation in terms of fairness in this sense” (ibid., 359). In other words, the moral claim base of 
citizens regarding market regulations is accordingly the claim that they must be justifiable to them 
qua free and equal members of a system of cooperation (in the Rawlsian sense) (ibid.). Conversely, 
Risse argues, fairness considerations don’t apply in the same way across state borders, by which he 
means that people elsewhere affected by the distribution of trade related benefits and burdens have 
claims towards other states on different bases. 
Let us turn to Risse’s description of the Strong Westphalian View (SWV), which he takes as 
his starting point since it reflects the realities of the state system and underwrites much of the 
relevant international law and social science literature (ibid.). Risse describes this view in the 
following way: “Trade policy is every country’s own and exclusive affair. As long as the production 
processes themselves do not harm other countries, the social costs of production and the prices of 
goods from a country should not be subject to external interference, unless such production 
involves atrocious activities such as slavery. The world market prices of goods from other countries 
must be accepted in much the same way in which climatic conditions must be accepted: their 
change cannot be demanded as a requirement of fairness, nor do such prices by themselves give 
individuals elsewhere claims in fairness to governmental protection such as subsidies. Different 
countries do not stand in a relationship to each other that allows for fairness considerations to arise: 
they do not owe each other anything as far as the determination of prices is concerned, nor do 
governments owe anything to their own citizens based merely on what social costs are elsewhere” 
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(ibid., 360f). 
Risse goes on to argue why he believes this view is not morally justified, centering his 
arguments on oppression in certain trade countries, oppression being defined as implying 
violations of negative human rights (mainly physical inviolability). His first argument is that the SWV 
fails to capture legitimate claims of those who are oppressed against their trade partners. The 
moral grounds of this argument are that trade has distributive effects within a country, which are 
only “acceptable if they are if guided by a process justifiable to all, including those who lose out” 
(ibid.). In countries where part of the population is oppressed, this is not given. In a situation where 
country “A is, on an ongoing basis, involved in trade with B, an activity from which both sides 
benefit, while representatives of B can reasonably be expected to know that parts of the 
population in A are oppressed and the gains from trade occur at this subset’s expense” (ibid.), 
trade partner should be seen as being involved in  the  oppression,  which  “gives  the  oppressed  a  
complaint  in  fairness  against  a  trade partner. Such trade is like ongoing trade with stolen 
goods” (ibid.). In short, the moral grounds of Risse’s claim are that trade partners should be seen as 
benefitting from wrongdoing (and possibly contributing to it), against which the oppressed have a 
stringent claim which outweighs the claim of the former to their benefits. According to Risse’s 
understanding of fairness, this gives the latter a claim of fairness against the former’s engagement in 
trade with their country, which requires the latter, prima facie, to suspend trade with the oppressive 
country. That the SWV does not accept these claims of the oppressed is a reason to abandon it. 
Nevertheless, and independent of the SWV, Risse goes on to argue, the former do not 
have a moral obligation to do so if sufficiently strong consequentialist reasons speak against this. In 
this case, “fairness” reasons are outweighed by the consequentialist reasons. Given that trade leads 
to growth, which is strongly supported by the evidence, and given that growth is beneficial for 
realizing goals that benefit the oppressed (like the UNDG), which is more controversial and conditional 
on certain factors, these beneficial consequences may (via deontological aggregation) outweigh 
current unfairness, if sufficient measures are taken to ensure they will come about (ibid., 364). 
Let’s look more closely at the moral grounds of Risse’s undertstanding of fair trade which 
underlies the above argumentation. Fair trade in this sense is understood as trade which  does  
not  involve  violations  of  the  human  rights  of  the  trade  partners. This is a recurring view in 
debates about fair trade. How convincing is this understanding of fair trade? 
A first problem is that this understanding of fair trade does not cover some instances specific 
to trade which are often considered unfair although no oppression is involved. Such are cases where 
trade leaves one party very badly off, or where farmers are offered commodity prices that are too low 
to enable their adequate subsistence. 
A second problem is that this view is not specifically about trade. Rather, it applies 
whenever there is interaction between a party and a country where there are wide-spread human 
rights violations from which the first party benefits in some way. The same would apply in the 
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case of tourists, for example, who in Risse’s sense might become complicit in supporting 
oppressive regimes by giving the governments of such regimes access to hard currency. Since this 
problem then is not internal to the practice of trade itself, it seems more accurate to consider it a 
problem of the general ethics of trade (cf. Miller 2010, 14). 
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6.2  The  Main  Ethical  Arguments  For  and  Against  Protectionist  Measures  from  the 
Perspective of States’ Trade Policy 
 
In arguing against the SWV, Risse offers a second argument, which is based on the so-called pauper-
labor argument (PLA). The latter, which we have encountered before, claims that “Foreign 
competition is unfair and hurts other countries if it is based on low wages” (Krugman/Obstfeld 2003).  
Krugman/Obstfeld  argue  against  PLA  that  countries  trade precisely because production costs 
differ, so this certainly cannot be seen as unfair trade. Risse interprets this view as being implicitly 
based on the SWV, implying that how other countries (B) determine social costs and treat their 
workers is none of their trade partners’ (A) business, and workers in A cannot complain on such 
grounds that they are being treated unfairly (Risse 2007, 366). Risse goes on to analyze the moral 
grounds of the latter view against its opposite, PLA, to answer the question if domestic workers have a 
fairness claim to compensation if they are harmed because of oppression or less stringent legislation 
abroad (‘social dumping’) (ibid.). 
As Risse rightly points out, a supportive argument cannot merely be that continuing to trade 
with nations where workers are oppressed or social standards are bad harms some people 
domestically, since any policy harms some people relative to a suitable baseline. Accordingly, a 
reason is needed as to why this specific harm is unacceptable (ibid.). 
Risse argues that this reason is given on grounds of consistency insofar as domestic workers 
are disadvantaged because social standards have been accepted in their society for moral reasons, 
while foreign competition benefits from disregarding those standards and reasons (ibid., 367). The 
argument is conditional: “if legislation of social standards rests on moral reasons, then consistency 
considerations (considerations exploring what is entailed by the  fact  that  standards  hold  for  moral  
reasons)  deliver  the  conclusion  that  domestic industries may deserve compensation” (ibid.) 
(“compensation” meaning shifting the burden from one industry to all taxpayers). The idea is that 
if the society as a whole decided to adopt social standards for moral reasons, then it should 
support industries that are suffering losses because they, contrary to others abroad, have to abide by 
those collectively set moral standards. Conversely, if social standards domestically have emerged 
from power struggles, there  is  no  such  collective  moral  decision  to  ground  a  collective  
responsibility  for  the negative effects on some domestic industries, and no corresponding fairness 
claim to compensation on their part. 
Again,  Risse  argues  that  these  fairness  reasons  might  be  overruled  by consequentialist 
reasons, on the grounds of the huge benefits of trade. In this vein it could be argued that trade with 
these countries should be sustained and the industries that loose out because they have to abide by 
higher social standards should be compensated from a part of the surplus generated by trade (ibid., 
368). In any case, the SWV cannot account for this claim. Together with the last argument this 
suggests that the SWV should be adjusted so as to be able to accommodate the claims discussed. 
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On these bases, Risse proposes the adjusted Moderate Westphalian View (MWV), which 
holds that while it is up to each country to determine the social costs of production, the production 
processes themselves must not harm other countries, and the effects of trade must be 
distributed in such a way that no negative rights are violated: “Violations of this latter condition give 
rise to claims in fairness to trade partners by those who lose out in the process, and constitute pro 
tanto reasons to suspend or restrict trade. (…) Changes of world market prices of goods from other 
countries that have been determined without the violation of negative rights cannot be demanded as 
a requirement of fairness. Still, prices of goods from other countries may, under certain conditions, 
give individuals claims in fairness to protection by their government, namely, if they negatively 
affect these individuals’ interests and have arisen in ways that are at odds with domestic social 
standards. However, these  claims  to  protection  have  to  be  weighed  against  competing  
economic interests in free trade and thus may also not be conclusive” (ibid. 369). 
To assess if the MWV is a plausible moral perspective on the trade policies of countries, Risse 
proposes to imagine a world where no countries violate negative rights and all have reasonably similar 
social systems (incorporating the adjustments in MWV), and ask if the SWV would encompass all 
morally relevant claims in this scenario. Risse argues that there remains the question if other 
countries B have fairness complaints if they are harmed because A protects its producers – in others 
words, if protectionism is to be considered fair, all relevant claims considered (ibid., 369). In terms of 
trade policy, this translates to the question whether governments have the prerogative or duty to 
protect their citizens’ commercial interests via protectionist measures, even if this makes others worse 
off. 
First, such arguments can be based on normative claims by producers. Farmers in developed 
countries can be argued to have claims against their fellow citizens, which put the obligation on the 
latter to accept redistributive measures to keep the farmers in business. Second, and 
independently of the first line of argument, such arguments can be based on the claim that 
countries have the prerogative to take measures for keeping producers in business, on the basis that 
they value their products for their social (or environmental) traits. 
To judge what fairness (in Risse’s sense) demands, the claims presented in the two lines of 
argument above have to be weighed against competing claims. This weighing of claims is complicated 
by the fact that different groups (producers and consumers) in both developed and developing 
countries have opposing interests, and possibly claims, in this context. Which then are the relevant 
claims in the case of subsidies? 
In the former case, claims on behalf of farmers in developed countries must be weighed 
against claims of developing country producers to participation and chances for success in the global 
market (which subsidies compromise). Second, domestic consumers might have a claim against 
subsidies because they raise domestic prices (since more is exported due to the subsidies, and there 
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are fewer goods on the domestic market which raises prices, and they are often paired with import 
restrictions that further drive up prices.) Third, consumers in countries which are net importers of the 
goods in question (possibly in some cases the same countries where producers are disadvantaged by 
the subsidies) might have a claim to the subsidies since they benefit from them. Additionally 
(Kurjanska and Risse don’t discuss this), since efficiency arguments and consequentialist arguments 
clearly give general reasons against subsidies, it might be argued that future inhabitants of 
developed countries have a claim to benefits from a competitive economy (which is jeopardized by 
subsidies). 
First, let’s turn to Kurjanska and Risse’s discussion of the moral grounds of claims for 
subsidies against their fellow citizens. They assume a Rawlsian liberal-egalitarian framework, where 
individuals have a claim to governmental services in the sense of a realization of the principles of 
justice (see Part I). These principles are much more abstract than a claim to subsidies. While the 
former presumably entail claims to basic economic protection (which can take the form of 
unemployment benefits, assistance with retraining to enter a different line of work, etc.), the latter 
is “a very specific claim to continue in a chosen line of work although  granting  the  claim  is  
detrimental  to  the  economy”  (ibid.,  36).  “For  claims  to subsidies to succeed, individuals must 
argue that the government can be liable for their choice of occupation (and for the consequences of 
this choice turning out to be unfortunate) as well as that they are entitled to this specific form of 
retribution” (ibid.). On what moral grounds could this rather implausible seeming argument succeed? 
Kurjanska and Risse argue that different versions of capitalism “are characterized by 
institutional complementarities: one set of institutions operates effectively only (or more 
effectively) if accompanied by other institutions. This especially applies to ownership arrangements 
and labor markets” (ibid.) A relevant example for our case are “coordinated” market economies (e.g. 
Germany), which have “rigid labor markets that encourage employees to invest heavily in specialized 
skills and reward them with job security” (ibid.). In such economies, workers, who specialized because 
legislation made it irrational for them not to, may claim  that  the  state  is  responsible  for their 
inability  to  find  new  work  if  their economic sector should collapse. In other words, by taking an 
active role in promoting specialization, the government can be seen as an active player in its 
citizens’ professional decisions, and accordingly the risk that accompanies specialization seems 
justifiable to citizens only if the state offers guarantees for the case that they fail (ibid.). Accordingly, 
Risse argues, highly specialized individuals might have a claim to assistance, which can take different 
forms, subsidies being only one of them (ibid., 37f). 
In liberal market economies on the other hand, people can choose if they want to 
specialize  or  not,  taking  on  the  risks  that  go  with  each  option,  because  the  system  is prepared 
to deal with workers who lack specialization and may need additional training. This also makes 
switching sectors easier for people who have specialized and failed (ibid.) Hence, it seems that there 
are no moral bases for a claim to special assistance to continue their line of work (ibid, 37f). 
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Kurjanska and Risse then turn to the second line of argument for subsidies, which they call 
the collective preference-based argument for subsidies. It states that the citizens of a country “might 
simply have a collective preference for home-grown products, be willing to pay the price for them, and 
assert that they are entitled to such indulgence. Similarly, they may simply prefer to buy local 
products to minimize the environmental harm caused by long-distance transportation, thus 
disagreeing with the market’s summation of the costs of production” (ibid., 39). The moral grounds of 
this argument can be understood as stating that it is a country’s freedom to disagree with the market 
about the costs or benefits of certain products, be it in the form of placing a higher value on products 
made at home, or by thinking that the market fails to consider the costs of producing products 
elsewhere (e.g. the environmental costs) (ibid., 38). 
As Kurjanska and Risse rightly argue, both this and the last argument cannot be sustained if 
one assumes that one or both of the following conditions apply: 1) developed countries have minimal 
duties towards developing countries (moral claim), and/or 2) trade plays a crucial role for growth as 
well as for other desirable goals of development (like the UN Millennium Goals) (empirical claim). 
We have considered the latter claim already and have found that empirical research suggests 
that trade does indeed play a crucial role for growth, and that under certain institutional conditions 
growth is indeed beneficial for the realization of other goals. To the extent that this is true, 
assumption 2) holds true. 1) also seems difficult to oppose on moral ground (although it can of course 
be done). Moral grounds for minimal duties of developed countries and their citizens toward people 
in developing countries85 could be for example that existing grave needs put a responsibility on those 
who can meet them to do so; or that in a global, Rawlsian Original Position behind the veil of 
ignorance such duties would be acknowledged, etc. (cf. ibid). In the language of claims, it seems 
plausible to assume that the global poor have a claim to assistance of some sort from developing 
countries. Given that trade is crucial for assistance, when weighing this claim with the one on behalf 
of producers to stay in their line of work, we might conclude that the former claim is stronger than 
the latter. Accordingly, the above argument would seem to be convincing, which means that it makes 
“an overwhelming case for helping developing countries to join world markets” (ibid.). Abolishing 
subsidies would therefore seem to be required by “fairness” in Risse’s sense, or general morality in 
mine. 
But on the bases of Risse’s understanding of “fairness”, it is only to the extent that free 
trade matters for growth and other goals in developing countries that subsidies pose a moral problem 
of fairness (again, in Risse’s sense), so the argument crucially depends on this empirical question. 
There is much controversy about how important trade and liberalization are compared to other 
factors and thus about how much priority should be put on reducing trade barriers, rather than, for 
example, focus on the domestic reform of institutions in developing countries (ibid., 39f). 
                                                             
85 For an in depth discussion of this question see e.g. Bleisch 2010. 
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“The ongoing nature of this dispute makes it hard to reach a bottom-line judgment about 
subsidies. We saw that, in coordinated market economies, individuals do have some claim to 
support from the government if their line of work fails. However, we also saw that it depends 
on the presence of competing claims whether this claim takes on the shape of subsidies. 
One competing claim is that if subsidies are trade distorting and other forms of support are 
not, then proportionate consideration of different claims requires that citizens be helped in 
minimally trade-distorting ways. The need to avoid trade-distorting measures and the case for 
the moral urgency of the termination of subsidies depend on the debate about the importance 
of trade for development” (ibid., 40). 
Kurjanska and Risse argue that the above considerations on duties to the distant poor and their 
relevance for the legitimacy of subsidies require us to adjust the MWV into a final, plausible moral 
position from which to assess the “fairness” of trade policies of countries. As such a position he 
proposes the Weak Westphalian View, which integrates these duties: Weak Westphalian View: “Every 
country’s trade policy is subject to constraints in fairness that limit how it can determine the social 
costs of production. First, the production processes themselves must not harm other countries. 
Second, the effects of trade must be distributed in such a way that no negative rights are violated. 
Violations of this condition on the distribution give rise to claims in fairness by those who lose out in 
the process to trade partners.  They  constitute  pro  tanto  reasons  to  suspend  or  restrict  trade  
and conceivably also for interference through non-trade-related measures by the trade partners; 
however, it is a separate question whether these reasons are conclusive. Third,  world  market  
prices  of  goods  from  other  countries  may,  under  certain conditions, give individuals claims in 
fairness to protection by their government. This would occur if such prices negatively affect these 
individuals’ interests and if they have arisen in ways that are at odds with domestic social standards. 
However, these claims to protection would have to be weighed against competing economic interests 
in free trade and may not be conclusive either. Fourth, trade policies must be devised in such a way 
as to be consistent with duties to poor countries. Therefore, countries have pro tanto reasons to 
determine prices in such a way that they take into account their effects on third parties” (ibid., 
42). 
With regard to the perspective of ethical trade policy of countries, I follow Kurjanska and 
Risse here. It is important to note that the efficiency problem stays the same as in the last case 
though. This suggests that even from a nationalist perspective, it might be advisable to try and fulfil 
what is seen as the claims of a country’s own citizens by resorting to compensatory or social security 
measures rather than protectionist ones. As our reflections in chapter 4 suggest, from the 
perspective of fairness as we understand it this seems demanded as well. 
Let me mention one last argument in favor of protectionist measures, which concerns a 
particular sector which elicits the most controversy in practice: protection of the agricultural sector in 
developed countries. This argument is based on food security. While I cannot do it justice here for 
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reasons of scope, let me nevertheless say a few things about it. Note that this argument, just as the 
ones discussed by Kurjanska and Risse, is not based on considerations of fairness and accordingly is 
not about fair trade policy, but is rather based on general moral considerations and should 
accordingly be considered an argument about ethical trade policy. 
The argument from food security for the protection of the agricultural sector rests on the 
recognition that food is absolutely indispensable for maintaining human life and crucial as a basis 
for a healthy and fulfilled life.  Therefore, in the words of e.g. the Japanese Basic Law on Food, 
Agriculture and rural Areas, it is a primary obligation of the government of each  country  that  “a  
stable  supply  of  good-quality  food  at  reasonable  prices  shall  be secured” (MAFF 1999, cf. Taka 
2010, 149). And further: “in consideration of the fact that there are certain unstable factors in the 
world food trade and supply/demand, this stable food  supply  to  the  people  shall  be  secured”  
(ibid.)  by  means  of  ensuring  continuous domestic  production  of  basic  foods.  If this requires 
subsidies or other protectionist measures, this is seen as a necessary means to the stated morally 
highly important aim of ensuring the food security of a country’s population. 
I consider this argument to be convincing. It is strongest where there is a large population 
who does not rely on subsistence farming and has little economic reserves, and is accordingly 
dependent on affordable food prices for their survival. The most vulnerable group  in  this  
respect  is  the  urban  poor,  and  accordingly  the  argument  is  presumably strongest with regard to 
countries with a high number of urban poor (such as slum inhabitants) – which encompasses mostly 
developing countries. In their case, even short term raises in food prices have dramatic 
consequences. However, even regarding developed countries the argument is presumably relevant in 
a precautionary sense with regard to times of deep international crisis – either in terms of economic 
break down or war.   I am accordingly  inclined  to  accept  the  argument  in  a  qualified  form  
even  for  developed countries. However, note that the plausibility of the argument is strictly limited 
to the basic food production necessary to sustain a country’s population whereas it does not 
give a reason for accepting export subsidies on basic foods as ethically justifiable. 
 
6.3 Conclusions on Fair Trade on the Level of Trade Policy of States 
 
Our discussions on the level of trade policy of countries have been mainly concerned with the 
ethical assessment of protectionist measures and have mainly followed along the lines of Risse and 
Kurjanska’s reflections on the topic. From the perspective of ethical trade policy in our terminology 
and assuming their broadly nationalist starting point is plausible, we agreed with most of their 
reflections. However, if one takes a cosmopolitan perspective on the Global Justice debate, their 
arguments are obviously not plausible. 
In any case, as I see it, Risse’s use of the concept of fairness is not plausible. The concept’s 
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moral underpinnings don’t lend themselves to justifying partiality the way he uses it. From the 
perspective of fairness as I understand it, the question poses itself in a different way: from the 
perspective of fairness as qualified impartiality, protection is only justifiable when it counteracts a 
disadvantage in the background conditions that stands in the way of participation on equal terms in 
the practice of global trade – that is, in case of developing countries with underdeveloped industries. 
It should be added that when generalized, any argument for protectionist measures leads to a 
situation where it would seem just from the perspective of all countries to protect their own workers, 
resulting in world dominated by economic protectionism. This is not a desirable situation with 
regard to efficiency and its presumed well-fare gains at all. In fact, it could in principle well lead to 
everybody being worse off than they would otherwise be. Paradoxically, under certain circumstances 
it might enhance the chances of food security becoming a salient problem. Both from the perspective 
of fairness and from the perspective of efficiency and its moral relevance for well-being, it is 
therefore certainly morally required to restrict protectionist measures with the above aim as far as 
possible, and solve the problems they aim to solve in other ways. 
 
 
7. “Fair trade” on the Level of the Global Supply Chains of Multinational Companies 
 
7.1 The Background 
 
In this chapter we are concerned with fair trade on the level of the global supply chains of 
multinational companies (MNEs). In this context it is often claimed that MNEs are guilty of unfair or 
unethical trade if the workers in their supply chains, who produce the products the MNEs sells, are 
subject to bad working conditions and earn below-subsistence wages. In the following I will discuss 
such charges of unfair trade directed at MNEs, analyze their moral grounds and assess their 
plausibility. 
Let us start with the concept of “supply chains” (or “value chains”). The notion refers to all 
activities that are necessary to bring a product from its designing, the extraction of raw materials 
through the different stages of production, storage and distribution to the consumer.86  Firms  where  
all  or  most  of  these  steps  happen  within  one  and  the  same company are called “vertically 
integrated”, referring to them being integrated under “one roof” and having a clear hierarchical 
structure from top to bottom. Until the early 1980ies this was the prevalent form of organization 
even of large multinational companies. 
But in the early 1980ies, a fundamental shift occurred in the focus and organizational 
structure of many big northern companies. A new business model gained prevalence which focused 
on product development and brand management as the company’s “core competencies”, whereas the 
                                                             
86 Some authors also include the stages after the use of the product, namely those when it becomes waste, 
including thus the whole life cycle of the product. 
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actual production process became seen as something that could in principle be done by someone else. 
As the MNEs moved their focus away from production towards branding they outsourced 
manufacturing to contracting companies in other countries with cheaper labor costs. The firm that 
pioneered this new business model which was soon copied all over the corporate worlds was Nike 
Inc. Nike’s Phil Knight summarized the idea clearly when he said: “There is no value in making things 
anymore. The value is added by careful research, by innovation and by marketing” (Katz 1994, 204). 
In the process of assuming this new business model, MNEs have become ever more inter-
connected with other firms. This results in a network consisting of the multinational enterprise 
(the lead firm) and the businesses it cooperates with, which is so important for business  
operations that  it  is  sometimes called the “Extended Enterprise“.87  Nowadays, complex global 
supply chains involving many legally independent firms are thus an integral, highly important part of 
MNEs’ business operations. 
In the new, global supply chains of MNEs working conditions were and still are often 
appallingly bad. There are widespread violations of human rights and international labor law (Dicken 
2007, 257f). This concerns issues like poor safety conditions, harsh disciplinary measures, no overtime 
regulations, no maternity protection, no possibility for workers to organize in unions, bad pay, and 
child labor. In many cases they seven concern issues of slavery and slavery-like conditions. 88 
Controls  in  suppliers  of  MNEs  showed  that  in  about  90%  of  cases  there  were 
shortcomings involving some of the above issues (Deutscher Bundestag 2007). For example, in about 
30% safety conditions were critically bad, and in 50% national overtime regulations were not complied 
with (BSCI 2005; Manhardt/Griesshammer 2006; ILO 2007; cf. Starmanns 2010, 12). In fact, “many 
argue that there is hardly a factory in the ‘Global South’ that has properly implemented the ILO Core 
Norms and ‘living wages’” (Starmanns 2011. Cf. Locke et al. 2006 and 2007; Barrientos/Smith 2007). 
Bad working conditions such as these occasionally occur in branches of the lead firm, but 
mostly they happen in suppliers and sub-contractors in developing countries along the global supply 
chains of MNEs, where legal social standards are lower and compliance with them more precarious. 
The lead firm’s headquarters on the other hand (and the consumers who buy the goods they 
produce) are usually situated in developed countries with higher legal and social standards protecting 
the workers. 89 
Starting with the 1990ies public campaigns directed at big brands such as Nike, Microsoft, 
Levis etc. a broad public became aware of the bad working conditions in the supply chains of 
MNEs. In the course of these campaigns, NGOs and the public widely criticized MNEs as engaging in 
unfair or unethical trade for selling products made under such bad conditions, e.g. in so-called 
                                                             
87 See e.g. http://jpfarrell.blogspot.com/2008/04/extended-enterprise.html. 
88 For an overview of the empirical issues see for example Hartman et al. 2003, for modern slavery e.g. Manzo 
2005. 
89 However, there are many examples of shockingly bad working conditions within industrialized countries as well. 
Often they concern migrant workers who work either illegally or are not well protected by the laws. 
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“sweatshops” (per definition factories with bad working conditions). They claimed that MNEs carry a 
responsibility for poor working conditions in their supply chain, and pushed them to remedy 
them 90 In some cases, the public actively used its economic power through boycotts to push MNEs 
to do so. 
Many people share the intuition that the moral outrage directed at MNEs for said reasons is 
justified. Others, among them many economists, argue that such criticisms are deeply mistaken. 
They argue that the MNEs’ trade leads to economic growth in the region, which benefits local 
people, and that they are offering jobs which people would otherwise not have. 
In the following, we will look closely at the claims of unfairness and immorality directed at 
MNEs in this context, analyzing their ethical justification and assessing their plausibility. As we will 
see, notwithstanding their intuitive appeal it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to defend some of 
these claims. Nevertheless I will show possible ways to do so. 
Let us first consider how we can formulate the main claims that are made when MNEs are 
accused of unfair trade with regard to their supply chains. What we are especially interested in is what 
implicit or explicit understanding of fair trade these claims imply. 
As I see it, we can identify three main claims on the matter:91 
 
(h)     Unfair trade on the level of MNEs is trade that fails to duly consider or equalize the interests 
of the workers in their supply chains. 
(i)      Unfair trade on the level of MNEs is trade that doesn’t distribute the burdens and gains of trade 
in a proportional way throughout their supply chains. 
(j)     Unfair trade on the level of MNEs is trade that is involved in exploitation through their supply 
chains. 
Formulated as claims on fair trade, they read: 
 
(h)     Fair trade on the level of MNEs is trade that duly considers or equalizes the interests of the 
workers in their supply chains. 
(i)      Fair trade on the level of MNEs is trade that distributes the burdens and gains of trade in a 
proportional way throughout their supply chains. 
(j)       Fair trade on the level of MNEs is trade that is not involved in exploitation through their supply 
chains. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to discussing these three claims and their moral 
foundations.  Let  us  lay  out  the  analytical  framework for  the  task  at  hand:  to  make  a judgment 
                                                             
90 See e.g. Mamic 2005. 
91 I don’t claim that my suggestions are exhaustive of all the relevant claims that are and can be made on the 
matter. Rather they constitute some of the most prevalent ones which I want to subject to analysis. 
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on the question if, and in what sense, the mentioned claims and criticisms are justified, we need to 1) 
formulate the argument for the claims, identifying their (partly implicit)  premises,  and  2)  discuss  
these  premises  and  the  normative  assumptions  and theories they rest on. We will start with (m). 
 
7.2 Position (h) Fair trade is Trade that Duly Considers or Equalizes the Interests of Workers 
in the Supply Chains. 
 
The first position I want to discuss understands fair trade on the level of MNEs as trade which duly 
takes into account or equalizes the interests of the workers their supply chains. The position that fair 
trade requires that the interests of the involved people be respected can be seen as an important 
normative base of the Fair Trade movement’s understanding of fair trade. In the same vein, it is often 
argued that trade is fair if it is based on activities which equalize the interests of each affected party 
(e.g. Bhagwati 1996, Koslowski 1996). On the base of this position MNEs are considered to be 
guilty of unfair trade if they fail to duly consider the interests of the people in their supply chains. The 
respective claims can be formulated as: trade is fair if it duly considers the interests of the workers in 
the supply chains; and trade is fair if it equalizes the interests of the workers in the supply chains. 
Understood in the former sense, in my terminology the position that is about ethical trade. 
Understood in the latter sense, depending on how we understand the position, it can be understood 
as being about fair trade in the sense of the fairness standard of the proportional fulfillment of 
stringent claims (see 4.6). In any case, the position concerns the procedural and outcome dimension of 
trade, and the duties resulting from the position are directed at individual trading actors. In the former 
case they demand of them to duly consider the interests of the workers in their supply chains, and in 
the second case to proportionally fulfill their stringent claims. 
The above position is based on stakeholder theory. “Using the language of business ethics we 
might argue that fair trade implies the taking into consideration of the interests and values of 
different stakeholder groups” (Boda 2001, 22, cf. Koslowski 1996). The basic idea of stakeholder 
theory as opposed to stockholder theory is to replace “the notion that managers have a duty to 
stockholders with the concept that managers bear a fiduciary duty to stakeholders. Stakeholders are 
those groups who have a stake in or claim on the firm” 92 (Freeman 2001, 56). According to the 
stakeholder approach, for example consumers as stakeholders have a moral right to get good quality 
product and relevant information concerning its traits, including, presumably, the conditions of its 
production; competitors have a right to fair competition; employees have a moral right to be treated 
decently; local communities have a moral right that the integrity and healthiness of their living 
                                                             
92 There is a narrow and a wide interpretation of the term stakeholder: On the narrow one, stakeholders are those 
groups that are vital to the survival and the success of the firm. According to Freeman this includes the owners, 
employees, customers, managers, suppliers, and the local community. On the wide definition, stakeholders are any 
group that affects or is affected by the actions of the firm (ibid., 59). Freeman himself uses the narrow definition 
for his further analysis. 
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environment be respected, etc. 93 Suppliers and their workers are considered stakeholders in 
different interpretations of the concept of stakeholder. 
While the rights of some stakeholders are protected rather well in current global trade 
(e.g. consumers in industrialized countries), it is usually argued that especially the moral claims of 
small producers and workers in the supply chains of MNEs are not properly taken into consideration 
by international trade. The Fair Trade movement addresses this problem by explicitly treating 
producers and workers in the supply chains of MNEs as central stakeholders whose rights and 
interests trading companies have a responsibility to respect. In their own trading structures the 
Fair Trade movement tries to build cooperative relationships with producers and workers in the 
South, to support them where necessary and to let more income flow back to them. 
Position (h) is best seen as based on the following argument: 
 
(P1) Trade in the supply chains of MNEs is fair if it respects or equalizes the interests of their 
stakeholders  
(P2) The workers and producers in the supply chains of MNEs are stakeholders 
 (C) Trade within the supply chains of MNEs is fair if it duly respects or equalizes the 
interests of stakeholders in their supply chains 
 
While premise (P2) is rather unproblematic, premise (P1) will have to be examined more closely. 
Premise (m1) is an expression of the stakeholder approach to business ethics and claims that 
companies and their managers have obligations to all the corporate stakeholders and faces the task 
of balancing their conflicting interests. 
Let us examine what are the normative bases of (P1). In other words, how is this claim 
justified? Bowie/Werhane (2005) argue in the following way: “A stakeholder theorist takes the needs 
and interests of all the corporate stakeholders as ends. A stockholder theorist takes the interests and 
needs of the stakeholders as means to an end. The moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (…) can be 
invoked here to show that the stakeholder theory is the one that should be adopted. Kant held that 
the motive for an action was the determinant of its morality. If something is done for the wrong 
motive, even if it leads to good results, the action is not a moral one. (…) Kant also argued that a 
moral motive was one that treated a person as an end and never as a means (…) Using people as 
instruments is wrong even if they are treated well in the process” (ibid., 35). 
We could also try to base the stakeholder approach on a contractualist perspective along the 
lines of Scanlon (1998). In this sense we might argue that a pure shareholder approach to business  
                                                             
93 Stakeholder notions have been incorporated in the concept of management for sustainability as measured by 
triple bottom-line accounting. The latter refers to the three realms of “people, planet, and profit” which 
managers have a moral obligation to consider in their decisions: they are seen to have an obligation to behave in 
a socially responsible way, to protect the environment, and to ensure the financial health of the organization (cf. 
Bowie/Werhane 2005, 27-28). 
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management  would  be  reasonably  rejectable  from  the  perspective  of  certain groups affected by 
it. 
Let us assume for the sake of the argument that some plausible justification of the 
stakeholder approach can be provided. Now, what does duly respecting or equalizing the interests 
of all stakeholders imply? 
It is actually a main criticism of the stakeholder approach that it does not provide clear 
guidance for the question how to prioritize the clashing interests of different stakeholders. As the 
critics point out, there are hardly any plausible suggestions in this respect. For this reason, the 
stakeholder approach is often criticized as being conceptually fuzzy and impractical to implement (cf. 
Bowie/Werhane 2005, 29). 
Let us look at a prominent suggestion regarding this question, which is, however, situated on 
a high level of abstraction. According to Freeman’s view, the normative core of the  stakeholder  
approach  is  that  there  are  “fair”  contracts  between  the  firm  and  its stakeholders 94 (Freeman 
2001). This again could be understood in different ways. Freeman himself, operating on an implicit 
understanding of fairness as impartiality, suggests applying Rawls veil of ignorance to a hypothetical 
situation where the stakeholders agree on the basic principles for managing the firm – that is, they do 
so not knowing which of the stakeholders they are (Freeman 2001, 63). He goes on to argue that 
stakeholders behind the veil of ignorance would agree on the following six principles or „ground 
rules“ for the management of a business: 1. the principle of entry and exit (clearly defined entry, exit 
and renegotiation conditions), 2. the governance principle (procedures for changing the rules must be 
adopted by unanimous consent), 3. the principle of externalities (any contract between A and B that 
imposes costs on C makes C a party to the contract), 4. the principle of contracting costs (all parties 
to the contract must share in the cost of contracting, 5. the agency principle (the manager  must  
serve  the  stakeholders),  and  6.  the principle  of  limited  immortality (sustainable serving of the 
stakeholder interests) (Bowie/Werhane 2005, 27). 
Note that this is about general principles, not the question how to equalize the interests 
of stakeholders in particular situations. In this sense, the stakeholder approach is particularly valuable 
in terms of offering a general normative outlook on the moral duties of companies. It can also be 
used as practical guidance for management decisions in particular situations, but this has serious 
limitations when stakeholder interests seriously clash. One such case is of course remuneration of 
different stakeholders, where the stakeholder approach as a general outlook does not get us far. 
Note that the above principles concern only the fairness of the terms and processes of 
transactions, and don’t contain principles about the distribution of costs and gains. (P1) itself is 
ambiguous in terms of the procedural/outcome dimension: “To duly respect someone’s interests” 
                                                             
94 This contract language is shared with a standard view that the firm is a nexus of contracts (cf. Jensen / Meckling 
1976), but Freeman adds a normative dimension to it by claiming that the contracts among the stakeholders must 
be “fair”. 
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can be understood as respecting them in the process of the transactions, i.e. through a process that 
lets them be heard, such as a truly deliberative process as opposed to a power-play negotiation. This 
could serve as a base for the claim for living wages, since they are certainly among the most basic 
interests a stakeholder group can have. 
But it can also be understood as respecting these interests directly in the outcome of the 
transaction via an independent criterion of outcome justice that equalizes the claims to shares of the 
productive surplus. If the former is at stake, this presumably plays out as demanding some sort of 
deliberative process with regard to determining the working conditions. If we focus on the latter, we 
will need a criterion for deciding what a just distribution of costs and gains amounts to in this context. 
Regarding the latter issue, we have to turn to a related position on fair trade, which can be 
understood as a sub-claim of the general position h) we have just discussed. This position focuses 
on the outcome dimension of trade and claims that a condition for fair trade is a just distribution of 
the costs and gains of trade within supply chains. 
 
7.3 Position (i) Fair trade is Trade that Proportionally Distributes the Burdens and Gains of 
Trade throughout the Supply Chains 
 
The second perspective on fair trade on the level of MNEs considers it as trade that proportionally 
distributes the burdens and gains of trade throughout their supply chains. Understood  in  this  way,  
unfair  trade  in  the  supply  chains  of  MNEs  concerns  the distribution of  the  gains  of  trade  
throughout these  supply  chains.  This criticism usually comes in the form that “[B]randing (…) has 
been hogging all the ‘value-added’” (Klein 2010, 197) whereas producers in developing countries 
are getting only a “disproportionally” tiny share of the profit. For example with regard to a T-shirt the 
MNE retains 50% of the selling price, whereas the remaining 50% are distributed among the many 
actors on several levels in the supply chains. 95 This unequal distribution of benefits along the supply 
chains is often considered to be unfair/unjust (cf.e.g. Klein 2010; Starmanns 2010). 
In our standard form, the claim reads: trade is fair if it proportionally distributes the burdens and 
benefits of trade throughout the supply chains. In my terminology the position is about fair trade in the 
particular sense of outcome fairness; accordingly it concerns the outcome dimension of trade. The 
duties resulting from the position are directed at individual trading actors, and demand of them to 
distribute burdens and benefits proportionally throughout their supply chains. Let us investigate the 
moral bases of this intuition or claim. 
It seems plausible to assume that this view is based on the fairness standard of a proportional 
distribution of burdens and benefits, as applied to supply chains. We remember from Part I that this 
fairness standard demands that people get a proportional share from goods that they contribute to 
                                                             
95 The example concerns a Van Laack shirt, see Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 16.12.2007 (cf. Starmanns 
2010, 12). 
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producing, since they get claims to benefits by contributing to the burdens of producing the good in 
question. We recall that on a more fundamental level, this is based on the norm of positive 
reciprocity. We also remember that this fairness standard concerns what I called cooperative justice, 
which is one of the two cases (alongside allocative justice) where the outcome is directly relevant for 
judgments of justice (see chapter 3.5.1). And finally we remember that cooperative justice applies in 
the case of people standing in a cooperative relation to each other, the cooperation producing 
certain burdens and benefits in the form of either common or public goods. 
On this background we can say that those voicing the above criticism about an unfair or 
unjust distribution of the gains of trade within the supply chains of MNEs seem to be implying that 
supply chains should be seen as cases of cooperation and accordingly trigger the fairness standard 
of a proportional distribution of burdens and benefits. Let us put this claim in the form of an 
argument to consider it in more detail. 
 
(P1) In cooperative interaction schemes, fairness requires that contributors receive a fair share of 
the benefits of the cooperation 
(P2)      Supply chains of MNEs are cooperative interaction schemes 
 
(P3)      “Contributors” in the supply chains of MNEs include workers 
 
(C1) Workers in the supply chains of MNEs have a claim to a “fair share” of the benefits of the 
cooperation 
 
Let us assume that (P1) is correct, since this view is generally well accepted and plausible (see Part 
I).  (P3)  seems to be uncontroversial.  It seems then that (C1) hinges primarily on the plausibility of 
(P2), namely the question if supply chains of MNEs can plausibly be understood as cooperative 
interaction schemes. Besides, it seems highly questionable if it is possible to operationalize what a 
fair share (i.e. a part of the gains of trade in proportion to the productive contribution of an actor) in 
the supply chains of MNEs amounts to. In the following we will therefore consider these two issues, 
starting with the latter. 
 
7.3.1 Distributing Burdens and Benefits Throughout Supply Chains Proportionally 
 
For operationalizing what a “fair share” in the supply chains of MNEs amounts to, „What is needed is 
some theory of fairness to determine how the revenues of a firm should be divided among the 
stakeholders who contribute to making those revenues. In other words, in an ideal world, we could 
measure the contribution of each stakeholder to the success of the firm, subtract compensation 
received and end up with the profit. Stockholder theory says that all the profit belongs to the 
stockholders. Stakeholder theorists might argue that some of the „profit“ should go to lower prices 
for customers and increased wages for employees. But no theory says that management ought to get 
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as much of the profit as it can before distributing it to other stakeholders“ (Beauchamp 1992, 9). 
When  asking  for  more  specific  guidance  in  this  respect  from  the  stakeholder 
approach, it is again Rawls’ hypothetical original position that is referred to: „Probably the best theory 
to evaluate (…) compensation is some version of justice theory. After all, we are looking for the fair 
means of dividing up the profits from the cooperative efforts of the various stakeholders in a 
business“ (ibid., 10). Beauchamp goes on: “Suppose all the various stakeholders were gathered 
together in one spot to decide how the income from a firm should be divided up. Thus 
representatives from labor, capital, management, and the local community would all be present. 
( …) We believe that stakeholders behind the veil of interest would adopt principle 1 and part (b) 
of principle 2. What is more problematic is whether they would choose part (a) where any 
inequalities must work to the benefit of all. Our doubt about whether part (a) would be unanimously 
accepted shows how difficult it is to step behind the veil of ignorance. Our own brand of capitalism 
already has a long-established history and it is hard to imagine theories of compensation that are too 
divorced from our own experience. Suppose we allow knowledge of our legal system and economic 
system to be outside the veil of ignorance. Our best guess is that stakeholders would agree that 
stockholders are entitled to a certain historical percentage of profit traditionally defined. However, 
profit that results from productivity gains, through improved technology or increased worker 
efficiency, should be split more or less evenly to the various stakeholder groups or distributed 
according to objective measures of the contribution of each stakeholder group to the ‚abnormal’ 
increase in profits. All this sounds indeterminate and so it is. But we think that it is still more 
reasonable than the myth of the strong CEO who single-handedly turns a company around. A CEO 
does not do that by him or herself“ (ibid., 11). 
So, let us consider if it is in principle possible to operationalize what a “fair share” of the 
gains of  trade  in  the  supply  chains  of  MNEs  amounts  to.  How then could we conceive the 
application of the fairness standard of distributing burdens and benefits proportionally to the case 
of supply chains? 
I think that in theory, this might be possible in an approximate way. Let us briefly sketch a 
suggestion of how this could be done. 
The idea would be to look at the productive contribution (“burdens”) of the different actors 
involved in the production of a final good and their relative reward (“benefits”) across the supply 
chain. This would then amount to a sort of proportional distribution of burdens and benefits amongst 
actors in a supply chain. The profit of the joint production in this perspective is to be distributed 
among the people who contribute to the end product. By the profit of a company I mean its gain 
above the interests on its capital. I take the latter to be the legitimate property of the company (see 
below). 
Now, to assess the relative productive contribution of different actors in the supply chain (or 
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in the above scheme, their „costs“), we would need an objective criterion. Recall that as an objective 
criterion to define the production value of a good or service, the labor theory of value proposed the 
average labor time that goes into the production of the good, multiplied by its quality factor. We 
have to adapt it to account for three relevant factors besides working time and quality: the role of 
capital and the idea of set up achievements of the founder of the company, different kinds of work 
(e.g. agricultural work and marketing), and different purchasing power at various places. 
I take it to be legitimate that the invested capital generates some interest, although there 
should be an upper limit to it. What would be needed to determine this upper limit is a theory of fair 
interest, which so far has not been formulated. Nevertheless, I think we could for the time being 
work with a certain approximate rate for a decent upper limit. Further I suggest accounting for 
different kinds of work by including the time necessary to learn the skills for the respective function 
(possibly also the financial cost of the respective education). And thirdly I suggest including a 
purchasing power parity factor. The latter ensures that outsourcing to developing countries still makes 
sense when applying my framework. 
Including all these factors leads to the following tentative formula to calculate fair wages and 
prices in the supply chain of companies96: 
 
Wi = ( (xi ∙cpppi) / (x1 ∙cppp1 + x2 c ppp2 + …) ) ∙ (PQ – rK – 
Vorleistungen) 
 
 
Where: 
 
Wi = salary 
xi = ti ∙ qi 
qi = 1+(ti/Ti) ∙ teducation 
teducation = time of eduction 
Ti = life working time 
cpppi = purchasing power parity factor r 
≤ ro, where ro= max. decent interest K = 
invested capital 
P = product price 
 
Q = number of sold products 
 
 
 
This perspective to determine fair wages and prices in the supply chain of companies would 
accordingly not lead to absolute minimal wages or prices as requirements of fairness, but to a certain 
ratio of labor input and gain throughout the supply chains of companies with regard to the 
                                                             
96 This suggestion for a formula expressing the contribution of different actors in the supply chains was designed 
with the help of Andreas Cassee. 
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overall performance. It would quantify how companies could distribute their profit in a way that 
rewards the people in their supply chain according to their contribution to the end product. It is thus 
a relational standard, meaning that the more profit a company makes the more it is required to pay 
the people in their supply chain, each according to their contribution to the end product. Since the 
fairness-standard is relational, it is in principle conceivable that it is met by paying below 
subsistence wages and prices, namely in the case when the company makes no or just a very marginal 
profit. This could for example apply to small startup businesses or to situations when a usually 
profitable business is going through a difficult phase etc. But those cases are certainly not the rule 
with respect to big MNEs, which generally make quite substantial profits. 
Clearly, there are points in the above suggestion that could be challenged. However, my point 
here is mainly to show that the above argument is not necessarily bound to fail in theory because of a 
theoretical impossibility to operationalize the proportional share of contributors. However, the 
question is different with regard to the implementation of such a proposal. 
Clearly, position (i) would be extremely precarious in terms of implementation.  We 
remember that Rawls argued that in a context as complex as the interactions of a whole society, 
it would be close to impossible to decide how cooperative outcome justice should distribute shares in 
accordance with people’s contribution to society’s good, and it would bring with it a plethora of 
other problems. As such, it would presumably undermine crucial functions of the free market system 
that we examined in Part I, such as its self-regulation of supply and demand through the price 
mechanism. 
For these practical reasons Rawls, as we have seen before, advocates that the system be set 
up such that it can work as one of pure procedural justice.97  The market as an objective, 
decentralized system of value distribution is to take over a substantive role in determining 
burdens/contributions and benefits, whereas people’s chances for success in the market are to be 
equalized in their formative phase and those that cannot participate successfully in the market are 
taken care of by the community. 
Besides the problem of implementation, the problem with (i) is (P2). Let us therefore return to 
the question if understanding the supply chains of MNEs as cooperative interaction schemes can 
plausibly be justified. 
 
7.3.2 Are Supply Chains Cooperative Interaction Schemes in the Sense of Demanding a Just 
Distribution of Benefits? 
 
 
Although it might at first resound with our intuitions, we should certainly take a very cautious 
perspective with regard to the idea that supply chains are cooperative interaction schemes in the 
                                                             
97 He does so in the national context, but the argument is in principle relevant for other contexts as well. See 
Part I. 
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relevant sense as to trigger the fairness standard of the proportional distribution of burdens and 
benefits of the cooperatively produced surplus. Supply chains, after all, are at least prima facie 
constituted by a sequence of economic transactions, and the (P2) obviously takes a rather peculiar 
perspective on the market based system of supply chains. 
As was mentioned before, defending (i) would imply arguing that supply chains should be 
seen as cases of cooperation in the relevant sense as to trigger the fairness standard of a 
proportional distribution of burdens and benefits. Accordingly we will have to investigate if this is 
defensible. 
While some actions are intuitively clearly cooperative, such as carrying a table together or 
singing a duet, others are more controversial, such as sports competitions and people keeping to one 
side of the road when driving to avoid crashing into each other. What elements are conditions of 
regarding something as cooperative action at all, and what kind of cooperation is necessary for 
triggering the fairness standard of distributing burdens and benefits equally? 
The Oxford Dictionary of English takes cooperation to be the action of process of working 
together to the same end (cf. Tuomela 2011). Full-blown cooperation involves a shared goal and 
relevant shared beliefs about the means to its achievement, and joint action that purports to 
achieving the goal (ibid.). So-called ‘we-mode’ cooperation is at stake when the members of a group 
who conceive of “themselves as a social group capable of group action and in which they think and 
reason in terms of a non-aggregative ‘we’” (ibid.), with people sharing “some common goals, values, 
beliefs, norms” (ibid.). The latter, which is thus based on concepts of collective intentionality, is 
usually considered a strong kind of cooperation. It is not thought to require that each participant in 
the system cooperates with every other, but rather that the participants consider themselves as part 
of a bigger system of cooperation. The classic case is society-wide cooperation (cf. e.g. Rawls 
1971).We- cooperation such as this is commonly thought to trigger the fairness standard of a 
proportional distribution of burdens and benefits among the cooperating parties. 
However, although the component of the “same end” often appears in definitions of 
cooperation, it does not figure in all of them. The economic understanding of cooperation goes 
roughly as follows: “People act (…) cooperatively if and only if they contribute positively to an 
outcome, which is beneficial to (…) all and is better than outcomes without contribution” (Leist 2011, 
19, emphasis added). In this sense, cooperation is understood as joint action conceptualized 
individualistically in terms of the participants’ individual goals and beliefs that the joint action is taken 
to serve (Tuomela 2010). This is often called ‘I-mode’- cooperation. I-mode cooperation essentially 
involves mutually adjusting one’s actions and goal to the other participants’ actions and goal “so as to 
further both the other’s goal (i.e. goal satisfaction) and one’s own goal” (ibid., 67). Here then, we 
don’t have a shared aim but different goals, the fulfillment of which are mutually furthered by the 
actions of the agents. 
155 
 
While we certainly don’t have we-mode cooperation in the case of the relation between 
MNEs and their suppliers, it is plausible to consider the latter as a form of I-mode cooperation. The 
MNE has the goal to maximize its profits (possibly under some restrictive conditions such as the 
triple bottom line), while the supplier has the goal to maximize his profits. They further each 
other’s goals by adjusting their actions: the supplier produces and sells the goods to the MNE as to 
the MNEs specification, whereas the MNE conduces market research, develops the products, and 
markets them. The supplier firm itself cooperates in the I-mode with its own suppliers and the sub-
contractors it outsources to: It has the goal to maximize its profits (again possibly under some 
restrictive conditions such as the triple bottom line), while the suppliers and sub-contractor have 
the goal to maximize their own profit by selling to them at the highest price possible. The workers of 
both the direct supplier and the sub-contractor are in turn cooperating with the management of their 
respective firms, their goal being to gain a wage as high as possible. 
The cooperative nature of this becomes especially clear if we consider the description of the 
relation between MNEs and their suppliers in production networks provided earlier: there is a lot of 
complex coordinating interaction involved. Far from being mere market exchanges with price being 
the only coordinating factor, they usually go way beyond with regard to the coordination of 
activities and exchanges on different levels, including goods, services, and knowledge. Relations are 
often based on long term relationships between suppliers and buyers, some involving frequent face-
to-face interactions. All forms of value chains involve beneficial interactions and the creation of a 
surplus. Besides, the contribution of all the parties is needed for the creation of the final product 
which forms the material basis of the multinational enterprise’s business. Through these 
interactions, the owners and workers  of  the  suppliers  contribute  relevantly  to  the  benefit  which  
the  multinational company (and the supplier factory) gets from the “cooperation”. 
However, the problem with understanding the whole supply chains of MNEs as schemes of 
cooperative action seems to be that cooperation is usually not thought to be transitive: if A 
cooperates with B and B cooperates with C, it does not result that A is cooperating with C. If an MNE 
cooperates with its direct suppliers and they in turn cooperate with their suppliers and sub-
contractors it does not follow that the MNE is cooperating with the sub-contractor. Accordingly this 
cannot serve as a basis for claiming that the MNEs is cooperating with their whole supply chains. 
For this we would need another reason. As we said before that it is implausible to consider supply 
chains as contexts of we-mode cooperation, this leaves us with the conclusion that it is unclear 
how we could plausibly understand supply chains as schemes of cooperative action that trigger the 
fairness standard of a proportional distribution of burdens and benefits. 
 
7.3.3 Conclusions on (i) 
 
Let us look at the implications  these  points  have  for  the  claim  that  “fair  trade”  requires  a 
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proportional distribution of costs and gains throughout the supply chains of MNEs in the current 
global market. First, it is not normatively called for to distribute the gains of trade proportionally 
throughout the supply chains of MNEs because they cannot sensibly be conceived as cooperative 
action schemes in the relevant sense. Second, although we could somehow operationalize such a 
distribution in theory, its implication is neither feasible because of its complexity nor desirable 
because of its undermining of relevant functions of the market. 
This, however, doesn’t let MNEs off the hook completely. Since there are no distributive 
global background institutions that correct the distributive results of the market at least in a minimal 
sense, it does not seem justified to restrict the ethical assessment of the actions of market actors 
regarding individual transactions to a criterion of pure procedural justice. Rather, it suggests that 
some sort of additional criterion is warranted. I take it that another position on unfair trade offers a 
promising suggestion in this respect, and I will analyze this position in detail in the following. 
 
7.4 Position (j) Fair trade is Trade which is not Involved in Exploitation Through their Supply 
Chains 
 
Many people seem to think of unfair trade in the supply chains of MNEs in terms of the exploitation 
of laborers in developing countries (cf. Risse 2007, 357). According to this view, “Generally speaking 
trade is fair if it is based on activities which do not exploit the workers and the natural environment” 
(Boda 2001, 22). Accordingly, fair trade on this level is usually understood as trade without such 
exploitation. Boda takes this view to be one of the prevalent  positions  on  what  “fair  trade”  must  
avoid  (namely  exploitation), and  that this view constitutes a common trait of diverse fair or 
alternative trade movements (ibid.). 
Focusing on MNEs this can be formulated as the claim that MNEs are guilty of engaging in 
unfair trade when they are involved in exploitation through their supply chains. In our standard 
positive form the claim reads: fair trade within the supply chains of MNEs is trade which is not involved 
in exploitation through their supply chains. In my terminology the position is about ethical trade in the 
sense of not violating people’s rights in the context of trade; accordingly it concerns the procedural 
dimension of trade. The duties resulting from the position are directed at individual trading actors, 
and demand of them not to be involved in exploitation through their supply chains.  
Let us then take a closer look at this claim in this negative form. To assess this claim we first 
need to bring it in the form of an argument with premises that we can subject to scrutiny. I suggest 
that this argument looks as follows: 
 
 
(P1) Exploitation is morally blameworthy and unfair / there is a moral duty not to engage in 
exploitation 
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(P2) If there are exploitative transactions in the supply chains of an MNE, the MNE is 
responsible for them 
(P3)     Being responsible for exploitative transactions is  a  sufficient  condition  for  MNEs 
 
being blameworthy and engaging in unfair trade 
 
(C1) MNEs are blameworthy and are engaging in unfair trade if there are exploitative 
transactions in their supply chains. 
(C2) Fair trade within the supply chains of MNEs is Trade which is not Involved in Exploitation 
Through their Supply Chains 
 
7.4.1 (P1) Exploitation is Morally Blameworthy and Unfair / there is a Moral Duty not to 
Engage in Exploitation 
 
At first glance it might seem that (P1) is so trivial as to not merit being discusses at all. It is true that 
exploitation is a thick ethical concept that already implies that it is morally wrong. However, as we will 
see, the concept is extremely complex and it is disputed if all forms of exploitation are actually 
morally wrong and morally prohibited (see below). Let us start with the concept of exploitation. 
 7.4.1.2 The concept of exploitation 
 
The term “exploitation” is used in relation to some kind of interactions. Note that there is a non-
moral sense of the notion “to exploit something”, just as is the case with “taking advantage” of 
something or someone (see Part I): we can say that someone “exploits” the weak backhand of her 
opponent in a tennis match, meaning simply that she “made use” of it for her advantage. This 
statement is morally neutral. What we are interested in on the other hand is in wrongful exploitation. 
This negatively connoted, wrongful “exploitation” evokes moral reactions. It is a thick ethical term 
that implies the wrongness of the associated actions.  
Let us say that a claim that A’s interaction with B is wrongfully exploitative is called an 
exploitation claim (Wertheimer 2011, 199). 98 What a theory of wrongful exploitation needs to 
provide is 1) the truth conditions for an exploitation claim. Question 2) that a theory of exploitation 
has to answer is according to Wertheimer why and under what conditions we are justified to 
prohibiting, regulating or interfering with exploitative transactions (ibid.). 
Regarding 1), in our case whether it is true in a particular case that a company wrongfully 
exploits their workers (P2) depends on whether the truth-conditions of the exploitation claim are 
fulfilled. 
Regarding 2), even if it is true that A exploits B in a certain situation, “it doesn’t follow as a 
                                                             
98 Usually wrongful exploitation is used with regard to people being exploited. This distinguishes it from the morally 
neutral use of the notion (see above). However, sometimes it is also used with regard to impersonal things, e.g. 
nature, and animals. My focus here is on people being exploited.  
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matter of moral logic that we should prohibit or regulate the transaction between A and B” (ibid.), 
since B might prefer to be exploited to not being interacted with at all. As an illustration, consider 
the following case: A’s car got stuck in the mud in a remote area. B comes upon the situation by 
chance and offers to tow A’s car out for 200$. In this situation we can imagine A saying that he 
knows that B is exploiting him in that transaction, but that he nevertheless prefers to be towed out 
for this fee to being left in the mud (cf. ibid.). 
In our case, 2) translates to the question under what conditions exploitation should be 
prohibited, regulated or interfered with. However, as in the above example, we can also come to the 
conclusion that exploitative action of A towards B is unfair and/or morally unacceptable, but that it 
should nevertheless be allowed all things considered. 
 7.4.1.3 Exploitation as unfair advantage taking in exchanges 
 
At the most general level, a widely accepted description of the moral wrong involved in wrongful 
exploitation is “unfair advantage taking of someone (or something)”.99  Another way to put this is 
that one party exploits another when it gets “unfair and undeserved benefits from its transactions or 
relationships” (Wertheimer 1996, x (preface)). 
In  this  sense,  unfairness  is  accordingly  seen  as  a  necessary  (but  not  sufficient) condition 
for exploitation. This means that in claim A), “unfair trade” on a general level is explicated as 
“trade involving unfair advantage taking” of someone or something. Interestingly then, when we 
understand unfair trade as trade involving exploitation, the concept of unfairness appears both in the 
explanans and in the explanandum. Nevertheless, the explication is potentially illuminating since it 
allows us to reformulate the question what unfair trade is to the more specific question what unfair 
advantage taking in economic transactions amounts to. The context that we are concerned with in 
this chapter is labor exploitation in a (supposedly) free market. We can accordingly spell out the 
question what unfair trade is as the question what unfair advantage taking in market transactions 
amounts to. 
If we want to see what unfair advantage taking in transactions amounts to we turn again to 
the concept of exploitation which has been investigated far more than the former. 
Analytically, we can distinguish between harmful exploitation and mutually beneficial 
exploitation. By harmful exploitation we mean cases in which the exploiter gains by harming the 
exploitee. By mutually advantageous exploitation we mean “those cases in which both parties – 
including the exploitee – reasonably expect to gain from the transaction as contrasted with the pre-
transaction status quo or more accurately, as contrasted with their pre-transaction rights or 
entitlements” (Wertheimer 2011, 201). 
We can further distinguish between non-consensual exploitation and consensual exploitation. 
                                                             
99 See Anderson, Scott 2006. 
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By non-consensual exploitation, the exploitee does not give normatively transforming consent to the 
transaction. This can mean two things, A) the exploitation itself may render consent non-
transformative in certain ways, or B) consent is understood in the usual way as voluntary, competent, 
informed, etc. (Ibid., 201)  In consensual exploitation the exploitee gives the (normatively or 
otherwise) relevant consent to the transaction. 
Because the two distinctions usually overlap (although there are imaginable cases where they 
don’t) we will in the following use the compound notions of harmful- nonconsensual and beneficial-
consensual exploitation. 
 7.4.1.4 Harmful non-consensual exploitation in labor relations 
 
In the above sense, we can say that those working conditions are harmfully exploitative which 
wrong workers and/or violate their moral rights. So which are these? 
The clearest candidates are certainly what I call rights-violating working conditions (P1a). 
They concern basic human rights violations, including cases of harmful, non- consensual exploitation, 
as paradigmatic moral rights violations. The assumption that where they happen routinely in the work 
context they constitute morally unacceptable working conditions is widely shared and uncontroversial. 
The second candidate is what I call unfair working conditions (P1b). They concern beneficial, 
consensual exploitation of workers, which will be discussed in the next section. The assumption is 
also widely shared that where beneficial, consensual exploitation happens, this too constitutes 
morally unacceptable working conditions. In the last chapter we have considered the charge and 
nature of exploitation in some detail, so we can build on these elaborations for the present purpose. 
Let me start with (P1a). Because of its uncontroversial nature I will not dwell on justificatory 
issues here but rather elaborate on how the relevant basic human rights bear on the work-context, 
pointing to the legal formulations of these rights in international documents. 
 
The relevant Human Rights in the work-context 
 
The  most  important  basic  rights  relevant  in  working  relations  include:  1)  The  right  to freedom, 
which forbids slavery and any other kind of forced labor. 2) The right to physical integrity, which 
forbids corporal punishments of any sorts, working conditions that damage or severely endanger the 
health of the workers (including inadequate safety measures such as emergency exits in factories). 3) 
The right of children to protection from exploitation and to an education, which forbids many forms 
of child labor. Possibly 4) The right to a living wage. While the former three are uncontroversial 
negative rights, the latter, as discussed before, is a positive right and thus controversial.  
The Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948) provide specific 
examples of what it means to respect an employee’s right to freedom in the context of work. 
Particularly relevant are Articles 3, 4, 5, and Article 23, section 4. The former three read “Article 3: 
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Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person. Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery 
or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. Article 5: No one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
As such they provide a basis for the prohibition of all forced labor, indentured servitude, 
corporeal punishment, and seriously unsafe working conditions. 
On the other hand, the right to freedom of belief and expression (as part of the right to 
freedom) adapts to a certain extent to the working context. For example, it is, “not an illegitimate 
infringement of one’s right to freedom of believe and expression if an employer prohibits 
proselytizing on behalf of one’s religious convictions while at work. Such activity is typically disruptive 
and as such incompatible with the purposes for which employees are hired.” (ibid.) In the same vein, 
an employer is not violating the same right when he terminates a worker at the front desk of a 
luxury hotel if he shows up one day with a full- face tattoo – again, if this is conceived as being 
incompatible with the purposes for which the employee is hired (there certainly is room for 
dispute about when exactly this is the case). 
The right to physical integrity prohibits basic physical infringements of any sort in the work 
context, and will therefore rule out e.g. corporal punishment, restrictions regarding necessary body 
functions, such as e.g. a rule that prohibits eating food in a long work shift, or a rule that permits 
only one bathroom break per day (cf. Arnold 2003, 89f). 
Finally, Article 23 UDHR, section 4, provides a basis for the prohibition of firing employees for 
organizing or joining a trade union: “Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.” (cf. ibid., 89f). As will become clear later on the practical relevance of this 
right can hardly be overestimated. 
The Articles of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights also provide a 
valuable resource for determining what it means for an employer to respect an employee’s right to 
well-being (see below). Article 23, section 2, provides a basis for the prohibition of discrimination 
based on arbitrary characteristics such as race or sex. Article 23, section 3, and article 25, section 
1, provide a basis for paying employees wages that are consistent with living with dignity. They 
also provide a basis for thinking that it is the responsibility of MNEs to ensure that social security 
and other taxes are paid to appropriate governmental authorities. Article 24 provides a basis for the 
view that employees are entitled to wages adequate for a dignified standard of living without working 
extensive overtime hours: 
Article 23 
 
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself  and  
his  family  an  existence  worthy  of  human  dignity,  and  supplemented,  if necessary, by other 
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means of social protection. 
 
Article 24 
 
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay (cf. Arnold 2003, 91-92). 
 
Besides the UDHR Articles, other important documents are the International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) publications, such as its 1998   Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, which identifies the core ILO conventions, and received much international support, 
among others from the UN, the World Bank, and the EU (ibid., 37). These core conventions concern 
the areas of forced labor, child labor, discrimination, and of freedom of association. In addition, the 
ILO’s carefully developed conventions and recommendations on safety and health provide a detailed 
template for minimum safety standards. Both the UN and the ILO provide specific guidance to MNEs via 
the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
(1977) and the United Nations Global Compact. 
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7.4.1.5 Beneficial consensual exploitation in labor relations 
 
As I said, most of the above mentioned rights and prohibitions are quite uncontroversial from a 
moral point of view since they concern negative rights. With regard to living wages however, they 
are a case of beneficial, consensual exploitation, and the question is why beneficial, consensual 
exploitation should be morally unacceptable at all. After all, if someone is benefitted by a transaction 
and voluntarily consents to it, why is this not enough to make the transaction morally acceptable? 
To discuss this question we will examine several lines of argument that argue that beneficial 
exploitation in the supply chains of MNEs in developing countries is in fact morally acceptable. I will 
present and discuss the main two lines of argument for this claim below: 
 
a) The “non-worseness” argument, which concerns the outcome dimension of transactions: 
transactions in free markets per definition make both parties better off, and making 
someone better off cannot be morally wrong. 
b)  The “volenti fit iniuria" argument, which concerns the procedural dimension of transactions: 
Transactions in free markets are based on contracts which require the voluntary consent of 
both parties. Therefore they cannot be morally wrong. 
 
In discussing these claims we will clarify our understanding of exploitation and its relation to 
unfairness. In particular, we will aim at understanding the interplay between the structural, 
procedural  and  outcome  dimension  of  exploitative  transactions  and  identify  where  the moral 
flaws are actually located. 
 
7.4.1.5.1 The non-worseness argument 
 
 
The  first  line  of  argument  focuses  on  the  immediate  benefits  for  people’s  well-being resulting 
from companies (in the supply chains of MNEs or otherwise) offering people jobs and an income that 
they would otherwise not have. MNEs have vehemently defended themselves against charges of 
(beneficial) exploitation by claiming that they are instead doing something good by offering jobs to 
people who otherwise wouldn’t have jobs. 
This is called the “non-worseness” argument and goes as follows: 100  Free market 
transactions only take place if they make both parties better off, and if the MNE does not make the 
transaction partner worse off but rather better off, how could this be morally wrong? Differently put, 
how can an MNE be “more morally blameworthy for doing business with a sweatshop that pays less 
than adequate wages than for doing no business abroad at all, even if workers in the unethical 
sweatshop would prefer and freely choose their work over the option of no work at all”? (Zwolinski 
                                                             
100 For this and the following cf. Wertheimer 2011, Zuber 2010. 
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2007, 700) 
This is indeed puzzling. It seems that we have two incoherent intuitions competing with  each  
other:  on  the  one  hand  the  intuition  that  assisting  people  in  dire  need  is demanded by 
morality, and on the other hand the intuition that certain “exploitative” transactions are forbidden by 
morality. 
It seems that, as a matter of descriptive psychology, common public opinion holds that all 
exploitation is worse than non-engagement or neglect. But public opinion might be wrong. What 
needs to be shown is if this judgement is justified. In fact, Wertheimer suspects that the reason why 
public opinion considers all exploitation worse than neglect is that the  word  ‘exploitation’  is  
generally  associated  with  the  thought  that  the  interaction  is harmful or non-consensual. If this is 
correct, then “the tendency to ‘often regard’ exploitation as worse than neglect may not reflect the 
moral reality when the exploitation at issue is mutually advantageous and consensual” (Wertheimer 
2011, 294). In this sense, it might be that our moral intuitions on the matter are flawed because they 
involve an unacknowledged ‘transfer’ of intuitions  associated  with  harmful  non-consensual  
exploitation  to  mutually advantageous and consensual transactions (cf. ibid.) 
So let us see how the non-worseness claim looks in the form of a formal argument so we can 
consider its premises in detail and make our judgment based on reasons as opposed to mere 
intuitions.  In  the  following  reconstruction  of  the  argument  I  will  include  the premises 
Wertheimer offers in his discussion of the non-worseness claim and supplement them with 
additional premises I consider to be missing for a convincing reconstruction of the argument. The non-
worseness argument with regard to a transaction between A and B goes as follows 101: 
If 
 
(P1) the interaction (transaction) in question is mutually advantageous (i.e. both A and B 
 
would be better off with than without the transaction) 
 
(P2) in the situation in question, it is not morally wrong not to interact / transact 
 
(P3) if it is not morally wrong to bring about a certain state of affairs (= no transaction), it a fortiori 
cannot be morally wrong to bring about a state of affairs where everybody is better off  
(= transaction) than in the former. 
 (C) It cannot be morally wrong to engage in the transaction in question 
 
 
Let us look at the premises in detail. (P1) is unproblematic since this is simply how mutually 
advantageous transactions are defined. 
 
(P2) is more interesting already. It is of course true that there is generally no duty to engage 
                                                             
101 Two premises included by Wertheimer are tacitly presumed but not explicitly mentioned here, because they are 
not at the core of the non-worseness argument: “the interaction has no negative effects on others”, and “A and B 
consent voluntarily to the interaction. Wertheimer 1999. 
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in any market transaction. But that is not the end of the matter regarding the truth of the premise. 
There are generally situations in which there is possibly a duty to (inter)act. A paradigmatic case is 
meeting someone in desperate need, which triggers the positive duty to help that person (at least if 
the cost to oneself is low). Now indeed, many transactions that strike us as clearly exploitative or 
unfair concern situations where one party is in a situation of desperate need, and another party, 
instead of simply helping the former, makes his help conditional on receiving something in return. 
Imagine a person in the desert near death from dehydration, who comes across a traveler carrying 
several water bags, and asks him for some water. But instead of helping him, the traveler asks for the 
desperate man’s gold chain in exchange for some water. This demand strikes us as clearly 
exploitative. Here the traveler assumedly stands under a duty to assist the person in desperate need, 
and he violates this duty by making his help conditional on a request in return. 
In this perspective then, the core of the moral problematic here is not that the terms of the 
transaction are exploitative or unfair, but that there is an exchange transaction at all: The morally 
required action in such a situation (at least prima facie) is unconditional assistance, not help 
conditional on something in return, which is what an exchange transaction in this situation amounts 
to. It seems simply wrong that we demand for something in return for helping a person in desperate 
need at low cost for ourselves. 
How  does  this  relate  to  the  situation  of  companies  as  employers?  If company 
representatives are faced with people in desperate need of regular income, can they be said to have a 
duty of assistance towards them? 
As was mentioned before, positive duties of assistance imply the complication that it is often 
rather unclear upon whom they fall. In the desert case, there is obviously only one person who is 
able to help, so the duty of assistance falls squarely onto him. But in the case of a company operating 
in an area with many unemployed, desperate people, this is far less clear.  First, helping destitute 
people is clearly not the function or role of companies – contrary to charities their legitimate 
primary function is not to help anybody but to generate a profit, in the process of fulfilling an 
existing demand and generating jobs. Second, translating the desert scenario 1:1 to the company 
case would also imply that a company should not offer desperate people jobs because this would 
amount to an exchange transaction. Conversely, the prospective responsibility and accordingly the 
duty of assistance towards destitute people lie not with firms, but rather first and foremost with their 
respective state. 
I accordingly conclude that companies which are confronted with people in desperate need 
searching for employment cannot be said to stand under an absolute duty of assistance towards them 
– in other words, they don’t stand under a duty to offer them employment. However, we must keep 
in mind that the situation of people in desperate need is one that does generate duties of assistance 
on the part of others, so it might be that they just take another form when companies are 
165 
 
confronted with people in desperate need looking for employment, or that this has consequences of 
another sort for the situation we are interested in (more on this in the next paragraph). 
 
 
(P3) The third premise is clearly crucial for our question, and we will look at its plausibility and 
ways to attack it in detail. 
 
For attacking (P3) it is crucial that we distinguish between the axiological ranking of states of affairs 
and the deontic moral ranking of actions. (P3) might be correct regarding the former but not 
regarding the moral judgement of the actions of companies. The point is that companies seem to 
have a third option besides non-interaction and exploitative interaction, namely fair interaction. 
Consider Wertheimer’s example Housekeeper: 
Housekeeper. A employs B as a full-time housekeeper for a minimum wage. B does not earn 
enough to live adequately. B has no other job opportunities and would be worse off if she were not 
employed by A. 
In principle, A has at least 3 options: (1) not hire B and do the housework herself, (2) hire B 
for the minimum wage, (3) hire B for a living wage (or a higher wage). Faced with all three 
options, A chooses (2), which is better for B than (1) but worse than (3). “But if the relevant set 
of moral principles presents A with a choice that is limited to (1) and (3), A is likely to choose (3) which 
is better for B than (2). If we say that (2) is wrong, thereby taking it off the moral table, then the 
expected result for B is not worse for B, given a sufficient likelihood that A will choose (3) rather 
than (1)” (Wertheimer 2011, 307).  The argument is accordingly a conditional one: if companies are 
able to choose this third option, that is, if they have the option to change the unfair component of 
the overall beneficial “package deal” they offer potential employees, then they should presumably 
do so. 
In our case, the argument rests on the assumption that companies have the option to offer 
fair transactions and will generally want to continue employing people in developing countries, and so 
condemning unfair transactions will generally work to the benefit of workers in developing countries 
(cf. ibid). If, on the other hand, it could be shown that companies simply cannot offer fair or decent 
transactions without becoming uncompetitive and eventually having to close down, resulting in a 
worse situation for workers in developing countries, then offering unfair but mutually beneficial 
transactions would be the preferable option. 
With regard to this question it is often claimed that companies are just reacting to the 
inherent necessities of the market and their actions are effectively entirely determined by the forces 
of the market. What happens is simply the market at work – individual firms cannot set prices, they 
are price takers like every other market participant, nor can they change market processes. In this 
sense it is argued that companies don't actually have other options open to them besides the ones 
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that contribute to bad working conditions and below-subsistence pay. If they want to stay 
competitive, so the claim, they have to produce as cheaply as possible and accept short-time 
deliveries leading to overtime work, since otherwise they would be at a comparative disadvantage 
with regard to the other competitors, eventually  resulting  in  their  inability  to  stay  in  the  market.  
Since they cannot change anything, firms cannot be morally responsible to do so either, in line 
with the principle ought implies can. Their actions are accordingly to be seen as ethically neutral. 
Although the problem of the comparative disadvantage of businesses with higher social (and 
ecological) standards is to be taken serious and solutions have to be found, it isn't in general a 
convincing argument for the claim that companies don’t have the opportunity to pay living wages. This 
would only be so if company action were inescapably determined by the market – which is 
obviously wrong. Companies usually do have a certain action range open to them, even under the 
presumption that they have to try to stay in the market. How exactly this should be judged is highly 
context dependent. As I said, my point here is conditional: if a company has the option to offer a fair 
exchange (which is perfectly possible) it should presumably do so. 
This  argument  rests  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  in  principle  possible  that  a 
transaction  which  is  mutually  beneficial  and  accordingly  not  wrong  by  virtue  of  being harmful 
might nevertheless be wrong by virtue of being unfair. But how could it be justified that even though 
we don’t have a duty to interact at all, we nevertheless can have a duty to interact in a certain way 
(fairly or un-exploitatively) if we decide to interact? 
The intuitive answer seems to be the claim that if an exchange transaction takes place this 
generates special duties on the part of the people involved to a fair outcome of the transaction. We 
have encountered this claim before in the section on duties of special relations with regard to beneficial 
interactions: the Interaction-Principle. Let’s quickly recapitulate what it says and apply it to economic 
exchanges. 
The Interaction-Principle (IP) holds that “one has special responsibilities to those with whom 
one interacts beneficially that one would not have if one had chosen not to interact with them” 
(Wertheimer, cited in: Zwolinski 2007, 708). According to one view of the moral foundations of the 
duty to avoid beneficial exploitation, trade creates special associative duties for its participants. In 
cases where A has no obligation to interact beneficially with B, if he hires B (or somebody else) to 
mow his lawn and thereby benefits from B’s labor, there is a minimum level of benefits that B 
should receive – namely a fair one, which lies possibly above the contractual level of benefits that 
A and B negotiated. In this sense, IP holds that “one can have obligations or moral reasons to 
provide super-contractual benefits to those with whom one engages in mutually beneficial and 
consensual transactions” (ibid., 256), i.e. those that are necessary to make the terms of the 
transaction fair. As we said in Part I, IP rests on  (or to  be  an  expression  of)  the  norm  of positive 
reciprocity, which holds essentially that someone who benefits from the beneficial actions of others is 
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morally required to reciprocate by equally beneficial actions. But it is not enough to refer to the 
principle of reciprocity to argue that employers have super-contractual obligations to employees, 
since the question is precisely what exactly this amounts to. After all, it could be argued that the 
benefits provided by the employer already fulfil the requirements of reciprocity (cf. Wertheimer 2011, 
269). In other words: the Interaction-Principle demands a fair or just outcome of transactions in the 
context of economic exchanges. But what does this imply? 
An intuitively attractive idea is that the exchanged goods or services should be of equal value. 
We discussed this possibility in chapter3.8 under the heading of iustitia commutativa and reached the 
conclusion that this is more complicated than it first looks. An intuitively compelling view might be 
that the exploiter’s gain is disproportionate compared to the gain of the exploitee with regard to the  
non-transaction-baseline.  But this cannot be right. Leaving aside the case where A might have a 
bigger claim to the benefits of the transaction from previous actions, if we measure just the gain each 
has from the transaction in terms of marginal utility, the exploitee’s is usually much higher than the 
exploiter’s gain. Consider a case with relevance for our context: Company A proposes to hire B for 
below-subsistence pay. If B accepts, this is presumable precisely because he desperately needs the 
regular income (even though it is very low). The company on the other hand could easily hire 
somebody else instead. In this situation then, the marginal utility from the transaction is much higher 
for B than for A. As a matter of fact, it is the fact that B has so much to loose that gives A an immense 
advantage in bargaining power over B (more on this below). 
Accordingly, we would have to assess the relative gains with regard to a normative as opposed 
to a non-transaction-baseline. Our discussion in Part I suggested that in some cases (primarily 
monopolies), the value could be assessed in terms of the normative baseline of the market price in 
a hypothetical ideal market. This means that in the case of monopolies a just or fair transaction 
outcome could be determined by asking what outcome “would be agreed to by rational informed 
bargainers in a competitive market environment or what we sometimes call ‘fair market value’” 
(Wertheimer 2011, 209). 
However, as we argued there this market economy interpretation does not capture all there 
is about our moral intuitions concerning the possible substantive unfairness or injustice of 
transactions. The example relevant in our context we mentioned was a transaction where a worker 
in a developing country supplies work to a company which is perfectly happy with the supplied 
work, makes a good profit but, the market price of unskilled labor in the region being very low 
because of high unemployment, doesn’t even pay the worker enough for subsistence in return. As 
we said there, this still seems to be exploitative, even if the market price is paid. 
How else could we then understand the normative baseline of fair transaction outcomes? 
Mayer proposes the following normative baseline (“just price”) for a just transaction outcome 
for a transaction: “Some initial disadvantage renders an agent exploitable. To calculate the just price 
in any given case, we simply imagine the same transaction without the initial disadvantage. The just 
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price is thus the price which a non-disadvantaged party would accept or pay” (Mayer 2007, 145). 
This is a very interesting suggestion. According to it, the exploitee is always disadvantaged in 
some sense, which leads him to accept an exploitative offer in the first place (ibid., 143). This 
disadvantage plays out in severely reduced bargaining power, which is “corrected” by the 
hypothetical scenario of imagining what he would accept without the disadvantage. 
Mayer’s suggestion interestingly combines the outcome dimension of transactions with the 
background dimension (one party being disadvantaged at the outset) and the procedural dimension 
(the other party taking unfair advantage of this circumstance). The disadvantaging background 
conditions are enabling conditions for the exploitation, the process dimension is constituted by an 
action of unfair bargaining by the exploiter in that it takes advantage of the severely reduced 
bargaining power of the exploitee, and combined they lead to an unjust transaction outcome. 
This suggestion can be interpreted straightforwardly in terms of the understanding of fairness 
we suggested. Fairness, we argued, requires that no party is disadvantaged with regard to the aim of 
the practice (in the case of bargaining, finding an agreement which is acceptable to all parties, or 
calling the deal off), and that there is no taking advantage of existing disadvantages in the background 
conditions. If the background conditions of the bargaining process severely disadvantage one party, 
the relevant equality of opportunity of the parties in reaching this agreement is jeopardized. Our 
account can accordingly capture the structure of exploitation according to Mayer well. 
But let us examine the procedural dimension of beneficially exploitative transactions in more 
detail to get a better understanding of what the exact problem is, and how it is connected to the 
background conditions.  We will do this by analyzing the second argument for the claim that there is 
actually nothing wrong at all with beneficial exploitation, which focuses on the procedural dimension 
of transactions. In the course of our discussion we will come back full circle to the above account of 
exploitation with a deeper understanding thereof. 
 
7.4.2.5.2 The “volenti non fit iniuria" argument 
 
The second line of argument, which is often called the “volenti non fit iniuria" argument, focuses on 
the process of transactions, namely people’s voluntary consent to economic transactions and its 
legitimizing role. It holds that transactions in free markets are based on contracts which require the 
voluntary consent of both parties, and accordingly their outcome cannot be morally wrong or unfair. 
In this sense e.g. Ian Maitland argues that “the appropriate test [for fair wages] is not whether the 
wage reaches some predetermined standard but whether it is freely accepted by (reasonably) 
informed workers” (Maitland 1997, 603). 
There are two different versions of the “volenti non fit iniuria”-argument in the context of 
free market transactions: an economic-descriptive version, and a normative version. 
The economic-descriptive version of the “volenti non fit iniuria”-argument reiterates the  
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understanding  of  voluntary  beneficial  transactions  of  economic  theory: as  we  saw earlier, in 
economic theory preference orderings are derived from the choices people make. This means that we 
can see people’s preferences in their choices: if someone consents to a transaction, this implies 
(descriptively) that she believes the transaction makes her better off (i.e. improves her preference 
satisfaction), since as a rational actor she would not consent to the transactions otherwise. The role of 
consent then is merely that it functions as evidence for the advantageousness of the transaction. 
Accordingly, the economic-descriptive version of the “volenti non fit iniuria”-argument cannot serve 
as a normative argument against (P1). 
The normative version of the “volenti non fit iniuria”-claim in the context of free market 
transactions by contrast focuses on the transformative moral force of consent: valid consent can 
make actions that would be morally prohibited become morally acceptable. This moral force can on 
the one hand be based on the right of every individual to decide over her private issues – in the words 
of Mill: “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (Mill 2009, 32). 
Alternatively it can be based on the Kantian practical imperative according to which one should never 
use a person as a mere means but always as an end in himself. To request consent guarantees that we 
treat our exchange partners as autonomous persons and by this in Kant’s sense as an end in 
themselves (cf. e.g. O’Neill 1986, 44). 
According to this understanding, as soon as there is valid consent to a transaction it is 
legitimate – whatever action it consists of and whatever consequences may result from it. This 
however is a very strong claim. Just how strong it is depends on what counts as the conditions of valid 
consent. The main conditions are usually considered to be that consent is informed and voluntary. 
Calling into question the legitimizing force of “voluntary consent” to transactions where people 
consent to exploitative work agreements accordingly amounts to arguing that one of the conditions 
were not met. 
A first issue in our context concerns situations where people lack full information about the 
consequences of a choice (e.g. to leave a poor rural area for factory work in a far- away industrial 
center), and accordingly can’t make a fully informed choice. A second issue is that such labor choices, 
once made, sometimes effectively can’t be undone anymore once additional information is learned 
“on the job” (e.g. it can become close to impossible to get out of a work agreement and return to 
one’s rural home). 
A third issue – the most interesting from an ethical perspective – are situations where the 
voluntariness of people’s consent is questionable. It concerns situations where people basically 
“have no other choice” but to accept a certain bad option (or job in our case). If we have the intuition 
that there is something wrong with transactions like in “Lecherous millionaire”  and  “Belo-subsistence  
wage”  even  if  the  transaction  partners  give  factual consent to the terms of the transactions, this 
is presumably because the consent is not “voluntary” in the normatively transformative sense. 
 
170 
 
1) Can offers be coercive? 
 
In  the  situations  we  are  interested  in,  companies  make  a  conditional  offer  along  the following 
lines: we offer you this job at the specified (bad) conditions, take it or leave it and suffer the 
consequences. Since under certain circumstances, offers for such exploitative labor exchanges 
seem to leave the exploitee no choice but to accept them, we might think that these offers 
themselves are coercive in the sense of undermining the normatively legitimating force of people’s 
consent to them (i.e. their outcome). If they were, they would be prohibited by the duty not to use 
coercion and we would have a good prima facie reason to prohibit them. In this sense we can ask 
the following question: is it morally wrong of MNEs to offer a job to bad conditions because such 
offers are coercive? Let us consider how it could be argued in favor of this claim. 
A possible approach that Zuber (2010) explores consists in drawing an analogy between 
coercive threats (like the one in the robber example) and coercive offers. This analogy can be 
exemplified drastically in the following way: “’Your money or your life’ might equally be proposed by a 
backalley robber or a pharmaceutical company; in one case it's a robbery, in the other case it may be 
a life-saving offer.”102 As this example illustrates, the basic structure of conditional threats and 
conditional offers is very similar. In the case of conditional threats, it looks as follows: A (the 
person making the conditional threat) attaches some undesirable consequences C to a certain action 
Q undertaken by B (ibid.): A claims that A will bring about consequences C if and only if B does Q. In 
the robbery example, A is the robber, B is the victim, C is the action of killing B, and Q is the 
action of not handing over his wallet. This “proposition has the same structure as an ordinary 
(conditional) offer by A to do something B desires if and only if B agrees to pay for it” (Zuber 2010, 
45; cf. Anderson 2006): A claims that A will bring about consequences C (something B desires) if and 
only if B does Q (pays for it). 
However, there is usually seen to be a crucial difference between conditional threats and 
conditional offers: the fact that threats propose to make their recipients worse off than they would 
have been otherwise, while offers usually propose to  make their recipients better off than they 
would have been otherwise (or at least not worse). Offering someone to make him better off on the 
other hand doesn’t restrict his options like coercing someone does,  but  quite  to  the  contrary,  it  
gives  him  an  additional  option.  In the words of Wertheimer, „Whereas threats reduce the options 
available to the target, offers expand the options, and one does not coerce another when one’s 
proposal expands rather than contracts the agent’s options“ (Wertheimer et al. 2008, 390). How 
indeed should giving someone an additional option be bad? This is of course the conventional 
argument by people legitimizing sweatshop labor. And in fact, it is not easy to refute. 
Joel Feinberg, who was one of the few philosophers arguing in favor of the possibility of 
                                                             
102 Cf: Anderson 2006. 
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coercive offers, argues that both the coerciveness and the offer-likeness are present in the case in 
question:  “They are offers because the proposer does not threaten any harm beyond what would 
happen anyway without his gratuitous intervention,” and because they increase the number of 
options available to the person. But at the same time, “They appear to be coercive in that they 
rearrange a person’s options in such a way that he has ‘no choice’ but to comply or else suffer an 
unacceptable consequence”(Feinberg 1986, 230). 
How is having “no choice” to be understood here? Feinberg gives his answer when he adds 
that “Typically,[coercive offers] force a choice between evils”, (Feinberg 1986, 235) and that in this 
situation, the lesser evil becomes the only option because it is the exclusive alternative to an 
intolerable evil. In this situation, we could try to argue, consent to the offered (bad) option could be 
seen as insufficient for the outcome of the transaction to qualify as morally justified. Although most 
authors are not convinced by this argument, I consider it to be promising and will explore it in more 
detail below. 
There is yet another perspective on the problem.  As we said before, what is commonly 
thought to distinguish conditional offers from conditional threats is that the former propose to make 
the recipient better off, while the latter propose to make their recipients worse off. Now, making 
someone “worse off” can be understood as harming him, i.e. making him worse off than before the 
transaction (respective to a descriptive baseline), but it can also be understood in terms of the 
violation of his rights, negative or, importantly, positive, accordingly making him worse off compared 
to a normative baseline. Wertheimer operates with the latter understanding in his definition of 
coercion: “A coerces B to do X only if (1) A proposes or threatens to violate B’s rights or not fulfill an 
obligation to B if B chooses not to do x and (2) B has no reasonable alternative but to accept A’s 
proposal” (Wertheimer et al. 2008, 390). 
This perspective can account for our common understanding in two specific cases: 
 
a) The case where A makes B worse off, but has a right to do so, and by this does not violate 
B’s rights, which is commonly not understood as implying coercion. An example would be 
economic actor A asking economic actor B to cooperate with him or else A will start selling his 
products at a better price than B and thereby possibly drive A out of the market. Since we 
commonly understand economic competition as legitimate and accordingly think B has no right not to 
have to compete against A, the behavior of A is not sensibly understood as an attempt at coercion, 
but as a genuine offer. 
b) The case where A has some obligation to render B better off than B’s status quo. An 
example would be B qualifying for social benefits, and accordingly having a right to it, and A, who is a 
government official in the social benefits department, offering (threatening) to initiate payments to B 
only if B pays him privately a certain sum of money. This would count as coercive since A is violating 
B’s right to social benefit money, although A does not propose to make B worse off than his status quo 
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(without the social benefit money). If B has a right to something, attaching additional conditions 
amounts to coercion. 
Zuber proposes to transfer this to the question of coercive offers. She argues that the latter 
could be understood as offers (threats) of an option which would make B better off, but would fail 
to benefit B enough, compared to A’s obligation. If B has a right to be made better off according to a 
certain normative standard, not to fulfill this obligation then would be comparable to taking away an 
option B has a right to (cf. Zuber 2010, 47 103). In this sense, we could try to argue that in cases where 
companies offer potential workers bad working conditions and below subsistence wages, they are 
violating their obligation by violating the workers’ right –a right to a living wage. Are we justified to 
believe those persons to have such a right? 
Working conditions that respect negative human rights are clearly something that people have 
a claim to. But as we saw in Part I, positive rights in general are highly disputed. The right to 
subsistence is certainly among the least contested positive rights. However, in the case of below 
subsistence wages it is not clear why it should fall on the employer to fulfill this right – rather than the 
state. In this sense, Wertheimer argues that if the worker’s right is not fulfilled because he lives in a 
context with unjust background conditions, it doesn’t follow that the worker has a right that his 
employer ensures her subsistence (cf. Wertheimer 2011, 212). 
Let us therefore approach the question of the procedural unfairness of beneficial, consensual 
exploitation from another, related perspective and see what it contributes to our understanding. 
 
 
2) Can circumstances undermine the normative force of consent to a transaction? 
 
To capture our intuition that the decision of workers to continue working under terrible 
conditions is not to be understood as voluntary consent to their working conditions in a 
normatively relevant sense, we need to broaden our understanding of the conditions of normatively 
relevant consent to a transaction. More specifically, we need to broaden them beyond economic 
theory’s weak definition of voluntariness as the absence of active, man- made coercion, in such a way 
as to capture the effect of circumstances on people’s freedom of decision making (cf. Zuber 2010). 
Conceptually, there are two ways to argue for the claim that circumstances can indeed be 
such as to undermine the legitimizing force of people’s consent to a certain option or transaction. 
1) The first line of argument which is taken by Zwolinski (2007) and Radcliffe-Richards (1998), 
still takes the conditions for voluntary consent to be the absence of coercion and fraud,  but 
broadens  the  understanding  of  the  concept  of  coercion  to  include  certain “coercive 
circumstances”. Following this approach one then needs to argue for the claim that man-made 
coercion and the coercive effect of circumstances are analogous in the morally relevant respect. 
                                                             
103 For a similar reasoning see Sample 2003, 20f. 
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2) The second line of argument understands non-coerciveness (understood in the traditional 
way) as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for normatively relevant voluntariness, hereby 
broadening our understanding of the concept of voluntariness to include more than just the absence 
of coercion and fraud (cf. Zuber 2010, 41). Following this approach one then has to justify a) the claim 
that additional conditions are needed, and b) which ones they are. 
So, let us examine if the effect of certain circumstances can be coercive like man-made 
coercion. 
Consider first the case of coercive human actions, and among them specifically coercive 
threats. If a robber tells his victim: “Your live or your money” this translates as: “If you don’t give me 
your money I will kill you”. This conditional statement literally seems to give the victim a choice: he 
can either hand over his money or die. But this perspective clearly misses the point: actually, the 
robber threatens the victim that he will bring about a completely unacceptable option (losing his life) 
if the victim does not do what he wants. In cases like this we speak of people being forced to do 
something, and conditional statements of the above sort are called “coercive threats”. The fact that 
the threat can be formulated as a choice obviously does not make it appropriate to say that the 
victim hands over his wallet “voluntarily” or gives his “voluntary consent” to this action in any 
normatively relevant sense. But why exactly is this? 
The reason is that the victim chooses the option of handing over his money only because the 
alternative (death) is completely unacceptable in absolute terms.  In other words, since one of the 
two options is extremely bad, he rationally has to accept the only other option left to him, even if it is 
bad as well. Formulated generally, if a person has the choice only between evils and chooses the least 
bad one among them, this is only proof of his rationality and not of his morally relevant consent to the 
option. 
When people say “I had no choice but to take the job”, or “I had no choice but to accept their 
demands” this suggests that they also felt forced to take a certain decision. The perceived coercive 
effect of certain circumstances is similar to coercive human actions in that they both severely 
restrict the options available to someone and, leaving them  with  only  bad  options  in  absolute  
terms.  In  this  sense,  we  could  translate  the statement “I had no choice but to do x” to “under the 
circumstances, the alternative options to the one I chose were all so bad or unacceptable in absolute 
terms that I rationally had no choice but to choose the least evil option x” – which is analogous to 
the robbery example above. In this sense one could say that the people in question were somehow 
forced by the circumstances to take the decision they took because their situation left them with no 
acceptable alternative options, and so they chose the option for rational reasons only. 
Severe poverty is such a circumstance that drastically reduces people’s options to possibly 
only a few bad ones, and might accordingly be understood as being coercive. One author who states 
this claim is Matt Zwolinski, when he writes: “Poverty can be regarded as coercive because it, too, 
reduces our options. Poverty reduces the options of many sweatshop workers, for instance, to a small 
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list of poor options – prostitution, theft, sweatshop labor, or starvation” (Zwolinski 2007, 701). 
Janet Radcliffe-Richards completes this  thought  when  she  writes  “It  is  (…)  claimed  that,  since  
they  are  coerced  by  their economic circumstances, their consent cannot count as genuine” 
(Radcliffe-Richards et al. 1998, 1950). The complete claim then is that a situation where the range of 
someone’s options is reduced to only bad ones in absolute terms can undermine the moral weight 
of the consent people give to transactions. It seems plausible then to broaden our understanding of 
the conditions of normatively relevant consent to a transaction beyond economic theory’s weak 
definition of voluntariness to include coercive circumstances as well.  Let us now come to the 
question which additional conditions need to be met for consent to an option to count as morally 
valid. There are mainly two candidates that come to mind. The first concerns p) the quantity of 
options available, while the second concerns q) the quality of the options available. Formulated as 
conditions for voluntary consent, they could be spelled out as p) having a certain minimum number 
of options from which to choose,  and  q)  as  having  one  or  more  acceptable  options  in  absolute  
terms  (quality) available. 
Let’s start with p). First, note that clearly not every limitation of options by itself undermines 
the normative force of consent to an option. As a matter of fact, people’s options are limited in 
many ways in all decisions they take, but we would nevertheless consider consent to them 
normatively valid in many cases. As such, a person in an industrialized country’s options as to what 
job to take are limited by their education, their abilities, their place of residence, the demand on 
the job market, etc. Nevertheless, we would hardly consider someone’s decision for a certain job in 
this situation as non-voluntary in the sense of undermining the moral weight of their consent. 
Maybe then a certain minimal number of options is necessary for consent to a transaction to be 
voluntary in a morally relevant sense? 
Comparing Zwolinski’s example with another one will serve to explore this possibility: consider 
Zwolinski’s case where person A has the options of prostitution, theft, sweatshop labor, or starvation 
(four options) and the case where person B has the options of either a well-paid job as a factory 
worker or an equally well paid job as a vendor in a shop (2 options).   Surely   B’s   consent   to   
one   of   his   two   options   seems   intuitively   rather unproblematic, while A’s consent to one of his 
four options seems very problematic. Does this suggest that what is crucial for the normative weight 
of consent might not the quantity of the options but their quality? 
Before exploring this option further, let me mention that there is a certain (rather trivial) 
connection between the quality and the quantity of options available to someone. 
Looking again at the example just mentioned, note that it just looks as if the person had only two 
options. Of course, theoretically, he additionally also has the options of person A – it is just that 
having good options he won’t have to consider these options of last resort. In this sense, the overall 
number of options is always higher when it contains good options in addition to the options of last 
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resort. This might account for our intuition that the number of options is relevant for the normal 
weight of consent in some way. 
The relevance of the quality of other available options is that the criterion of the mutual  
advantageousness  of  a  transaction  concerns  the  quality  of  a  given  transaction relative to no 
transaction at all. If no transaction implies e.g. starvation, then more or less any  transaction  is  
more  advantageous  than  that  and  accordingly  fulfills  the  economic criterion – even horrible ones 
in an absolute sense, including prostitution, selling an organ, selling one’s child, or selling oneself into 
slavery. Considering such examples where the alternatives to a certain transaction are sufficiently 
bad shows that the criterion of mutual advantageousness is extremely weak – possibly so weak as to 
be morally completely irrelevant. Since the economic criterion of mutual advantageousness is 
intrinsically linked to the criterion of voluntary consent to a transaction – as we saw before, the 
assumption that a certain transaction is beneficial to both parties in terms of subjective preference 
satisfaction is derived from the assumption that the (rational) parties voluntarily consent to it – this 
matches  the  extremely  weak  moral  relevance  or  even  insignificance  of  the  economic criterion 
of voluntary consent, which is then merely the freedom to make a rational decision. 
Coming back to the relevance of the quality of options for the normative weight of consent, 
consider the case where a person C has the bad options mentioned by Zwolinski, prostitution, theft, 
sweatshop labor, or starvation, but also one option that is good in absolute terms, say, employment 
to good conditions. Now the consent of C to the one good option he has would usually intuitively be 
considered to be morally unproblematic. This is still the case where some person D has only two 
options – say, starvation or employment to good conditions. This suggests that b), having one or more 
good options in absolute terms (quality) available, might be a sufficient condition for morally 
legitimating voluntary consent, while a) is not crucial in itself. Tentatively we could say then that if a 
person has at least one option open to them that is acceptable in absolute terms, this is sufficient 
to make their consent to the respective transaction morally valid. Conversely, we could say that if a 
person has no option open to them which is acceptable in an absolute sense, this would make their 
consent to any of the unacceptable options morally invalid. 
From what has been said in the last sections we can conclude that circumstances can be seen 
as undermining the moral relevance of consent to a certain transaction in that they can be such as to 
make it rational to choose any morally horrible option. The main problem from a moral point of view 
then is the absolute moral badness of the options per se. It is plausible to argue that below-living 
wages constitute such morally bad options in absolute terms – for example from the position of 
Scanlons contractualism (1998). 
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3) The argument from treating others as equals for blocking exchanges born of desperation 
 
A similar conclusion, namely that exchanges born of desperation should be considered immoral and 
should actually be blocked, is reached via a different route of argument by some authors. 
According to Okun (1975) for example, exchanges born of desperation should be blocked as part of 
limiting the dominance of wealth (ibid., 20; cf. Walzer 1983, 100). Okun, who draws a line 
between the sphere of money and the sphere of rights, argues that due to this limitation of the 
sphere of wealth by the sphere of rights, human beings and their liberty cannot be sold, and neither 
can a person sell himself as a slave. What goes on in the market should never compromise the 
normative fact from the sphere of rights that people are equals. On the basis of the same rationale, 
“(…) what goes on in the market should at least approximate an exchange between equals (a free 
exchange). These last words don’t mean that every commodity will sell for a „just price“ or that 
every worker will receive his ‘just reward’. Justice of that sort is alien to the market. But every 
exchange must be the result of a bargain, not of a command or an ultimatum. If the market is to work 
properly, ‘exchanges born of desperation’ must be ruled out, for necessity, as Ben Franklin wrote, 
‘never made a good bargain’. In a sense, the welfare state underwrites the sphere of money when it 
guarantees that men and women will never be forced to bargain without resources for the very 
means of life. When the state acts to facilitate union organization, it serves the same purpose. 
Workers who stand alone are liable to be forced into trades of last resort, driven by their 
poverty, or their lack of particular marketable skills, or their inability to move their families to accept 
the ultimatum of some local employer. Collective bargaining is more likely to be an exchange 
between equals. It doesn’t guarantee a good bargain (…), but it helps to sustain the integrity of 
the market” (Walzer 1983, 120f). 
This comes again very close to our understanding of the requirements of fairness. The practice 
of bargaining is understood as standing under the rationale of finding an agreement of some sort, as 
opposed to “a command or an ultimatum”. An exchange “should at least approximate an exchange 
between equals”, that is, it is measured against a presumption of equality, and accordingly requires a 
rough equality of opportunity in the practice of bargaining. 
In this sense, Walzer argues that the blocking of desperate exchanges and the fostering of 
trade unions serves a more equitable distribution of market power (ibid., 122). “The eight-hour day, 
minimum wage laws, health and safety regulations: all these set a floor, establish basic standards, 
below which workers cannot bid against one another for employment. (…) This is a restraint of market 
liberty, a reassertion, at lower levels of loss, of the ban on slavery“ (Walzer 1983, 102). 
What does this mean with regard to the situation of workers in developing countries where 
the state does not guarantee through a social safety net that the workers “will never be forced to 
bargain without resources for the very means of life” (Walzer 1983, 120f)? As I see it, accepting our 
exchange partner as an equal implies treating him in a negotiation as if he had a viable other option, 
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that is in our case an option to at least secure the resources for his survival, which would guarantee 
him sufficient bargaining power to make the negotiation a case of bargaining at all. In this 
counterfactual situation, he would not agree to any deal that left him with a below-subsistence 
wage. In this sense, the minimum we have to offer if we want to treat our potential exchange partner 
as an equal is a living wage. Unless that is, if we seriously cannot afford paying that wage (according to 
ought implies can). 
In other words, we can argue that there is a duty on the part of B not to take advantage of 
the power the desperate situation of A gives him regarding the determination of the terms of the 
transaction. This claim is based on the recognition that the fact a desperate person has everything to 
lose makes them utterly powerless in a “negotiation” about the terms of the transaction. Just as in 
the desert case, they would accept almost any working conditions set by a potential employer in an 
(more or less) exclusive position to “help” them. Respecting people as equals demands that B does 
not take advantage of this extreme power imbalance to strike a deal for maximum profit – although 
he could.  Rather, it implies abstracting from the powerlessness of the transaction party and offering 
him a fair deal anyway – one that he could accept if he were not in a situation of desperate need: an 
acceptable offer in absolute terms. 
And here we are, back full circle to the account of exploitation by Mayer: “Some initial 
disadvantage renders an agent exploitable. To calculate the just price in any given case, we simply 
imagine the same transaction without the initial disadvantage. The just price is thus the price which a 
non-disadvantaged party would accept or pay” (Mayer 2007, 145). 
 
 
Should beneficial, consensual exploitative transactions of companies be legally prohibited? 
 
Should we argue that beneficial, consensual exploitative transactions in the supply chains of 
 
MNEs (particularly below-subsistence wages) should be legally prohibited or regulated? 
 
Note that we need to clearly distinguish between the ethics of transactions and the ethics of 
interference. From what has been said above it does not follow that beneficial, consensual 
exploitation should be prohibited or regulated in current reality. 
Wertheimer argues against such prohibition or regulation for the following reason from 
the perspective of the individual: “Given the non-ideal background conditions under which people 
find themselves, there should be a very strong presumption in favor of principles that would allow 
people to improve their situations if they give appropriately robust consent and if doing so has no 
negative effects on others” (Wertheimer 2011, 223). For this reason, Wertheimer argues that 
allowing beneficial-consensual exploitation (including paying below-subsistence wages) is a plausible 
principle of non-ideal moral theory. 
Above that, our assessment of the question if beneficial, consensual exploitation in the supply 
chains of MNEs should be allowed, all things considered, will depend to a significant extent on the 
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consequences that such a prohibition would have for the ones affected by it. So let us have a look at 
this question. 
One might think that contrary to the above example Housekeeper, companies cannot choose 
not to employ any workers because someone has to produce the products they want to sell. 
Accordingly they have to choose option (3) over (1) and the workers will be better off as a 
consequence since they are paid a living wage. If this were the case, this would be a weighty 
reason to prohibit below-subsistence pay. 
However, as we saw before, requiring companies to pay living wages may have the 
consequence that they can employ less people than they otherwise would. Those workers whose 
marginal productivity is below the threshold of a living wage would simply not be employed in 
this case (it is an empirical question how many workers this would concern). In any case, this would 
have to be weighed against the benefit for the workers who newly receive a living wage. 
But there is more. Note that the above argument regarding Housekeeper rests on the premise 
that companies cannot choose not to employ any workers because someone has to produce the 
products they want to sell. But this doesn’t take into account that companies might have the option to 
automatize the respective production processes (which would be the equivalent to (1) above). 
Whether this premise is plausible depends on empirical issues like the technical feasibility of 
automatizing the relevant processes, and the access to capital necessary for such automation. 
Regarding the vast means available to MNEs and todays technical possibilities it seems clear that these 
obstacles to automation can be overcome. 
On this background, we might need to reassess the situation: a substantial raise in labor 
costs might critically raise the incentive for MNEs to invest in technological solutions for 
automatizing their production processes – and proportionally raise the probability of option (1) being 
picked by MNEs, in which case they would no longer need a tremendous number of people 
currently working in their supply chains. 
Considering the speed of technological change, I believe that the latter is a very real option – 
to happen sooner or later, depending on the circumstances. We therefore need to consider the 
following two questions: a) would the raise in labor costs due to paying living wages be big enough 
to prompt MNEs to automatize their processes? And b) if they did, what would be the 
consequences for workers in developing countries? 
Ad a) As we saw before, in terms of the additional cost of, say, a t-shirt, the raise in 
production costs due to living wages seems to be rather small. However, if we consider the raise in 
labor costs for MNEs, the picture looks different: according to estimates, their labor costs would be 
raised by 30-45% (Starmanns 2011, 195f). I don’t have the necessary figures to assess if this is 
enough (over time) to make a shift to automation worthwhile. But MNEs can be relied on to do the 
math. What I am saying is merely conditional: if the increase in labor costs due to living wages 
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makes this shift profitable, then we need to very carefully assess the consequences this would have 
for people in developing countries and include this in our ethical assessment of the desirability of such 
measures. Since, while we might be able to prohibit companies to pay below-subsistence wages, we 
cannot prohibit them to automatize their production. 
Ad b) As I said, without being an expert on the matter, it seems very plausible to assume 
that sooner or later the currently manufacturing-based production processes in the supply chains of 
MNEs will be substituted by primarily automatized production processes. But what implications 
would this have for the people affected? 
Let us take a short look at the – extremely simplified – history of automation in Europe. In 
Europe this process was (and actually still is) gradual, starting with early industrialization and picking 
up tremendous speed in the last 30 years or so. During this development, social conditions changed 
gradually to accommodate the new need for different kinds of labor – from low-skilled manufacturing 
work to high-skilled work related to machines. The need for high-skilled workers for this different kind 
of labor led to a demand for better education. People equipped with this education found new 
jobs, goods were being produced much cheaper without manual labor, and the new technologies 
freed up tremendous amounts of time (think of washing machines etc.), especially for women. All in 
all, this development led to massive raises in living standards over a rather short period of time. 
Since the development was gradual, there was no catastrophic place in time when a large 
majority was all of a sudden out of a job. But what would be the consequences if MNEs shifted to 
automated forms of production in the course of a few years? Would they shift back production to 
industrialized countries, or would they establish their new automated plants in developing countries? 
What would the effects of all this be on developing and on industrialized countries? 
Even if a gradual shift to automation with automated production facilities being established in 
developing countries could have beneficial consequences (as they had in Europe), a sudden shift 
would presumably have dramatic effects for workers and developing countries in general, since they 
have become highly dependent on being part of the supply chains of MNEs. Much would depend on 
how well people in developing countries would be prepared for such eventual changes. 
 
Conclusions on (P1) 
 
Our  discussion  of  (P1)  showed  that,  while  the  truth  of  (P1)  is  uncontroversial regarding harmful, 
non-consensual exploitation, it is much more difficult to justify that it is also true regarding beneficial, 
consensual exploitation. Nevertheless, we showed that there are plausible reasons for thinking that it 
is indeed morally blameworthy of a company to exploit others in a beneficial, consensual way. We 
argued that it is blameworthy of companies to offer unfair working deals in cases where they could 
offer fair ones. Further, we argued that the claim to a living wage (directed at companies) could be 
based on a demanding understanding of voluntary consent and the claim that it is  wrong  to 
make people choose between “evils” (i.e. bad options in absolute terms). As I said, if a person has 
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the choice only between evils and chooses the least bad one among them, this is only proof of his 
rationality and not of his morally relevant consent to the option. 
Further, we argued that under just background conditions systematic beneficial labor 
exploitation would not occur since people would have their subsistence and basic needs secured and 
would accordingly never have to bargain from a position of desperation (and according 
powerlessness). In practice, the powerlessness of workers can be mitigated through the possibility of 
collective bargaining 
On the other hand, we argued that it could be very risky to legally enforce e.g. living wages 
since this might indeed worsen the situation of many people in developing countries. This conclusion 
is widely shared with regard to beneficial exploitation in general. 104 In the sense of the precautionary 
principle we might possibly consider the current practice of governments in developing countries as 
being justified. It seems then that we would have to search for alternative solutions to lessen the 
plight of people working for below-subsistence wages. It might be more plausible to argue that yes, 
we think that everybody who works full time should earn a living wage, but that the costs for this 
should be carried by collective institutions instead of the employers alone. In this model, 
employers would be allowed to pay  market  wages  and  the  collective  institutions  would  
supplement  the  wage  (though specific policies similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US) to 
bring the employee’s net income up to the required level (cf. Wertheimer 2011, 287). 
Let us now turn to premise 2), which is concerned with the responsibility of MNEs for 
exploitative transactions in their supply chains. 
 
7.4.2 (P2) If there are Exploitative Transactions in the Supply Chains of an MNE, the MNE is 
Responsible for them 
 
The assumption that if there are exploitative transactions in the supply chains of MNEs the latter are 
responsible for them is of course a very different claim from the one that exploitation is wrong. After 
all, as we saw, it is usually not the MNEs directly who exploit their own workers, but other firms 
who merely supply MNEs with goods or services. 
In some authors’ view, the factors leading to the situation where workers in the supply 
chains of MNEs are being exploited is so complex that ascription of responsibility to individual actors 
(be it the factory owners, MNEs or others) is generally mistaken. In Iris Marion Young’s (2004, 2006) 
view, the problem of bad working conditions in the supply chain of MNEs is a problem of 
“structural injustice”. This implies that causality is not clear- cut and there are many actors 
simultaneously contributing to poor working conditions. The latter are accordingly the mediated 
result of complex global structures into which different actors are embedded and to which they all 
contribute. While consumers are generally shocked about sweatshop working conditions, when 
                                                             
104 See e.g. Radcliffe Richards et al. 1998; Wertheimer 1999; Zwolinski 2007. 
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making purchasing decisions most of them are nevertheless primarily interested in the design, the 
functionality and the low price of goods and care little about poor working conditions (cf. Devinney et 
al. 2010). MNEs provide goods according to these consumer preferences and argue that the legal 
system in the production countries must deal with ethical requirements. Producers in development 
countries are interested in getting as many big contracts as possible and don’t decline orders that 
require them to compromise working conditions. Workers on the other hand are dependent on jobs 
and continue to work even under bad conditions. The governments of developing countries pursue 
the strategy to attract investment and increase exports while keeping legal requirements for 
working conditions low because they are competing against other developing countries. The 
governments are strongly influenced by industry lobbies who keep warning them that MNEs would 
place their orders in other developing countries if there were higher minimum wages, and that 
factories would have to shut down and workers be out of any job at all. 
Young argues that in this kind of situation it is not possible to blame one single agent for being 
remedially responsible for bad working conditions. She suggests that various actors share a 
prospective responsibility and that four criteria determine their share of responsibility: power, 
privilege, interests and collective ability (Young 2006, 127ff). One of her central points is that 
background conditions such as the fashion system or market competition need to be challenged. She 
emphasizes that without addressing these background conditions we will not substantially improve 
the situation of workers in the supply chains of MNEs. 
Young is certainly right that many factors play together in leading to exploitative working 
conditions in the supply chains of MNEs, and that it is not possible to clearly assign the whole of 
responsibility to one group of actors. 
However, this is not to say that we can say nothing of relevance regarding the particular  
responsibility  of  certain  actors  in  that  system  leading  to  the  exploitation  of workers in 
developing countries. In fact, we can engage with the question of particular actors’ 
responsibility in much more specific ways than Young’s approach might suggest. In what follows I 
want to focus on the group of actors that NGOs and the public consider to be carrying the main 
responsibility (cf. Starmanns 2010, 7) and analyze the moral grounds of these claims: the MNEs or 
brands in whose supply chains the exploitation of workers happens. 
Whereas it is rather easy to justify that MNEs are responsible for the working conditions in 
their own facilities, it is much more difficult to justify why they should also be responsible for working 
conditions in their legally independent suppliers. 
This point was stressed by MNEs when confronted with the public criticisms with regard to 
poor working conditions in their supply chains. The following exemplifies the position, prevalent at 
least until a few years ago among firm owners and managers, that legally independent firms are 
generally not responsible for each other’s actions, and that it is impossible to ascribe  responsibility 
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to  an MNE for bad working conditions  in  its  supply chains: confronted with accusations from a 
journalist about his company being responsible for terrible conditions in a Haitian contracting firm 
that produced Disney clothes, Disney Spokesman Ken Green replied: “We don’t employ anyone in 
Haiti. With the newsprint you use, do you have any idea of the labor conditions involved to produce 
it?” (Majtenyi 1996, 6; cf. Klein 2010, 197f) 
Indeed, as the statement suggests, with supply chains having become ever more complex 
ascriptions of responsibility have become ever more difficult. 
However, the public and many authors were unimpressed by this reasoning and insisted that 
this didn’t absolve the MNEs from their responsibility concerning exploitation and bad working 
conditions in their supply chains, including in their legally independent suppliers and 
subcontractors. 105 
Starting from this controversy let us then have a closer look at how (P2), the claim that if 
there are exploitative transactions in the supply chains of an MNE, the MNE is responsible for them, 
could be justified. 
 7.4.2.1 The social license to operate: empirical-social grounds of MNEs' responsibility for wrongs in their supply chains 
 
As a matter of fact, the mentioned public opinion or social expectation towards MNEs per se is often 
cited as the actual grounds for MNE’s responsibility towards the people in their supply chains. 
Consider for example how the influential Ruggie-Report devised on behalf of the UN put it: “…the 
broader scope of the responsibility [of business] … is defined by social expectations – as part of 
what is sometimes called a company’s social licence to operate“ (Ruggie 2008, 16f). 
This perspective relies on an empirical-social understanding of MNE’s responsibilities. In this 
sense, for example Donaldson/Preston (1995) and Gray et al. (1988) argue that a firm's 
responsibility (in the sense of accountability) to society is grounded in a social contract between 
business and society, with business deriving its existence from society. This is thought to give society 
the right to direct demands to the companies regarding their actions. According to this perspective, to 
be legitimate companies (including MNEs) have to comply with the expectations or demands which 
society directs at them. 
This perspective is certainly relevant in practice. From the sociological perspective of neo-
institutional theories, organizations (including MNEs) adapt to the pressure of their environment to 
be conceived as legitimate actors (Di Maggio / Powell 1983; Zöllner 2004; cf. Starmanns 2010, 16). 
And indeed, as a result of the pressure brought about by social expectations, MNEs have started to 
take on the responsibility the public claimed they had concerning their supply chains. In the last 10-
15 years brands and retailers have started to engage in so-called corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
                                                             
105 See e.g. Mamic 2005. 
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activities, by which they also try to improve working conditions in their global supply chains. “Today, 
almost every large company agrees that they have some responsibility for working conditions in their 
supply chains” (Starmanns 2011, 199). 
However, they mostly did (and do) so only insofar as they fear reputational problems when 
not fulfilling the public’s expectations because of their potential negative economic consequences. 
Based on the same logic business ethics usually tries to argue that there is a “business case” – 
meaning an economic argument – for corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures, including those 
directed at improving working conditions in supply chains. As Vogel (2005) pointed out, such an 
economic argument seems to work for some cases, but not for others. Whereas it might be 
applicable to the most famous brands because of their high visibility and consequent vulnerability to 
reputational damage, for most other firms it may well not apply. 
In any case, while the empirical-social understanding of MNEs’ responsibility for conditions in 
their supply chains certainly has its merits, it does not resolve the ethical question whether the 
demands of society toward MNEs are actually justified. Also, there is little agreement on what exactly 
lead firms are responsible to do: Are they responsible for working conditions at the contracted 
suppliers or does their responsibility extend to subcontracted producers and suppliers’ suppliers? Are 
buying companies responsible for implementing national laws (e.g. ‘minimum wages’) or for ensuring 
working conditions and wages above legal standards (cf. Starmanns 2011, 199)? 
It is the question about the moral bases of the claim that MNEs are responsible for 
exploitation in their supply chains, the question what they are actually required to ensure in terms of 
working conditions, and particularly the question whether MNEs have a responsibility for ensuring 
living-wages in their supply chains that I am going to explore in the following. In this sense, I will 
treat the above mentioned public opinion as a moral intuition holding that multinational companies 
are indeed accountable for exploitation in their supply chains, and ask: how (if at all) can this public 
intuition be philosophically justified? 
 7.4.2.2 The moral grounds of MNEs' presumed responsibility for exploitation in their supply chains 
 
To get an idea of the claims and assumptions that are often made regarding the moral grounds for 
MNEs’ responsibility for wrongs in their supply chains, consider the following exemplary quotation: 
A firm “cannot hire child labor, nor can it promote the practice of hiring children by the 
contractors or suppliers with which it deals. For if the practice is unethical, then to help promote and 
indirectly support the practice is at least indirectly to act unethically. (…) ethics demand that if one 
considers an action wrong, then one cannot consistently claim that encouraging others to perform 
the action  for  one’s benefit is  ethically acceptable“ (De George (1996), 88-89, emphasis added). 
Of course actively promoting and encouraging a wrongful practice is supposedly blameworthy. 
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But the claim is stated in a more careful way in the same quotation: to “help promoting” and 
“indirectly support” a wrongful practice “for one’s benefit” is “at least indirectly to act unethically”. 
To amount to an argument for companies being responsible for wrongs in their supply chains, this 
claim is certainly is in need of quite a number of additional premises. These premises concern 
assumptions about the conditions for the ascription of responsibility. In the quotation above, as in 
many other claims on the matter, these conditions are not made explicit. Also, it is necessary to 
clarify what exactly is meant by the claim that companies are “responsible” for (bad) working 
conditions in their supply chains. Is it that they cause them? That they are to be blamed for them? 
That they have to redress them? 
There is no straightforward answer to this question since, as we saw in chapter 3 . 4 ,  
“responsibility” is a very multifaceted notion. To be able to judge the plausibility of (P2), in the 
following I will apply the findings on responsibility from chapter 3.4.1 and Miller’s connection theory 
of responsibility (chapter 3.4.2) to the context at hand. To be able to do so, we first need to get a 
better understanding of how MNEs interact with their supply chains. 
 
7.4.2.2.1 The interaction of MNEs with their supply chains 
 
 
Let us have a look at those elements of how the MNE interacts with the actors in its supply chains 
which are crucial for our question. We will do so with the example of a fashion brand. The MNE 
places an order, either with a buying agent A or directly with a garment producer B. Brands 
specify the quality of the ingredients used by B, but they do not have direct contracts with textile 
producers C or fiber producers D (usually only B has contact with C, and only C with D). When placing 
an order, a purchasing contract determines at least four criteria (Humphrey/Schmitz 2001): (P1) 
Product: what shall be produced? (P2) Quantity: how many pieces shall be produced? (P3) Delivery: 
when and how shall the products be delivered? (P4) Standards: what social and environmental 
standards must be complied with? (cf. Starmanns 2011, 197). Additionally (P5) Price: what price will be 
paid under consideration of P1-P4? 
Generally, the lead firm and the supplier agree on a price in a negotiation. Who holds more 
power in this negotiation depends on several factors. Starmanns claims that “a large brand is usually 
in a better bargaining position than the supplier, because the brand can always choose to place the 
order with another company (ibid.). Even if changing the supplier results in additional costs, most 
brands regularly select new suppliers, which has been interpreted as part of a lead firm’s ‘power’ in 
so-called ‘buyer-driven’ chains (Gereffi 1994). However, in some supply chains the supplier rather 
holds the power, because he is much larger than the lead firm” (Starmanns 2011, 197f). 
The latter issue is part of the governance of value chains. To analyze the government of global 
value chains, Gereffi et al. (1994, 2005) developed a Global Value Chain (GVC) framework, 
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distinguishing between different types of governance. Some scholars have argue that  the  GVC  
framework  is  not  well  suited  for  analyzing  problems  related  to  global production since the 
concept of “chains” does not represent the complexity of the actual production processes (Dicken 
et al. 2001; Coe et al. 2008; Hughes et al. 2008; cf. Starmanns 2011). Dicken et al. (2001) suggested 
that the concept of “networks” is more suitable, and accordingly developed a global production 
network (GPN) framework which also includes relationships among producers and various other 
actors who influence production: brands, governments, industry lobby groups, NGOs, consumers, and 
others. 
With this very general picture of the main kinds of interactions between MNEs and their 
supply chains in mind, we will now apply Miller’s connection theory of responsibility to the question of 
MNEs responsibility for wrongs in their supply chains. Our aim in doing so is to establish reasons for 
making  a  judgement  concerning  the remedial responsibility of MNEs for putting them right. In this 
context we will identify the most relevant aspects in terms of the supply chain structure and 
governance regarding the question at hand. In the course of the analysis, we will engage more deeply 
with those aspects of supply chain governance that are relevant for our question.  
7.4.2.2.2 MNE’s responsibility for wrongs in their supply chains 
 
In our analysis we will first try to establish if MNEs are to be considered outcome responsible for the 
wrongs in question. If they are, the additional question is whether they should be seen as 
acting morally blameworthy in this respect, since an affirmative answer would justify judging MNEs 
morally responsible for them. The latter is according to Miller the most powerful moral reason 
to assign remedial responsibility, since “by holding A remedially responsible for P we not only create 
a mechanism for getting P out of that condition but we also help to put right the moral imbalance 
between A and P” (Miller 2007,100). 
 
a) Outcome responsibility 
 
For a justification of the accountability of MNEs for exploitation in their suppliers we have to focus on 
their so-called outcome responsibility for the exploitative transactions. 106 For the identification of 
outcome responsibility we want to know whether a particular agent can be credited or debited with a 
particular outcome O – in our case the exploitation in the context of suppliers’ operations (Miller 
2007, 87). Outcome responsibility is so important for the assignment of accountability because we 
want people to be able to control what benefits and  burdens  they  receive, but  we  also  want  to  
protect  them  against  the  side  effects, intended or unintended, of other people’s actions (Miller 
2007, 89). Accordingly, in case an agent is identified as being outcome responsible for a crime, this 
gives us reason to require him to make compensation or redress to that person. This is clearest if he 
                                                             
106 In what follows I follow Millers (2007) account of the conditions of outcome responsibility. 
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acted morally blameworthy, but can be so even in the absence of moral responsibility – that is if he 
acted morally innocently or even praiseworthy. 
What then are the conditions for someone being outcome responsible for a bad state of 
affairs? According to Miller, the criteria of outcome responsibility are the following: 1. causal 
contribution, 2. control over one's actions, 3. a reasonably foreseeable connection between the action 
and the outcome, and 4. other options for action. 
The first condition is that the agent must in some way have causally contributed to the 
outcome. In this way, outcome responsibility is connected to causal responsibility and its key 
question: why did O occur? It is important to note that “causal contribution” is a much weaker 
condition than causal responsibility would be. Identifying the latter is very tricky since there are 
always several factors contributing to an outcome and it is hardly ever possible to single out a 
particular one as its only cause (Cassee 2008; cf. Hart/Honoré, 1985, ch. 2;). This distinction is 
relevant because the causalities with regard to wrongs  in  supply  chains  are  hazy  for  structural 
reasons. In this sense it can be argued that the most important cause of bad working  conditions  are  
not  MNEs  nor  suppliers,  but  'the  market'  itself.  If the market demands something, e.g. through a 
short term increase in demand, this causes economic actors to require their suppliers to work 
overtime to meet the demand. 
But even in the case of such market-related problematic working conditions, we must 
remember that there is hardly ever one single cause for any event. So even if we take 'the market' 
to be the main cause of market-related poor working conditions, all that is required for the causal-
contribution-condition to hold according to Miller’s concept of outcome responsibility is a causal or 
enabling contribution of some sort for the working conditions in question, which combined with the 
other conditions will suffice for establishing outcome responsibility. 
Let us examine if there is such a causal contribution of MNEs for exploitation in their supply 
chains. What is usually implied in criticisms of MNEs’ actions is that MNEs causally contribute to 
exploitation in their suppliers through their power over the supplier, through which the MNE is in a 
position to basically dictate actions and working conditions to the supplier. To see how much power 
MNEs are often assumed to have, consider the following paradigmatic statement: “The fear that the 
flighty multinationals will once again pull their orders and migrate to more favorable conditions 
underlies everything that takes place in the [freetrade] zones. It makes for an odd dissonance: despite 
the fact that they have no local physical holdings – they don’t own the buildings, land or equipment – 
brands like Nike, the Gap and IBM are omnipresent, invisibly pulling all the strings. They are so 
powerful as buyers that the hands-on involvement owning the factories would entail has come to 
look, from their perspective, like needless micromanagement. And because the actual owners and 
factory managers are completely dependent on their large contracts to make the machines run, 
workers are left in a uniquely weak bargaining position: you can’t sit down and bargain with an order 
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form” (Klein 2010, 226). And further: “If anything, the multinationals have more power over 
production by not owning the factories. Like most committed shoppers, they see no need to 
concern themselves with how their bargains were produced – they simply pounce on them, keeping 
the suppliers on their toes by taking bids from slews of other contractors” (ibid.). 
In cases where the multinational company is the only or main client of a supplier, it is plausible  
to  assume  that  it  has  the  amount  of  power  over  the  supplier  that  Klein’s statements 
assume. 107  In many cases though, sub-contractors fill orders for a variety of MNEs. Besides, in 
some supply chains, export companies (such as the huge Li & Fung in the garment sector) play an 
important role linking MNEs and producers in developing countries by  taking  the  formers’  orders  
and  coordinating  their  implementation  by  the  latter (Starmanns 2010, 10). In such cases, MNEs 
can hardly be seen as having substantial causal influence on the actions of the supplier, so Klein’s 
statement must be qualified. 
However, even in the latter case there are two lines of argument for the claim that MNEs 
make some causal contribution to exploitation in suppliers. The first one concerns the MNE’s 
purchasing policy: Through their purchasing policy with its conditions and requirements for the 
suppliers a company gives strong incentives for one or another course of action. If their only 
requirement is that goods must be produced as cheaply as possible (and we are talking little margins 
since suppliers are in a race to the bottom with other suppliers all over the world), this leads to the 
suppliers getting very low prices for their goods, which forces them to reduce all possible costs – at 
all costs. This will certainly be conducive to bad working conditions. If on the other hand MNEs require 
good working conditions, then suppliers will try to modify them accordingly, since they depend on 
being able to sell to their buyers. The claim that companies can be simply „neutral“ with respect to 
conditions in their supply chains is therefore implausible: at least through their purchasing policy 
MNEs can be seen as causally contributing to bad or good conditions in their supply chains. 
Second, certain specific requirements might be seen to causally contribute to exploitative 
practices. For example, if the multinational company requires high volume short term extra 
production, the supplier will have to let his employees work overtime to fulfil the requirement. 
Third, it amounts to a causal contribution to exploitation to buy from an exploitative supplier 
since it contributes to the businesses being profitable, and thereby to their being able to continue 
their exploitative practices. The bigger the orders, the bigger the contribution.  Note  however that  
in  this  case  we  need to  distinguish  between cases  of harmful exploitation and beneficial 
exploitation. In the former case, the contribution is certainly to an unacceptable moral wrong. In the 
latter case, as we saw earlier, this is not as straightforward: contributing to the business being 
profitable could also be interpreted as contributing to the employees of the supplier having jobs at 
all instead of no jobs. How we judge this depends on our assessment of the MNEs possibility to 
                                                             
107 Such chains in which buyers have a lot of power over suppliers are called buyer-driven (Gereffi/Humphry et al. 
2001). 
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enforce fair wages in their suppliers, which in turn depends on their power over the supplier (see 
above). 
Let me turn to Miller's second condition for outcome responsibility, which is that the agent 
has control (in the relevant sense) over his actions, which implies genuine agency. This condition 
excludes among others cases of mental derangement, manipulation, and coercion. With  regard  to  
our  question,  mental  derangement as  an  excusing  factor  is  out  of  the question since we deal 
with a corporation, not a person. Manipulation is not something that we see as a ground for the 
normal dealings of a company either, and neither is coercion. The question in how far the actions of 
companies should be seen as 'coerced' by the inherent necessities of the market was discussed in 
the last section already. I argued there that companies in most cases should not be seen as genuinely 
“coerced” into actions leading to poor working conditions by the market, and if this is correct, the 
control-over-one's-actions condition is fulfilled. 
The third condition is that there is a reasonably foreseeable connection between the action 
and the outcome – or more precisely, that a reasonable person would have foreseen the negative 
consequences of the action, given the circumstances (ibid., 96). 108 This doesn't require that the 
outcome is produced intentionally – one can be outcome responsible for bad  outcomes of 
negligent actions  as  well: when I  pick up  a fragile  figurine  “I can  be expected to foresee that 
unless I handle it with care, there is a danger that it will break. Handling it roughly is an action of 
mine that with some probability will produce the result that does occur, so when the figurine 
smashes the responsibility and the costs fall to me” (ibid., 88). 
When  applying  this  condition  to  our  question  we  have  to  ask  if  MNEs  could 
reasonably foresee, or know about, the negative effect some of their causal contributions have for 
the conditions in their supply chains. Considering the high levels of monitoring in suppliers with close 
connections to the MNEs, the latter must be assumed to know in many cases about the exploitation 
in their suppliers, and they can be expected to make the connection to certain requirements and 
actions of theirs. Even in cases where there are no close ties between supplier and MNE, in many 
cases it is nowadays well known that the mainstream commodity production implies weighty moral 
wrongs, such as for example in the case of cocoa production in the Ivory Coast where child slavery is 
known to be extremely widespread (see e.g. Manzo 2005). Of course MNEs know that buying such 
commodities contributes to the profitability of criminal businesses and thereby supports the 
continuation of the wrongs. It seems plausible then to claim that MNEs should be considered at the 
very least negligent with regard to the risk of contributing to bad working conditions and exploitation 
in their supply chains, which suffices for the condition of reasonable foresight to be fulfilled. 
The fourth condition for the ascription of outcome responsibility is that the agent must 
have had other options open to him and could have acted in a way to avoid the bad outcome (Miller 
                                                             
108 Here Miller follows Ripstein 1999, ch. 4. 
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2007, 95). I take this again to be the point that was discussed before. I argued that  although  the  
problem  of  the  comparative  disadvantage of  businesses  with higher social (and ecological) 
standards  is to be taken serious and solutions have to be found,  it  isn't  a  convincing  argument 
for the  claim  that  the  condition  of  'having  other options'  is  not  fulfilled.  This would  only  be  
so  if  company  action  were  inescapably determined by the market – which is obviously wrong. To 
the contrary, highly profitable multinational companies do have a certain action range open to them, 
even under the presumption that they have to try to stay in the market. There are, among other 
options, always several possible ways to internally cut costs, an obvious example being to reduce 
executive perks. In the case of market supply chain links, the claim that as isolated actors MNEs 
don't have the option not to contribute to wrongs in the production is equally misleading: they have 
the possibility to either buy commodities from socially certified production (e.g. Fair Trade-labelled) 
and/or to seriously engage in collective action with other buyers, governments, NGO's etc. to solve 
the problem. This suggests that the condition of other options is fulfilled in the relevant sense. 
Summing  up  this  short  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  outcome  responsibility  with regard 
to MNEs and exploitation in their suppliers firms, we have reason to conclude that the outcome 
responsibility of MNEs is strongest in the case of MNEs in a strong power position in relation to their 
supplier. This seems to be the setting most people claiming that multinational companies are 
(outcome) responsible for exploitation in their supply chains have in mind (cf. e.g. Nichols/Opal 
2005). In the case of MNEs in weak power positions in relation to their supplier, the outcome 
responsibility of supplier firms themselves weighs much heavier than is often assumed, and should 
clearly be in the focus of remedial justice. However, even in these cases MNEs seem to carry a certain 
outcome responsibility for the exploitative working conditions. 
That MNEs are generally to be seen as outcome (co-)responsible for bad conditions in their 
supply chains is a weighty reason for assigning them some remedial responsibility for them. In a next 
step we will consider if they should also be judged morally responsible for them. If so, they would 
fulfil the probably strongest condition for the ascription of remedial responsibility. 
 
b) Moral responsibility 
 
For an agent to be morally responsible for something, the first condition is that he “must have 
acted in a way that displays moral fault: he must have deprived P deliberately or recklessly, or he 
must have failed to provide for P despite having a pre-existing obligation to do so.” (Miller 2007, 
100). This excludes cases where someone acts morally innocently or praiseworthy but produces a 
bad outcome nevertheless – an example would be the case where an agent is rushing someone 
else to the hospital and damages another’s car in the course (ibid., 90). 
With regard to bad conditions in the supply chains of MNE’s we accordingly have to ask  if  
MNE’s  fulfil  the  condition  of  having  acted  in  ways  that  display  moral  fault.  An important reason 
for claiming that this is indeed so is given when they must be assumed to know about the wrongs in 
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their supply chains and still go on contributing to them. This certainly applies where the production of 
some commodities is well known to imply weighty moral wrongs. 
Turning a blind eye on bad working conditions in their suppliers while contributing to them 
should, or so I would argue, be seen as a conscious decision to let them go on, which is certainly not 
to be considered “morally innocent” but rather blameworthy. In combination with additional 
connections (which are considered below), this probably puts a substantive degree of moral 
responsibility on the multinational company. 
Could we argue that MNE’s are morally required to make sure they know that there are no 
bad working conditions in their suppliers (as opposed to the cases where they happen to know about 
bad conditions)? This would amount to claiming that MNE’s have prospective responsibilities with 
regard to the working conditions of the people in their supply chains. I think this is plausible, but the 
argument for this claim must be put off until we have looked at the remaining conditions for 
remedial responsibility. 
 
c) Profiting from wrong or injustice 
 
The claim that people and companies have a duty not to profit from previous wrong or injustice is 
often brought forward when MNEs are blamed for exploitation and wrongs in their supply chains. 
In this context, Pogge for example argues that we all have “a negative duty not to … profit from the 
unjust impoverishment of others” (Pogge 2002, 197, my emphasis). In their paper Anwander/Bleisch 
(2007) argue that profiting from injustice or wrong per se, that is, independently of causal 
contributions, is morally relevant (ibid.). It seems that the intuition that profiting from injustice or 
wrong is blameworthy is widely shared (see e.g. Anwander/Bleisch 2007, 182). 
So, what are the moral bases for the claim that profiting from a wrong conducted by 
somebody else makes the profiting party blameworthy and/or puts some kind of responsibility on 
him? 
This  question  is  much  more  difficult  to  answer  than  we  usually  assume.  Our 
psychological unease and moral intuition with regard to profiting from wrong seems to suggest that 
there is something like a “contagion with the wrong” to the profiting party (e.g. Green 2002, 
Anwander/Bleisch 2007, 183). Although I believe this is a good formulation of our common intuition 
regarding the matter, it is unclear what this is supposed to mean in concrete ethical terms. How 
then could this claim be formulated more concretely, and how could it be justified? 
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Profiting from wrong and special responsibility to remedy 
 
 
A second perspective on profiting from wrong is that it generates a responsibility to remedy the 
wrongs in question.  The idea that those who  profit  from  injustices  should  also participate in 
measures to overcome these injustices seems to be widely accepted. In this sense, the following 
statement from Gosepath seems to be intuitively appealing: “Responsible for remedying of a wrong 
(…) are (…) primarily those who cause, support, or profit from them” (Gosepath 2006, 398, cited in: 
Anwander/Bleisch 2007, 184f). As we saw in chapter 3.4.2, Miller equally counts benefiting from 
wrong  as  a  condition  that  can  generate  remedial responsibility for the wrong in question. The idea 
is obviously that profiting from wrong is in some way a morally relevant form of involvement in the 
injustice. But how can this claim be justified? 
The most promising line of argument seems to be that profiting from wrong leads to unjust 
enrichment, which leads to the duty to restitute the unrightful gains. According to David Miller 
(2010) for example, in cases of benefiting from wrong the agent „has been unjustly enriched by the 
train of events that led to P's being deprived…” (ibid.,103, italics added), and this requires the 
profiting party to rectify the situation. 
The central idea of the concept of unjust enrichment, which is relevant in both the Anglo-
Saxon and continental judicial order, is that someone who has profited to the detriment of someone 
else is obliged to hand over the profits if the latter is based on an injustice or wrong or if there is 
no legal basis for that profit – even if the one who profited did not commit any injustice himself 
(Anwander/Bleisch 2007, 186, FN 31; cf. Brooks 1989, 36; Birks 2001 and 2005). To exemplify this, 
consider the case where A makes a gift of a bicycle to B which he has stolen from C. In this case, 
since B’s gain is based on an injustice it constitutes an unjust enrichment. Even if B has not committed 
an injustice herself she has an obligation  to  return  the  bicycle  to  C,  its  righteous  owner. The 
example shows what  is required in cases of unjust enrichment: the good has to be returned to the 
one who suffered the injustice (Anwander/Bleisch 2007, 187). It is important to note that the duty to 
remedy the injustice is not based on the blameworthiness of B, nor is it to be understood in the 
sense of a punishment to B. Rather, B merely has a duty to contribute to remedying the wrong that 
was done to C so that C is not worse off than she would have been without the injustice (ibid., 187). 
If however B made an extra profit from the bicycle (e.g. by renting it to others) C would not 
have a claim to this profit since it had nothing to do directly with the injustice that happened to C (ibid., 
188). 
When trying to apply this perspective to the case of MNEs profiting from wrongs or injustice 
in their supply chains, there are at least two things that might make the analogy problematic: First, 
in our case there are no tangible goods that could be restituted – what is at issue rather economic 
advantages.  Second, it is questionable if the profits actually happen directly to the detriment of the 
workers in the supply chains of the MNEs (ibid.,189). 
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Regarding the former problem, it seems not a problem per se that restitution in our context 
would not be in tangible goods but in monetary (or other) terms. Of course the exact amount required 
for restitution might be hard to determine, but that is not a fundamental argument against that 
claim. And even the second problem doesn’t seem fundamental since what is at issue is simply the 
following: as long as the ones primarily responsible for the injustices don’t remedy them, the profits 
that were made on the basis of these injustices should be used to do so. This serves a just 
distribution of the costs for remedying the wrongs, since the profiteers are not required to make 
special sacrifices but merely to forego the profits which they have no claim to (ibid., 190). 109   The 
main point in this argumentation is that people (and companies, organizations, etc.) don’t have a 
claim to profits that are based on injustices or wrongs, even if they are not outcome responsible for 
the wrongs. Anwander/Bleisch call the relevant duties of justice  restitutive duties (ibid., 192). 
These duties fall neither in the category of negative nor positive duties but in an extra category. 
Again, they require that unjust profits one has no claim to are given back to the victims of the 
injustice or used for remedying the injustice in question. 
According to this line of argument, insofar as the profits of MNEs can be said to be at least 
partially based on wrongs in their supply chains and thus to constitute unjust enrichment they have 
such restitutive duties towards the victims of these wrongs in their supply chains. 
But this argumentation is problematic or at least incomplete. Consider the following example: 
A and B both apply for the same job, and then A gets beaten up by a thug (an event which B had 
nothing to do with) and stays injured. As a consequence, B gets the job. Would we be justified for 
putting moral blame on B since he “has been unjustly enriched by the train of events that led to 
P’s being deprived”? And would we think that he has a moral duty to remedy the wrong in question? 
This certainly seems counterintuitive, and upon consideration unjustified, since B didn’t contribute in 
any way to the wrong, couldn’t have prevented it and actually didn’t do anything wrong at all. He 
simply happened to be the beneficiary of the unfortunate event that befell P. The only thing we could 
reasonably blame B for would be if he felt happy about A’s misfortune that contributed to his own 
good fortune. From the perspective of virtue ethics, we would consider these feelings a sign of 
bad moral character. However, above this they would certainly not be considered a reason for 
putting remedial responsibility on B. 
Let’s look at the particular case of moral wrongs in the supply chains of MNEs, and how they 
are related to the example above. In what sense could MNEs be said to be profiting from 
wrongs in their supply chain? Generally, if the wrongs reduce the production costs of the supplier 
and lead to him being able to offer a cheaper price to the MNE, the latter makes a higher profit 
than it would without the wrongs occurring, and can in this sense be said to profit from the 
                                                             
109 This argument could also be applied to the question of the duties consumers have towards workers in the global 
supply chains of the products they buy: they could accordingly be said to have a duty of justice (as opposed to 
fairness) to use their gains from wrongs done to these workers to remedy the injustices done to them. 
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wrongs done to the workers in their supply chains. However, as we said, mere profiting from the 
wrongs is not enough to make them morally blameworthy. But in our case, there is more, because 
the wrongs in the supply chains and the MNEs’ profit are potentially negatively related: the worse 
the conditions in the supply chains and the cheaper the price the suppliers can accordingly offer, the 
higher the company’s end margin and profit. Seeing that companies (or rather their shareholders) are 
commonly  interested  in  making  as  much  profit  as  possible  this  negative  relation  is 
interpreted as implying that they (or the shareholders) must accordingly be happy about the wrongs 
since they lead to a bigger profit for themselves – and that, as a consequence, they have an interest 
in keeping the wrongs happening. It is this interpretation that turns the companies into profiteers 
from wrongs – a notion with a strong negative connotation that implies the deliberate choice for (or 
acceptance of) the wrongs in the supply chains for the sake of maximum profit. If that picture were 
correct, this would of course be highly blameworthy in terms of virtue ethics. The assumption is of 
course hard to proof. 
From what has been said, I take it that the fact that someone indirectly benefits or profits 
from a wrong per se is not a sufficient reason to put moral blame on them, nor is it necessarily a 
reason for assigning a duty to remedy the wrongs in question. However, in situations where the 
benefitting from wrong is structurally connected to outcome responsibility and moral responsibility, I 
take it that it is plausible to count it as an additional reason for morally blaming and for assigning 
remedial responsibility to an actor. This applies to MNEs as well. 
 
d) Capacity to remedy 
 
 
The fourth kind of connection that grounds remedial responsibility according to Miller is capacity to 
remedy. This concerns the capability of actors to remedy the bad situation in question. Relevant in 
this respect are both the effectiveness of the help and the cost for different potential agents: the 
agent who could help most effectively and at minimal cost has the highest capacity to remedy. 
I take it that in cases where moral or outcome responsibility can be identified, remedial 
responsibility will fall on the respective agents first. But if they don’t have the capacity or means 
for bringing relieve, there is not much sense in assigning them the responsibility to do so. Accordingly, 
in the mentioned case responsibility is considered to shift to other agents who can bring relieve 
effectively and at little cost. If there are several potential agents, responsibility might be divided 
between them (Miller 2010, 104f). 
For our question if MNEs have remedial responsibilities concerning wrongs in their global 
supply chains, the capacity condition probably means the following: the higher the control and 
influence over the suppliers, the  higher the MNE’s capacity to  remedy the wrongs in their supply 
chains. Here again much depends on the size of the MNEs orders to a particular supplier as compared 
to his overall capacity. A company only filling 1% of a factory’s capacity will have severe difficulties to 
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improve the workers’ situation, whereas a company that fills 90% of a factory’s capacity will have a 
large influence on the supplier (Starmanns 2011, 207). In cases in between these two extremes, 
suppliers might have other possibilities to improve the situation of the workers, e.g. through 
searching a dialogue with the suppliers, or through striving for industry wide regulations. The claim 
that they cannot influence the suppliers and therefore cannot be assigned any remedial responsibility 
could only be taken seriously after such possibilities have been intensely pursued and proved to fail. 7.4.2.3 Conclusions on (P2) 
 
We can now sum up what has been said so far on the fulfilment of the conditions of remedial 
responsibility for the case of bad working conditions in the supply chains of MNE’s. As we have seen, 
the analysis gives us weighty reasons in many cases for judging the MNE’s remedially co-responsible 
for them: they are often co-outcome responsible for bad working conditions and low wages; they are 
in many cases morally responsible for them since they knowingly go on contributing to them; and 
they have the capacity to change things for the better in many cases. Granted this is right, what 
form should that remedial responsibility take? 
In  certain  cases  it  could  mean  that  the  MNE’s,  possibly  together  with  the  co- 
responsible supplier businesses, have to compensate the people who suffered the wrongs. But as I 
see it, remedial responsibility in our context primarily has implications for the prospective 
responsibility of MNE’s. The connection between remedial responsibility and prospective 
responsibility with regard to bad conditions in the supply chains of MNE’s is the following: when 
structural matters put an agent (in our case, an MNE) in a position where he is to be judged 
constantly remedially (co-)responsible for a certain on-going bad state of affairs, his remedial 
responsibility gets a prospective dimension, namely the preventive obligation to changing this 
situation such that the respective state of affair is sustainably put right. 
This argument interestingly takes a different route than we originally expected: We said at 
the outset that if we could show that MNEs are prospectively responsible for wrongs in their supply 
chains we could consider them outcome responsible in case such wrongs happen. Now however we 
argued that in cases where MNEs are judged to be structurally remedially responsible for such 
wrongs they acquire a prospective responsibility for preventing them. 
Assuming that our argument is plausible, what form should this prospective responsibility of 
MNEs for avoiding exploitation in their supply chains take? There are mainly three practices are 
relevant in this respect: 
A)  Legislative governance (Starmanns 2010, 15): Codes of Conducts (CoC): Most brands define 
certain working standards in their CoCs, which are quite standardized nowadays regarding 
their minimal requirements: most require national law and the core ILO norms to be 
adhered to. Above that some brands require that living wages be paid. In the CoC lead firms 
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also specify which stages of production processes must comply with the required standards 
(i.e. only direct suppliers, or also subcontractors and producers further away from the lead 
firm) (Starmanns 2011, 199). 
B)  Judicative governance (Starmanns 2010, 15):  Audits: most lead firms control if their 
suppliers comply with the CoC. However, while being expensive, audits as such do not lead 
to improvements for the workers. The important question is what happens when standards 
are fond to be unfulfilled in the audit, which leads us to C). 
C)  Executive   governance   (Starmanns   2010,   15):   Support   for   improving   working 
conditions:   Some   brands   support   their   suppliers   in   improving   their   working 
conditions. However, “these practices differ very much and so does the time and efforts to 
implement standards. For example, few companies try to adapt their purchasing policies to 
the extent that prices do not conflict with the demands of implementing working standards” 
(Starmanns 2011, 200). 
 
In terms of tools for the implementation of social standards, probably the most popular strategy 
is currently voluntary Multistakeholder-Initiatives or Governance-Networks that approach the 
problems by involving stakeholders within specific industries to define, audit and improve 
social standards (like e.g. in the garment industry the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF), Ethical Trade 
Initiative (ETI), Business for Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) etc.110) (Utting 2002, Starmanns 
2010). 
 
7.4.3 (P3) Being Responsible for Exploitative Transactions is a Sufficient Condition for MNEs 
Engaging in Unfair Trade 
 
Finally, how should we judge the premise that responsibility for exploitative transactions in one’s 
supply chains is a sufficient condition for being engaging in unfair trade? 
Let  us  start  with  a  general  moral  understanding  of  “unfair”  as  “unethical”.  We defined 
ethical trade as being trade in the context of which no moral rights are violated. We argued that 
harmful-nonconsensual exploitation implies right violations, so harmful- nonconsensual exploitative 
transactions in the supply chains of MNEs are an instance of unethical trade. If MNEs are co-
responsible for harmful-nonconsensual exploitative transactions in their supply chains, they should 
accordingly be seen as engaging in unethical trade.  If we consider beneficial-consensual to be a 
rights violation too, the same applies if MNEs are co-responsible for beneficial-consensual 
exploitative transactions in their supply chains. However, we saw that this is more controversial than 
we might have thought. 
What about the version of the premise that claims that responsibility for exploitative 
transactions in an MNE’s supply chains is a sufficient condition for them being guilty of unfair trade in 
                                                             
110 There are over 40 such initiatives by now (Fransen / Kolk 2007). 
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the specific moral sense? Can we construe a plausible version of the argument while understanding 
unfair in the sense of the specific moral fairness concept? 
Since exploitation (even the beneficial-consensual form) implies unfair advantage taking and 
is accordingly unfair, exploitative transactions in the supply chains of MNEs are a clear instance of 
unfair trade. But does it make sense to claim that MNEs are themselves engaging in unfair trade if 
they are co-responsible for exploitative transactions  in  their supply chains? Unfairness as we 
understood it is about disadvantaging others in interactions under certain conditions. As far as I can 
see MNEs don’t disadvantage the actors in their supply chains that they don’t deal with directly, and I 
don’t see how this claim could be plausibly upheld. In this sense I consider premise (P3) only plausible 
in the form of the claim that MNEs are engaged in unethical trade. 
 
7.5. Conclusions on Fair Trade on the Level of the Supply Chains of MNEs 
 
In this chapter I considered three widespread positions on fair trade on the level of the supply 
chains of Multinational Companies: position (h) fair trade on the level of MNEs is trade which duly 
takes into account or equalizes the interests of the workers their supply chains, position ( i) fair trade 
on the level of MNEs is trade that proportionally distributes the burdens and gains of trade 
throughout their supply chains, and finally the position (j) fair trade on the level of MNEs is trade that 
is not involved in exploitation through their supply chains. 
 
Regarding  position  h)  we  argued  that  it  can  be  understood  as  respecting  the interests 
of stakeholders in the process of the transactions via an inclusive kind of a process, or directly in the 
outcome of the transaction via an independent criterion of outcome justice. If the former is at stake, 
this presumably plays out as demanding some sort of deliberative process with regard to determining 
the working conditions, or a demanding understanding of the voluntariness requirement. If we focus 
on the latter, we will need a criterion for deciding what a just distribution of costs and gains amounts 
to in this context. This led us to position n) which proposes just that. 
Regarding position i) we argued that this position is indeed a position on fair trade proper, 
that is, it is based on the specific moral fairness concept, in this case in the form of the standard of 
the proportional distribution of burdens and benefits. We argued that it would in principle be 
possible to construct a rough formula for such a distribution and suggested how this could look. 
However, we argued that supply chains don’t possess the relevant traits to be considered as 
cooperative structures in the relevant sense as to trigger the fairness standard of a proportional 
distribution of burdens and benefits; and that above that, assuming position i) is not advisable 
because it would undermine important functions of the free market. Accordingly we concluded that 
position i) is not plausible. 
Finally, regarding position j) we argued that when focusing on the actions of MNEs, it is 
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plausible as a position on ethical trade, but not as a claim on fair trade proper. We argued that 
harmful-non-consensual exploitative economic transactions are clearly morally unacceptable, and 
that, while the argument is much more complicated in the case of beneficial-consensual exploitation, 
from the perspective of companies offering them they are ethically unacceptable as well. I 
reasoned that beneficial-consensual exploitative transactions are unfair with regard to a combination 
of the procedural and the outcome dimension, and offered an argument on these grounds for the 
claim that living wages are a demand of fair trade in direct economic transactions. Based on the 
application of Miller’s connection theory of responsibility I concluded that MNEs have the prospective 
duty to ensure that there are no moral wrongs in their supply chains, including exploitation, which 
requires minimally that living wages are paid. 
8. Final Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis started from the observation that global trade is attacked from various sides and in many 
different ways as being unfair. On this background, my first aim was to get a deeper understanding of 
what these criticisms considered unfair, what their respective understanding of fair trade was and 
what normative grounds the positions where based on. My second aim was to develop the basics of a 
position of my own with regard to the question what fair trade amounts to, particularly in the supply 
chains of MNEs, and to examine if and how it is justifiable that living wages are a demand of fair trade 
in the supply chains of MNEs. Let me summarize the findings of this thesis regarding these objectives, 
starting with the former, the goal to get a deeper understanding of what the criticisms of global trade 
considered unfair, what their respective understanding of fair trade was and what normative grounds 
the positions where based on 
 I started out with a broad understanding of the term “fair trade” to capture the relevant issues 
in debates on the topic of fair trade, and later on distinguished between positions with regard to their 
ethical foundations. Correspondingly, I classified them into positions on ethical trade, just trade, and 
fair trade in the following way: 1) Ethical trade refers to the actions of trading actors. Its basic 
condition is that trading actors fulfill their perfect moral duties with regard to trade, meaning that 
they don’t violate negative rights in the context of trade, and are not co-responsible for other actors 
violating negative rights either. The extent of trading actors’ duties is defined by the scope of their 
corresponding responsibility.  
2) Just trade refers to trading systems. Its conditions are that the background conditions 
and the distributive outcomes of the trading system are just with regard to the fulfillment of people’s 
stringent moral rights and claims. In this sense, just trade is embedded in the context of whole 
institutional systems and linked to a conception of distributive social justice. With regard to global 
trade, positions on just trade are accordingly related to positions on global justice. Assuming the 
international context is a context of justice in a minimal sense that respects people’s basic moral 
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equality, I take it that for the global background conditions of trade to be considered just, it is at least 
required that people’s basic rights are fulfilled in a sufficientarian sense. 
Additionally, I argued that according  to  my examination  of  the  relation  between  the  
three  dimensions  of justice, if background conditions of trade are just, pure procedural 
justice/fairness in trading interactions is enough for them to qualify as morally legitimate. But if just 
background conditions are absent, procedural conditions must be conceived in a more demanding 
way to ensure people’s basic moral equality is respected, which is what I spelled out in the course of 
the thesis as being about a substantial understanding of voluntariness. Or, I had said, outcomes of 
trade must be judged in their own right in terms of how they satisfy the parties’ substantive claims.  
3) Fair trade: The basic condition of fair trade with regard to the trading system is that the 
rules or terms of trade (background fairness) are fair. In my understanding, for them to be fair 
means that no party is disadvantaged with regard to the rationale of the practice, against a 
presumption of basic equality of the parties, and an ideal of equality of opportunity among them.  
With regard to trade among trading actors, I argued that the main condition of fair trade is a 
procedural  standard, namely that no party is disadvantaged in transactions, with regard to the 
rationale of the practice, against a presumption of basic equality of the parties, and an ideal of 
equality of opportunity among them. This takes background conditions into account in the sense of 
(hypothetically) correcting them so as to enable the equal participation of the disadvantaged parties 
in trade exchanges. Accordingly, as long as background conditions disadvantage some parties in a 
process, fairness requires us to adjust the process in a way that makes up for the disadvantage, or to 
hypothetically “imagine the disadvantage away” when deciding on the outcome. Since just 
background conditions are not given in the current non-ideal situation, to ensure people’s basic moral 
equality is respected, the conditions of fair global trade are more demanding than they would 
otherwise be. With regard to procedural conditions, fairness in trade requires that no advantage is 
taken from other’s being disadvantaged by the background conditions of the interaction, which 
implies correcting for the disadvantage in the trade exchanges itself. Interestingly, although I focused 
on the procedural dimension, my argument regarding the unfairness of exploitation led me 
nevertheless to an outcome related standard for these cases as well, namely that the outcome of 
transactions has to be acceptable in absolute terms. 
In the special case of cooperation, I argued that the additional outcome related fairness 
standard of sharing burdens and benefits proportionally applies and has to be fulfilled for the 
outcomes of the cooperation to qualify as fair, which I called “outcome fairness”. 
Let me summarize the main results of my analysis of the 10 positions on fair trade that I 
examined, categorizing positions with regard to their ethical foundations.  
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1) Ethical trade: The first position on ethical trade is position 1) fair trade is trade that respects 
the claims of future generations, which is advanced by Boda. I said that I take this position to be highly 
plausible and consider the resulting duties to apply to both the actors shaping the global trading 
system as a whole, and for individual trading actors. 
On the level of the trading practices of the supply chains of MNEs, position (h) fair trade on 
the level of MNEs is trade that duly considers the interests of the workers in their supply chains is 
also a position on ethical trade. This position is based on stakeholder theory and comes with its 
merits and problems. It is not per se informative in cases where stakeholder interests clash, such as 
remuneration. 
2) Just trade: Position (b) fair trade is free trade is a position on just trade. A first line of 
argument which I consider plausible holds that free trade is just based on the non-instrumental value 
of liberty, in the sense that it prohibits coercion. The line of argument based on desert fails. A third, 
highly important line of argument holds that free trade is just on utilitarian grounds since it maximizes 
welfare, mediated through efficiency. It holds that free trade is desirable insofar as it leads to growth, 
and insofar as growth is necessary for welfare gains and development. I consider this argument strong, 
but only insofar as actual markets come close to the ideal market of the theory, which is very rarely 
the case. I argued that the measures of the Fairtrade movement that aim at correcting market 
failures are sensible and desirable.  
Position (c) fair trade is trade that serves the worst off is another position on just trade. I 
argued that its plausibility depends entirely on a cosmopolitan position on global justice, which can 
be as minimal though as a sufficientarian one developed by Sen. The latter seems plausible to me, 
although I didn’t argue for it in this thesis. 
On the level of trading policy of states, position (g) fair trade policy balances the legitimate 
claims of citizens and foreigners proportionally which is taken by Risse/Kurjanska is also a position on 
just trade in my terminology. It serves to  judge  the  claims  of  domestic  producers  to 
protectionist measures against the claims of foreign producers. As I argued, it does not, yield a 
general convincing  argument  in  favor  of  protectionist  measures,  stating  that  although  certain 
domestic losers of trade might have a claim to protection, this should be effectuated in ways that do 
not jeopardize efficiency and the according welfare gains, that is, e.g. by social security schemes. 
With regard to individual trading transactions, according to our examination of the relation 
between the three dimensions of justice, if background conditions of trade were just, pure procedural 
fairness in trading interactions would be enough for them to qualify as morally legitimate. But if just 
background conditions are absent, procedural conditions must be conceived in a more demanding 
way to ensure people’s basic moral equality is respected. Assuming the international context is a 
context of justice in a minimal sense that respects people’s basic moral equality, I take it that for 
the background conditions of global trade to be considered just it is at least required that people’s 
basic rights are fulfilled in a sufficientarian sense. 
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3) Fair trade: Position (a) fair trade is trade the rules of which are determined in a fair way, is 
a position based on fairness proper. Strictly speaking, it is not about fair trade but about fair 
negotiation. But the fairness or unfairness of the negotiation process presumably has implications for 
the fairness of the global trade rules which are determined by the outcome of the negotiations. If 
parties cannot participate in the negotiations on equal grounds that ensure them equality of 
opportunity with regard to the aim of the practice, namely finding an agreement based on the 
interests of the parties, the interests of the disadvantaged parties will also be less reflected in the 
outcome of trade negotiations. 
Position (d) fair trade is trade the terms of which are based on reciprocity and impartiality, 
and Position (e) fair trade is trade on a level playing field in terms of harmonized standards can be 
understood as based on the fairness standard of impartiality. However, I argued that impartiality 
without qualification is not plausible as an explication of fairness. Accordingly, position e) cannot be 
defended on the bases of fairness in our understanding, since it would lead to disadvantaging parties 
that are disadvantaged already even more. To be plausible, both positions would have to be 
understood in the sense of requiring qualified impartiality. With regard to position d) this means that 
preferential treatment measures are indeed are requirement of fairness. 
With regard to position e) I take it that the global implementation of high ecological standards 
and higher social standards is a highly plausible demand from the perspective of ethical trade. From 
the perspective of fair trade, as a demand of background fairness in the sense of qualified impartiality 
we need to take into account not only the rules, but also other aspects like the state of technology etc. 
that disadvantage developing country producers compared to others. Fairness as qualified impartiality 
accordingly demands certainly that we don’t simply impose high standards overnight and require 
everybody to comply with them, because this would put developing country producers at a severe 
additional disadvantage, but that we must support developing countries in the process of adjusting to 
these higher ecological and social standards. 
James’ position (f) fair trade is trade the burdens and benefits of which are distributed equally 
is a position on fair trade in the sense of outcome fairness. It focuses on the distributive effects of 
global trade and only correctively redistributes the burdens and benefits of global trade. This is a 
strength of the position because it makes it independent of encompassing conceptions of global 
distributive justice, but it is also a problem because it has problematic implications, among others 
that it differentiates between the losers of global trade and the losers of domestic trade with regard 
to their claim to compensation. 
Position (i) fair trade on the level of MNEs considers it as trade that proportionally distributes 
the burdens and gains of trade throughout their supply chains, is another position based on the 
outcome-focused fairness standard of the proportional distribution of burdens and benefits. I argued 
that it would in principle be possible to construct a rough formula for such a distribution and 
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suggested how this could look. However, I argued that supply chains don’t possess the relevant 
traits to be considered as cooperative structures in the relevant sense as to trigger the fairness 
standard of a proportional distribution of burdens and benefits; and that above that, all things 
considered from a moral perspective assuming position (i) is not advisable because it would 
undermine important functions of the free market and threaten its welfare benefits. 
 
Finally, let me sum up the findings regarding my aim to develop the basics of a position of my 
own with regard to the question what fair trade amounts to, particularly in the supply chains of MNEs, 
and to examine if and how it is justifiable that living wages are a demand of fair trade in the supply 
chains of MNEs. As we just saw, my analysis led me to refuse the position that fair trade in the supply 
chains of MNEs requires a proportional distribution of gains throughout the supply chains. However, 
the discussion of position (j) fair trade on the level of MNEs is trade that is not involved in 
exploitation through their supply chains led to the following findings: position (j) is closely related 
to unfairness proper because exploitation is a paradigmatic case of unfairness. My understanding of 
fairness captures the fact that we don’t consider exploitative transactions in a normative vacuum, but 
that background conditions such as severe poverty that disadvantage some with regard to the 
practice of bargaining  the  terms  of  economic  exchanges,  as  measured  against  basic  equality  
and equality of opportunity, must be included in judgments of fairness. On this basis, I reasoned that 
beneficial-consensual exploitative transactions are unfair with regard to a combination of the 
procedural and the outcome dimension, and I explored arguments on these grounds for the claim 
that living wages are a demand of fair trade in direct economic transactions. I argued that all things 
considered, harmful-non-consensual exploitative economic transactions are clearly morally 
unacceptable and must be prohibited. While the argument is much more complicated in the case of 
beneficial-consensual exploitation, which includes the case of below-subsistence wages, my analysis 
led to me to conclude that from the perspective of companies offering them, beneficial-consensual 
exploitative market transactions are decidedly unfair and accordingly unacceptable.  
As a claim about unfair trade by MNEs themselves, I examined if the conditions of remedial 
responsibility offered by Miller apply and we can thus establish that MNEs are remedially responsible 
for exploitation in their supply chains. I argued that this has to be established in individual cases, and 
mostly depends on the power the MNE has over the relevant suppliers. In this perspective position (j) 
is plausible as a position on ethical trade by MNEs, but not of unfair trade proper because MNEs are 
violating general moral duties and not specific fairness duties. However, the analysis led to a plausible 
argument for MNEs being morally required to ensure living wages being in their supply chains. 
 
The reflections in the context of this thesis have led to a substantial clarification of the 
ethical foundations of positions in debates on global fair trade, but they leave much to be explored 
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in further research. My aim of gaining an understanding of the “big picture” regarding debates on fair 
trade had the unavoidable side-effect that most of the positions on fair trade could not be examined in 
a detailed way. The clarity of controversies on fair trade could definitely be further enhanced by more  
in  detail  examinations  of  the  individual  positions  on  fair  trade.  
Another closely related issue that does not appear in this thesis is the question what demands 
fair trade makes on consumers. As this is a highly important question today, research should focus on 
this question in the future. 
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Appendix: A Short History and Overview of the Social Fair Trade Movement 
 
The forerunners of the current Fair Trade movement are to be found with informal initiatives in the 
1940s and 1950s in the USA. In 1946, Edna Ruth Byler started a grassroots campaign in the United 
States selling handcrafted products from Puerto Rico out of the trunk of her car. Her idea was to 
provide sustainable economic opportunities for artisans in developing countries by creating a market 
for their products. The project was later on to develop into the non-profit fair trade organization 
„Ten thousand villages“ that is still successfully active today. 111In 1949 SERRV International started to 
develop fair trade supply chains as well. The first formal Fair Trade shop opened in the USA in 1958. In 
Europe, the British NGO Oxfam started selling handicrafts of Chinese refugees in their shops in the late 
1950s. In the context of a more general critique versus the Neo-liberal trade policy of the big 
multinational corporations, a movement started to emerge in the 1960s alongside campaigns 
attacking foreign domination and exploitation that were seen to be closely connected. With idols like 
Nelson Mandela, Julius Nyerere and the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in their back, they promoted the 
ideals of the right to independence and self-determination and to equitable access to the world’s 
markets. From the beginning, the Fair Trade movement aimed at turning the attention of 
consumers to the problems caused by conventional trade in the context of the GATT and later WTO 
system and at introducing changes to its rules. 
In 1965, Oxfam created a program called „Helping by Selling“ that sold handicrafts from 
developing countries in its stores and through mail-order. That program was the first of its kind and a 
forerunner of a type of organizations that came to be known as Alternative Trade Organizations 
(ATOs) or later on Fair Trade Organizations. At about the same time, Dutch groups started to sell 
cane sugar with the slogan “By buying cane sugar you give people in poor countries a place in the 
sun of prosperity”. Later on they included handicrafts in  their assortment,  and  in  1967  the  
importing  organization  Fair  Trade  Original  was established in the Netherlands. Two years later 
the principles of Fair Trade were brought to the retail sector by the first „World Shop“. The 
volunteer-run shop sold handicrafts manufactured by poor households to make an additional 
income and bought from them under „fair conditions“.  It  was  so  successful  that  several similar  
shops  soon  went  into business in Western European countries, mainly in the B e n e l u x  region 
and in Germany. The sale of products went alongside with background information on the origin of 
the products, the producers living conditions and the methods of production. Up to now, World- and 
Fair Trade Shops see the awareness building and mobilization of consumers as one of their main 
aims. 
In  the  late  1960s,  NGOs  and  individuals  in  the  developing  countries  themselves started 
to form organizations to support disadvantaged producers, often helped by and always forming links 
to the newly established organizations in Europe and the USA. Their common goal was to work 
                                                             
111 http://www.tenthousandvillages.com/. 
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towards more equity in international trade. Meanwhile, at the second United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Delhi in 1968, the governments of the developing countries 
started emphasizing the need for more equitable trade relations between the developed and the 
developing countries. The slogan “Trade not Aid” that was adopted by the conference was promoting 
a change of perspective away from development aid to focusing on the terms of trade itself. 
The aforementioned alternative or  fair  trade  initiatives  founded  by  large development and 
religious agencies evolved as a response to poverty and disasters in developing countries and were 
mainly concerned with promoting development through the marketing of craft products. 
Consequently, this approach is subsumed under the heading of „development trade“.  Besides  the  
development  trade  there  was  also  a  variant  called „solidarity trade“ in the context of which 
organizations started to import goods from progressive but politically and economically marginalized 
countries in the South. 
In the first three decades, the products traded by Fair Trade Organizations were almost 
solely handicrafts. In 1973, the Dutch organization Fair Trade Original included the first  “fairly  
traded”  coffee  from  cooperatives  of  small  farmers  in  Guatemala  in  their assortment. 
Later on the food range was expanded to include products like cocoa, sugar, tea, nuts, dried 
fruit, rice, spices, wine, fruit juices, etc., while other non-food products, mainly cotton and flowers, 
were added to the Fair Trade assortment. 
Paralelly,  the  volunteers  running  and  working  at  the  World  Shops  in  different countries 
started  to  build  stronger  networks  amongst  themselves.  In 1984, the first European World 
Shops Conference took place. It set the beginning of a closer cooperation between volunteers 
working in World Shops all  over Europe to concert their efforts  in awareness building and the 
marketing of their products. 
To further develop the networking of the Fair Trade movement in the European context, the 
European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) was founded in 1987. It was an association of the 11 largest 
Fair Trade importing organizations in Europe. 
Another decisive step in the history of the Fair Trade movement came about a little later with 
the development of a new means for reaching a broader public: In the same vein as the labels that 
singled out organic products, a Fair Trade label should be set up to single out products that were 
produced and traded respecting Fair Trade conditions. This would give any company the possibility 
to get involved in Fair Trade and open up new distribution channels for Far Trade products trough 
making them stand out on the shelves of organic shops and ordinary supermarkets. In 1988, the “Max 
Havelaar” Fair Trade label was established in The Netherlands. The concept proofed to be successful: 
within a year, coffee with the label had a market share of almost three percent. In the following years, 
similar Fair Trade labelling organizations were established in Europe, the USA and Canada. 
Meanwhile, as the number of Fair Trade organizations continued growing, the need for some 
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kind of global umbrella organization became pressing. In 1989, the International Federation for 
Alternative Trade (IFAT) was founded. It links all levels of Fair Trade organizations: national and 
regional networks, support organizations, importers, retailers, export marketing companies and 
producer cooperatives and associations. In 2008, it had over 300 member organizations in over 60 
countries. In 1994, the American-Canadian Fair Trade Federation (FTF) was created as an association 
of wholesalers, importers and retailers. It links its members to Fair Trade producer cooperatives, 
provides information, resources and networking opportunities. 
In Europe, the networking efforts of the World Shops eventually led to the formal 
establishment of the Network of European World Shops (NEWS!) in 1994. NEWS!, which currently 
consists of around 3.000 World Shops in 15 European countries, coordinates campaigning activities 
and fosters the exchange of information and experiences on their work. In 1996, NEWS! established 
the European World Shops Day that focuses every year on a particular issue related to Fair Trade. 
Two years later, in 1998, FLO, IFAT, NEWS! and EFTA created the informal association FINE, its 
name being composed of the first letters of the four organizations. FINEs goal is to harmonize Fair 
Trade   standards, increase the  efficiency  of  monitoring  systems  and coordinate campaigning. 
Parallely it seemed important for the impact of the Fair Trade movement that political decisions 
makers themselves were approached directly. The fourth and maybe foremost aim of FINE is 
accordingly to lobby for Fair Trade politically. In this field, they profited from the centralized structures 
of the European Union. In 2004, a FINE Advocacy Office was established in Brussels as the lobbying 
organization of the Fair Trade movement. 
As well as with respect to organizations, coordination was urgently needed on the labelling side 
to bring some structure into the diverse labelling initiatives that had sprouted all over the place since 
the Max Havelaar label had been launched. To this end, a worldwide Fairtrade Labelling association 
was set up in 1997. The Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO) sets international standards for Fair 
Trade products, certifies their production and audits their trade according to these standards and 
labels the finished products with their international label. The labelling initiative has proven to be 
successful for the marketing of Fair Trade products in the mainstream business sector, where over 
two-thirds of Fair Trade products are nowadays sold. 
Another effort in the field of awareness raising was the establishment of a World Fair Trade 
Day on May 4, 2002 by IFAT, which had taken up of the idea from the European Fair Trade Day 
launched some years earlier. 
Since more and more organizations declared themselves to do „Fair Trade“ and no control 
mechanisms were in place with respect to organizations, the credibility of the Fair Trade 
movement was in danger to crumble in the eyes of consumers, politicians and the mainstream 
business. To tackle this problem, IFAT devised a monitoring system for Fair Trade organizations. 
In 2004 it launched the Fair Trade Organization Mark (FTO Mark) which identifies IFAT members that 
meet the IFAT standards and the requirements of the monitoring system as registered Fair Trade 
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Organizations. 
Besides these initiatives, in the course of time many national and regional Fair Trade networks 
have been established all over the world. The biggest regional networks are the Association Latino 
Americana de Commercio Justo, the Asia Fair Trade Forum and the Cooperation for Fair Trade in Africa 
(COFTA). 112 
In  2007  another  networking  initiative  was  founded  with  the  Fair  trade  Action Network. 
It is a web-based international grassroots network, which links volunteers from many European 
and North American countries and supports Fair Trade Town initiatives. 
In terms of market share, FT products are on the raise but are far from being a serious 
competition to products from conventional trade. The biggest success story in this respect is 
Switzerland, where FT bananas have a market share of over 50%, flowers over 30% and sugar over 
10%. After the US and UK Switzerland has the highest turnover of FT products in absolute terms 
worldwide (Nicholls/Opal, 169).  Sales of FT products have grown an average of 40% per year since 
2004. 2007 they reached a turnover of 2.3 billion Euros worldwide. 2007 there were 632 Fair Trade-
certified producer organizations in developing countries, representing about 1.5 Mio farmers and 
workers. FLO estimates that with the inclusion of their families about 7.5 Mio people in developing 
countries profit directly from the Fair Trade system. By the end of 2015, there were more than 1.65 
Mio farmers and workers in Fair Trade certified producer organizations.113  
  
                                                             
112 National networks include for example Ecota Fair Trade Forum in Bangladesh, Fair Trade Group Nepal, 
Associated Partners for Fairer Trade Philippines, Fair Trade Forum India, Kenya Federation for Alternative Trade 
(KEFAT), and many more. 
113 http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/en/what-is-fairtrade/facts-and-figures. 
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